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Abstract 
 
 
In 2015, Lesvos a Greek Island located at the North-Eastern edge of the Aegean Sea at the 
borders with Turkey became an important gate for border crossers who were fleeing 
persecution, wars, conflicts, authoritarian regimes and violence. During 2015 over 800,000 
border crossers arrived via the Aegean Sea and Turkey into Greece and out of them 
approximately 500,000 arrived via Lesvos. Lesvos suddenly became the epicentre of what 
is predominantly referred to as the refugee crisis. The overwhelming arrivals of people 
seeking international protection and the mainstream discourses by the media and policy 
makers created a theatrical border spectacle full of suffering, misery and death. Although, 
Greece and Lesvos has been an important gate for unauthorised border crossers since the 
1990s, it was only after the death of Alan Kurdi –a Syrian border crosser child, whose 
body was washed ashore at Turkey’s coast- that shocked and sensitised the public opinion 
and the EU policy makers. Even though policy makers expressed their “deep concerns” for 
the increased death toll of border crossers, in the name of protection of human lives and 
public order enforced a strengthened militarised thanatopolitical border regime. This thesis 
is an ethnographic study which explores the multiple, multilayered border-related harms 
and everyday violence border crossers experience while seeking sanctuary in Europe. 
Having Lesvos as a case study this research aims to document the collateral casualties in 
human cost of the monolithic and cruel EU border regime and the politics of deterrence. 
The rationale of the thesis rests on the idea that violence, abjection, spatial and temporal 
confinements, stuckedness and deaths border crossers experience in Lesvos, and other EU 
countries are neither random, unforeseen, unpreventable “tragic” events nor accidents; they 
are instead an outcome of the continuum of multiple political decisions being enforced in 
time and space since the 1985 Schengen Agreement. By deploying ethnography with auto-
ethnographical evocative narratives in the form of Vignettes this thesis examines the 
continuum of violence in time and space and its harmful long-term impacts upon border 
crossers’ lives. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: An Unforeseen Crisis? 
 
In 2015, images of displaced people making desperate journeys via the Aegean and 
Mediterranean Sea dominated the news and the social media. The mass and social media 
bombarded audiences with images of overcrowded dinghies floating, capsizing or sinking, 
and of rescues carried out by volunteers and humanitarian organisations. The massive 
border crossings, the misery, suffering, screams, and even deaths at Lesvos, the North-
Eastern edge of the European border, were reduced to a “theatrical spectacle” (Gillespie, 
2018, p. 150). The Aegean -similar to the Mediterranean Sea- became a deadly border 
(Albahari, 2016). Lesvos became the epicentre of the so-called refugee crisis. Over the 
course of 2015, approximately one million border crossers1 reached Europe by sea, via 
Greece and Italy (Clayton & Holland, 2015). Approximately 500,000 border crossers 
reached Europe via Lesvos (Gillespie et al., 2016), an island with a general population in 
2016 of 86,436 people (Hernadez, 2016). In 2018, there were 9,000 border crossers 
indefinitely trapped on Lesvos in limbo (UNHCR, 2018a). 
Border crossings, violence, and the pain, suffering and deaths of people seeking 
international protection on Lesvos remain intense, enduring and traumatic lived experiences 
for me which still haunt me in my dreams as nightmares. I lived and worked for various 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) on Lesvos Island by supporting border crossers, 
survivors of torture, violence and trafficking including unaccompanied minors for more 
than a decade. This support, in the language of my profession, is commonly framed as 
“social work”. Parallel to social work, I have been politically involved in local activist 
movements supporting border crossers. In 2008 I traversed the threshold of Pagani 
detention centre for border crossers on Lesvos in order to provide social support to people 
who were reaching Lesvos (Iliadou, 2012). Naively, during that period, I thought that 
Pagani, termed as a “reception centre”, although in practice was a place of detention, was 
the worst space in Greece. I was wrong. Through the passage of time and accompanying 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this thesis I adopt the term “border crossers” instead of the legal and bureaucratised terms 
“refugees”, “asylum seekers” and “irregular migrants”. The border regime and borders produce border 
controls, visas and passports, “legal” or “illegal” mobilities, bureaucratic and legal classifications of people 
as migrants, refugees or asylum seekers. This thesis resists these terms. In doing so I am morally and 
politically engaging with grassroots movements, which condemn the violent border regime and its fatal 
consequences by emphasising the fact that the actual problem is the borders and not the people who cross 
them.  
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otherwise unaccompanied minors from detention centres to reception facilities, I had access 
to various “reception” centres within the Greek mainland. I thus observed, lived and served 
as an eyewitness (Ellis, Adams, & Bochner, 2011) of what Andriani Fili calls the “detention 
continuum” (2016), as well as the insult and violation of human dignity. Reception centres 
within the Greek mainland and Lesvos before the refugee crisis era had systematically been 
condemned for the appalling, inhuman and degrading living conditions and for human 
rights’ abuses (Amnesty International, 2010, 2012a, Carr, 2012, 2015). Pagani was 
condemned as the worst detention centre in Europe during 2009, and as “worse than 
Dante’s inferno” (Carr, 2015, p. 94; Sarantidis, 2018b). The living conditions there were so 
appalling that the European Court of Human Rights ruled that they “violated the very 
meaning of human dignity” (2011). In 2010, Frontex’s Deputy Executive Director 
described Greece as the “hottest area of illegal immigration in Europe” (Carr, 2015, p. 88). 
Evros River, the natural border between Turkey and Northern Greece, became an enormous 
graveyard for hundreds of border crossers. This period was also framed as a “humanitarian 
crisis” (Pro Asyl, 2014). 
 
Greece has been a major entry point for border crossers since the 1990s, when hundreds of 
thousands of Albanian border crossers arrived in the Greek mainland, in the aftermath of 
the collapse of the pyramid banking system in Albania (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; 
Dalakoglou, 2016). Moreover, from the early 2000s onwards, Greece and particularly 
Lesvos was an important gateway for border-crossers coming from Asian and African 
countries, as documented by academics (Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2013; Iliadou, 2012; 
Lauth Bacas, 2010b) and from Human Rights Organisations (Human Rights Watch, 2012, 
3; Greek Council for Refugees, 2004, p. 6). Between 2000 and 2014, Lesvos and the 
“refugee issue” did not attract as much attention as the refugee crisis of 2015. It was only 
after the death of Alan Kurdi, a three-year-old Syrian refugee child, whose dead body was 
washed ashore upon the coasts of Turkey, that the public opinion and the cold EU 
technocrats were sensitised to the phenomenon which had gradually unfolded since the 
1990s in Lesvos and Greece. Thus, the beginning of the refugee crisis is chronologically 
located in Alan Kurdi’s death who became, in Shahram Khosravi’s words, “an allegory of 
refugeeness” (Khosravi, 2010, p. 73). As Miriam Ticktin argues, “The photo [of Alan 
Kurdi] gave the “migrant crisis” a new face: innocence. It shamed Europe into action” 
(Ticktin, 2016, p. 258).  
In the aftermath of the refugee crisis, the border became the spectacle of death and 
suffering to such an extent that Lesvos Island became suddenly famous. When I moved to 
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the UK in September 2015 to conduct my PhD research on border harms and everyday 
violence border crossers experience on Lesvos, most of the people I spoke to had never 
heard of Lesvos. I remember someone asking me “Lesvos? Where is that? Is it in Malta?” 
However, a few months later Lesvos became so famous that even Skala Sykamias -a small 
fishing village on Lesvos- was announced as the most popular holiday destination from 
AFAR travel magazine, due to the spectacle of border crossing and solidarity of the local 
people (Cosgrove, 2016; economy65, 2017). Lesvos became a popular destination, 
attracting celebrities, volunteers and voluntourists, journalists and academics, NGOs 
(Gillespie, 2018, p. 149), and even profiteers (lesvosnews, 2015). The scale of this 
intervention of various actors, particularly of NGOs, was so enormous that even I, 
throughout the research process, was repeatedly asked by local people, “Are you working 
for an NGO?” By having first-hand lived experiences and bearing witness to multiple 
border crossings, humanitarian crises, sufferings, pain and deaths in time and space, this 
crisis panic (in terms of discourse, intervention and humanitarianism) seemed to me 
incomprehensible from the beginning, whilst mixed feelings of anger and sadness 
overwhelmed me. How can people, the media and particularly the EU and Greek 
policymakers be sensitised only now by the death of a single child? What about the 
thousands of deaths of children, women and men within the Aegean and Mediterranean 
Sea crossroads from 2000 onwards (see Albahari, 2015b, 2016; themigrantsfiles & 
UNITED, n.d.)? How can these border crossings and deaths have been ignored? What 
crisis are they talking about, since the odysseys and tragedies that border crossers 
experience had been unfolding during the previous two decades? How can the EU and 
Greek policymakers speak about crisis by pretending that crisis is a sudden, unforeseen, 
“tragic” event, an “accident” and not an outcome of their political decisions? 
The refugee crisis as a term has been challenged and problematised by scholars (Albahari, 
2016; Collyer & King, 2016; De Genova & Tazzioli, 2016) on the grounds that it has been 
abused in order for EU policymakers to justify and legitimise emergent and exceptional 
measures –“a state of exception” (Agamben, 2005)-  in the name of humanitarianism but at 
the expense of border-crossers’ lives. The refugee crisis language and events which have 
proliferated resulted in particular governmental responses (De Genova & Tazzioli, 2016, p. 
5) and practices. These were manifested via the overwhelming securitisation and 
militarisation of the external EU borders (De Genova & Tazzioli, 2016, p. 10; Vaughan-
Williams, 2015b, p. 24), internalisation and externalisation of the borders as well as a huge 
humanitarian intervention, particularly in Lesvos (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017), enabling 
what Maurizio Albahari frames as, “a moral economy of salvation; a sovereign 
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humanitarianism (...). A way of doing nothing while pretending to fight trafficking and the 
lethality of the border” (2016, p. 278).  
This thesis has several key concerns and areas of focus. 
 
 It addresses the range and multi-layered forms of border harms and everyday 
violence which border crossers experience en route, at, within and beyond the EU 
borders. It deals with how these harms and their impacts upon border crossers 
interact, are layered and unfold (Tombs, 2019) in a continuum within time and 
space, and why to a large extent those harms are rendered invisible.  
 
 This thesis is also concerned with the continuum of institutional violence – the 
genealogy of enforcements and political decisions related to borders and migration 
controls, and their harmful consequences upon border crossers’ lives.  
 
 I also examine the continuum of structural violence in respect to: (i) the 
bureaucratic procedures surrounding the identification, registration and asylum 
procedures; (ii) the degrading reception and living conditions inside detention 
centres, hotspots, and refugee camps, and more broadly inside Lesvos Island.  
 
 Additionally, the thesis explores the EU responses towards the refugee crisis which 
were enforced through the lens of “a state of exception” (Agamben, 2005) and 
deterrence.  
 
 The thesis also interrogates how the processes of naturalisation and normalisation, 
through official discourses and media representation, reduced the refugee crisis and 
border-related deaths into random, unforeseen, unpreventable events, and “tragic 
accidents” by minimising and subjugating the fact that they are all outcomes of 
political decisions.  
 
Having Lesvos as a case study I explore the following research questions. What are the 
forms of border harms and everyday violence border crossers experience at, within and 
beyond the borders? How border crossers’ experience everyday harm and violence on 
Lesvos? Why is not the everyday violence that border crossers experience more widely 
recognised and denounced by local and international observers/citizens/stakeholders? 
How violence and social harm border crossers experience render invisible?  
 [15] 
 
 
The research questions are partly shaped from my first-hand lived experiences for more 
than a decade as a local, activist and professional in detention centres in Greece and 
particularly on Lesvos. As my first-hand experiences indicated, border crossers on the one 
hand were confronted with multiple forms of harms and violence and at the same time they 
were coerced to make unbearable coerced choices (Chapters 4 and 5) -while en route, at, or 
within Europe- in order to secure safety and freedom. Border crossers, having escaped 
from violent contexts, found themselves in precarious, violent, harmful and life-threatening 
conditions, in closed detention centres, hotspots, and/or makeshift camps inside Europe. 
The violence that border crossers experienced mainly takes place quietly, vicariously, 
normally, routinely through bureaucratic, administrative procedures, through protracted 
spatial and temporal “stuckedness” (Hage, 2009b) and waiting, through everyday 
xenophobic violence from local population. Although everyday violence is widespread it 
has become normalised, unnoticeable and, therefore, is not perceived as violence. Hence, 
violence becomes more coercive, an embodied experience and, as Linda Green argues, it 
takes also the shape of a psychological terror, which haunts peoples’ lives by 
penetrating into their dreams as nightmares (Green, 1994, p. 246). 
 
The research questions are further shaped from gaps in the existing literature. The existing 
academic literature which explores the phenomenon of the unauthorised border crossing is 
rich and focuses on a diverse range of issues from various perspectives. Most notably these 
include the following. Securitisation, criminalisation and illegalisation  (Aas & Gundhus, 
2015; Aas, 2005; Aliverti, 2012; Bigo, 2000, 2002, 2006; Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Mary 
Bosworth & Turnbull, 2014); detention and deportation (Bosworth, Hasselberg, & 
Turnbull, 2016; Fekete, 2005; Fili, 2016; Hasselberg, 2016; Khosravi, 2019);  
borders (Albahari, 2015a; Jones, 2016; Khosravi, 2007, 2011, Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, 
2015a; Weber & Pickering, 2011), the autonomy of migration (De Genova, 2017; 
Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2007, 2013), humanitarianism (Fassin, 2011, 2012; Ticktin, 
2016); prevention through deterrence, internalisation and externalisation  Akkerman, 201 ; 
Andersson, 2014a, 2014b; Canning, 2017; De Le n, 2015; Frelick et al., 2016; Hess & 
Kasparek, 2017; Hyndman & Mountz, 2008; Mountz, 2012; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 
2016; Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2014a; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b); bureaucracy, 
structural violence, asylum procedures (Biehl, 2015; Canning, 2017; Griffiths, 2012; 
Gupta, 2012; Rozakou, 2017; Whyte, 2011); temporalities of migration and experiences of 
waiting (Andersson, 2014b; Canning, 2017; Griffiths, 2014; Griffiths et al., 2013; Haas, 
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2017; Hasselberg, 2016; Iliadou, 2012, 2017, 2018; Jefferson et al., 2018; Khosravi, 2018c, 
2018a, 2014; Turnbull, 2016); death and grieving  Délano et al., 2016; Stierl, 2016) .  
The thesis adds empirically to existing literature by critically examining the representation 
of the refugee crisis by policy makers and the mainstream media as a “state of exception” 
(Agamben, 1998). In the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis there is a limited but 
growing academic literature which critically focuses on the refugee crisis and the border 
regime. This focuses on the continuum of policies and political decisions in time and space 
which have shaped the conditions which have fostered the refugee crisis to unfold (De 
Genova & Tazzioli, 2016; Frelick et al., 2016; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Noll, 2015; 
Pallister-Wilkins, 2016; Tazzioli, 2018; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b). But this thesis moves 
further by providing evidences of how the “refugee crisis” discourses were used in order 
violence towards disposable populations to be legitimised and normalised. To date, 
academic literature focusing on the long-term human consequences of this border regime 
and prevention through deterrence politics, which have been strengthened and proliferated 
in the aftermath of the refugee crisis, is limited  Albahari, 2015a; Andersson, 2014a; 
Davies et al., 2017; De Le n, 2015; Jones, 2016; Squire, 2017). Thus, although since 2015 
Greece and particularly Lesvos has attracted much academic attention, there is limited 
academic literature which examines the aforementioned issues on the region. Therefore, 
this thesis also fills a gap in literature which focuses on the region of Greece and Lesvos by 
examining the human consequences of the border regime enforcements and the infliction 
of social harm.  
There is also limited but growing academic literature focusing on the lived experiences of 
time and waiting beyond the refugee camps, which focuses on the temporal and spatial 
confinements beyond the institutional walls of the refugee camp, detention centre, hotspots 
and the lived experiences of border crossers in respect to time and waiting (Jefferson et al., 
2018; Mountz, 2011b, 2012, Tazzioli, 2017, 2018; Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018). But in 
respect of time and waiting as a form of control which underpins the border regime and 
functions as deterrence tool and governance technique of the unauthorised human mobility, 
the academic literature is relatively  limited (Andersson, 2014b; Mezzadra & Neilson, 
2013; Tazzioli, 2018). Therefore this thesis fills a gap by documenting and showing the 
infliction of social harm due to the temporal border regime which has enforced states of 
“stuckedness”  Hage, 2009) and waiting upon border crossers. There is also limited 
academic literature which focuses on experience of time and waiting as a form of state 
violence (Iliadou, 2012, 2017, 2018, 2019). From this angle, the thesis fills a gap in 
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literature by showing that time and prolonged waiting is a tool of control and deterrence 
which inflicts multiple forms of harm upon border crossers. From this angle this thesis has 
argued that time and waiting is a form of state violence. Furthermore, this thesis fills a gap 
in literature by showing that time and waiting is a form of state violence which inflicts 
multiple forms of social harm even in death as well as beyond the moment of death.  
This thesis is also novel theoretically in seeking to draw upon what have tended to be 
treated as distinct theoretical perspectives.  
 
The thesis draws on and adds to a social harm approach (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; 
Pemberton, 2015; Tombs, 2019) which is rooted in critical criminology. The social harm 
approach “overcomes the focus on crime and criminal law” (Tombs, 2019) and focuses 
instead on social harm. It examines various acts, incidents and events which are not 
considered “traditional” crimes, even though they generate harm upon people. 
Furthermore, they are not covered by the criminal law and when they do they are ignored 
or not handled accordingly (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007, p. 12). These non-“traditional” 
crimes can inflict serious and long-term harms, damage and suffering upon people 
throughout their life course, and particularly to those who live at the margins of the society 
(Tombs 2007; Hillyard & Tombs 2007, p.7–14 in Davies et al. 2014, p.246). These forms 
are considered as “non-conventional violence” (Lasslett, 2010; Pantazis & Pemberton, 
2012; Tombs, 2007, 2015) and, hence, can be more coercive and deleterious. The social 
harm approach highlights social and structural factors as (non-conventional) violence, 
often taking the form of the exclusion from the basic human rights (Davies et al., 2014; 
Dorling et al., 2008; Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; Tombs, 2015). According to Simon 
Pemberton social harm approach encompasses “physical”, “mental”, “health”, “relational”, 
and “autonomy” harms (2015, pp. 28–31). Physical and mental health harms refer to harms 
which can inflict death or deteriorate people’s physical and mental health by preventing 
them to “lead an active and successful life” (Doyal and Gough, 1991, p. 59 in Pemberton, 
2015, p. 28).  
 
In this respect a range of physical injuries, accidents, exposure to harmful environmental 
conditions, diseases and conditions which can restrict people in formulating active choices 
inflict death or produce feeling of precariousness, helplessness, and worthlessness are 
considered as harms (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007, p. 17; Pemberton, 2015, pp. 28–29). In 
contradiction to Pemberton’s typology Paddy Hillyard and Steve Tombs refer to “physical” 
and “psychological/emotional” harms. They argue that psychological and emotional harms 
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refer to harms which generate anxiety and depression, (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; 
Pemberton, 2015, p. 29). “Relational” harms come in two forms, “the enforced exclusion 
from social relationships and harms of misrecognition” (Pemberton, 2015, p. 30). The 
exclusion from social relationships can be proved particularly harmful since people cannot 
fulfill ordinary emotional needs. This can inflict feelings of social isolation and loneliness. 
Misrecognition is generated when people are reduced as “others” by the members of the 
dominant culture. Being treated as “others” people experience exclusion, 
misrepresentation, stigmatisation and degradation (Pemberton, 2015, p. 29). Autonomy 
harms are inflicted due to one’s inability of taking control of one’s life, to be active in the 
decision making- process, to actively engage within the labor market. All these features 
affect the self-esteem and self-worth of a person (Pemberton, 2015, pp. 29–30) and can 
produce feelings of worthlessness. “Autonomy” harms are inflicted when people’s 
achievements and contribution in the society is overlooked, misrecognised and 
unrewarded. The typology of harm also encompasses the “financial/economic” (Hillyard & 
Tombs, 2007, p. 17) and “cultural” harms (Copson, 2018; Tombs, 2019). 
“Financial/economic” harms encompass poverty and various forms of property and cash 
loss (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007, p. 17). Cultural harms as a concept is inadequately 
developed and thus there is not a single or unified definition (Copson, 2018, p. 3). Copson 
identifies three types of cultural harm: harms which are inflicted to a culture; by a culture 
and; harms of misrecognition (ibid.). The social harm approach is very helpful in the 
understanding of the lived experiences of border crossers and the range of harm and 
violence they experience within borderlands, buffer zones, isolate and remote thresholds, 
en route to Europe.  
These insights from social harm perspective (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; Pemberton, 2015; 
Tombs, 2019), rooted in critical criminology, are brought together with approaches which 
are concerned with the continuum of institutional and structural violence which are rooted 
in social anthropology, anthropology of structural violence (Farmer, 2004; Scheper-
Hughes & Bourgois, 2004; Scheper-Hughes, 1997) and the genocide studies (Duschinski, 
2010; Green, 1994; Sabo et al., 2014; Scheper-Hughes, 1997). These approaches focus on 
the continuum of institutional and structural violence (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004; 
Scheper-Hughes, 1997) and encompass the ordinary and mundane processes, practices and 
acts of normalisation, routinisation, naturalisation, legitimisation, anonymity and 
bureaucratisation of violence, which render violence misrecognised, unnoticeable, invisible 
and taken for granted (Duschinski, 2010; Green, 1994; Sabo et al., 2014; Scheper-Hughes, 
1997). This literature highlights the fact that violence is not always expressed through its 
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physicality as “violence to the body” (Poulantzas 1978b, p. 29 in Green & Ward, 2009, p. 
116), but rather through its non-physicality, in an indirect and routinised way. This indirect 
and routinised way is not easily identified with the naked eye, and additionally tends to be 
more coercive.  
Further, the social harm and structural violence perspectives are also considered with 
approaches which are concerned with the intersection between time, borders and space 
which are rooted in border studies, human and carceral geography (Donnan, Hurd, & 
Leutloff-Grandits, 2017; Green, 2009; Moran, 2012; Tazzioli, 2018). Those approaches 
highlight the synergy between borders, time and space twofold; (i) through the metaphor of 
the “line” which is related to walls, fences and barriers (Green, 2009); the metaphor of the 
“trace” which is related to the small, invisible and unnoticeable fragments, signs and 
memories of the borders which are left in space (ibid.); through the metaphor of 
“tidemark” which encompass both border lines and traces and which as Sarah Green 
argues “combines space and historical time, and envisages both space and time as being 
lively and contingent”  2009, p.17).  ii) Through the lived experiences of spatial and 
temporal confinements inside and even beyond carceral spaces (Moran, 2012b; Tazzioli, 
2018). A central focus here is on the overlapping temporalities and spatialities which exist 
within carceral spaces and beyond them, and how they affect people in their everyday life 
(ibid.). 
Therefore this thesis fills a gap by showing:  
(i) the range and multitude of social harm border crossers experience and their long-
term consequences; 
(ii) that social harm and is inflicted upon the living and the dead. 
(iii)that institutional and structural violence unfolds as a continuum in (historical, past, 
present) time and space by multiplying and worsening existing harms and 
producing new types of harm;  
(iv) the memories, traces, marks, fragments and tidemarks which the violent and 
harmful borders leave and inflict upon people and places;  
(v) how the spatial and temporal confinements beyond the institutional borders of the 
camp affect people’s lives in the form of a normalised, routinised everyday 
violence;  
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(vi) the silent and quiet processes and circumstances which reduce and dehumanise 
some lives as unworthy and disposable, whose death or killing deems of little 
consequence. 
1.1 Key Concepts 
 
The key concepts which I have developed, introduced and will be discussed in this thesis 
are the following; 
 The concepts of the continuum of institutional and structural violence and 
“everyday violence” which are rooted in social anthropology, genocide studies, 
border studies, human and carceral geography are central and traverse the whole 
thesis. They are particularly discussed in Chapter 3. 
 The “Coerced Choices” concept in relation to “autonomy harms” is introduced, 
analysed and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 “Bureaucratic Deterrence” concept in relation to “bureaucratic violence” and 
deterrence is introduced, analysed and discussed in Chapter 5. 
 “Despair Harms” concept is introduced, analysed and discussed in Chapter 5. 
 The concept of “Violence of Stuckedness and Waiting” as state violence is 
introduced, analysed and discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 The “Spatial and Temporal Confinement beyond Detention and Carceral 
Continuum” concepts are discussed in Chapter 6. 
 “Necroharms” concept in relation to state violence, social death and cultural harms 
is introduced and analysed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 “Thanatoharms” concept in relation to the thanatopolitical border regime is 
introduced and analysed in Chapter 7. 
This thesis moves away from a traditional and rigid PhD structure which establishes the 
existence of a literature review chapter as a norm. This thesis moves away from this 
tradition and adopts a non-conventional structure. In this regard, the analyses of concepts 
and the theoretical discussion will be embedded separately in each chapter. In this way, 
repetition and overlaps between theoretical discussion in the literature review chapter and 
the rest of the thesis will be avoided.  
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1.2 Aims and Objectives 
This is ethnographic research with aspects of autoethnography which seeks to explore 
border harms and the everyday violence border crossers experience en route, at and within 
the EU borders, in Lesvos. Apart from exploring the lived experiences of violence and 
harms within the Moria hotspot and other formal camps of Lesvos, this thesis moves 
beyond the institutional borders of the camp within Lesvos Island and seeks to identify the 
direct and indirect, conventional and non-conventional, every day and mundane forms of 
harm and violence, which kill people slowly, silently and softly. In this respect, the aims 
and objectives of this thesis are the following.  
First, to explore the extent to which the refugee crisis discourse and sequence of events, 
has been deliberately abused by the EU policymakers in order to govern, prevent and deter 
the unauthorised border crosser. In the name of humanitarianism and “state of exception” 
(Agamben, 2005) EU policymakers imposed and legitimised brutal, obscene and violent 
politics, which violate human rights, liberties and cause physical and social death. I aim to 
explore the extent of which these politics are not something new, but they have for long 
time shaped the so-called EU border regime. Having Lesvos as a case study my main aim 
is to explore the extent to which harms, abjection, violence and deaths of border crossers, 
while traversing the various land and sea borders in order to reach Europe, are neither 
accidents nor unpredictable events, which take place as an outcome of the increased 
coerced displacement during the so-called refugee crisis (2015 onwards). On the contrary, 
they are the outcome of the continuum of the fatal and harmful EU policies and political 
decisions being enforced in time (past, present and future) and space for more than two 
decades.  
Second, to explore how in the aftermath of the refugee crisis the EU border regime through 
externalisation and internalisation processes, has worked both at the external and, as the 
Lesvos case shows, the internal EU borders. My main purpose here is to explore how the 
EU border regime and a series of political decisions eventually (re)produced a Kafkaesque 
and structurally violent context with devastating and harmful consequences upon border-
crossers’ lives; (i) at the external border zones through the proliferation and militarisation 
of border controls, bilateral and interstate agreements with authoritarian non-EU countries 
like Turkey and Libya; and (ii) at the internal EU borders through the establishment of a 
Kafkaesque, maze-like, mentally exhausting bureaucratic regime which dominates the 
registration, identification, international protection procedures, detention, deportation and 
the management of deaths.  
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Third, to identify the range of violence and harms border crossers experience beyond the 
institutional walls of the camp. My aim here is to explore the temporal and spatial 
confinements beyond the institutional walls of the camp, the temporal borders and 
temporal controls (Agier, 2013; Tazzioli, 2018) which inflict violence and harms to border 
crossers; more subtle, stealthy and obscene ones. My purpose is to explore the various 
forms of the “carceral continuum” (Foucault, 1975, p. 303) –everyday practices of 
policing, social control, panoptical surveillance and enforcement- beyond the camp inside 
Lesvos Island. In the aftermath of the EU-Turkey Statement and the geographical 
restriction regime, Lesvos has turned into a spatial and temporal confinement. My aim is to 
explore how the “carceral continuum” diffuses beyond detention “in the intimate and 
mundane spaces of the daily life” (Mountz, 2012, p. 83) of border crossers in Lesvos. 
Furthermore, Lesvos has turned into a spatial and temporal confinement where border 
crossers are locked up within “the border of time” (Agier, 2013, p. 23). Here, I aim to show 
the violent synergy between temporal and spatial borders, which confine border crossers 
lives by “stealing” (Khosravi, 2014, 2018b, 2018a), “spending, wasting border crossers’ 
time of their life” (Iliadou, 2017, 2018) through protracted legal limbo, misrecognition of 
achievements, precariousness and exclusion from protection, citizenship and rights.  
Fourth, to explore the synergy of time and waiting as a “border technique” (Mezzadra & 
Neilson, 2013; Tazzioli, 2018) and as an integral feature of the temporal border regime; the 
discipline, regulation, management and governance of the undesirable human mobility 
through time (Tazzioli, 2018; Walters, 2016) and “stuckedness” (Hage, 2009b). Here, I 
focus on the slow-paced bureaucratic procedures which are characterised by temporal 
deadlines, time lags, postpones and cancellations, and which trap border crossers to a 
protracted temporal stuckedness (Jefferson, Turner, & Jensen, 2018; Tazzioli, 2018). My 
aim is to explore the extent to which “the violence of stuckedness and waiting” is a 
deliberate technique being enforced by the EU policy makers in order to; (i) regulate, 
discipline, govern and control the undesirable border crossers; (ii) to mentally exhaust 
them by making their lives unliveable in order to deter them from coming, staying or 
moving further to Europe. Thus, my aim is to explore the extent of which this violent 
synergy between time, waiting and stuckedness is state violence.  
Fifth, to show how and why the multiple forms of harm and violence are avoidable and as 
such they all are manifestations of state violence. 
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 is the Introduction where I also explain the 
aims and objectives, the theoretical framework and the structure of the thesis. In Chapter 2, 
I discuss methodology and provide a detailed account of how I did the research, what 
methods I used and what barriers I confronted during my research. Chapter 3 is an account 
of the continuum of coerced border crossings, violence and harms of the bureaucratic and 
asylum procedures, reception and living conditions in space (Greece and Lesvos) and 
(past) time. This chapter provides a detailed account of the border harms and everyday 
violence border crossers were experiencing in Lesvos and Greece before the so-called 
refugee crisis of 2015. This chapter is pivotal since it focuses on the continuum of violence 
and everyday violence (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004) in time and space. These are 
the main arguments which traverse the whole thesis. This chapter is also based on the 
concept of traces and tidemarks also framed as border crossing monuments in the Vignette 
section. Chapter 4 explores the externalisation, internalisation and deterrent policies and 
how they have been proliferated in the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis. This 
chapter provides an account of the range of harm that EU policies inflict upon border 
crossers in order to make their lives unliveable and deter them from coming, staying or 
moving forward to Northern Europe. Through this lens I move to Chapter 5 which is 
divided into two parts. In Part I, I focus on harms inflicted upon border crossers due to the 
overwhelming bureaucratisation, procedural chaos, inconsistency and uncertainty, 
enduring waiting and queuing, capricious and mentally exhausting registration, 
identification and asylum procedures, which border crossers must live through while living 
in harmful, life threatening, degrading reception and living conditions. Part II, focuses on 
the harmful and structurally violent, degrading living conditions within the Moria hotspot 
that border crossers must endure while waiting to complete various bureaucratic and 
asylum procedures. Chapter 6 addresses the notion of confinement beyond detention and 
the violence of enduring waiting. This chapter focuses on the strategies and technologies of 
confinement, social control and violence outside of the Moria hotspot within Lesvos Island 
which, after the EU-Turkey Statement and the geographical restriction regime, has turned 
into a spatial and temporal confinement and limbo, where instead of walls and iron bars 
there is the deep blue sea. In this chapter I also focus on the temporal border and controls 
which are enforced in order to govern unwanted human mobility through temporality, and I 
emphasise on the dominant feature of temporal controls which is the infliction of 
stuckedness and enduring waiting. Stuckedness and waiting will be analysed as a form of 
state violence. In Chapter 7 I examine the politics of death, deterrence and the governing of 
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the unwanted human mobility through violence, abandonment and death. I provide a 
detailed account of the range of harms inflicted upon border crossers due to the 
thanatopolitical border regime, which I name them as thanatoharms. I then move to discuss 
the necroharms and violence inflicted on border crossers by condemning them to social 
death. I discuss here the abandonment of border crossers to a silent, quiet and protracted 
social death. Finally, Chapter 8 presents my Conclusions, where I summarise and discuss 
the main arguments of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Methodology 
 
 
In this Chapter I will focus on the pathways of inquiry I traversed in order to conduct my 
PhD thesis. In terms of methodology, the research adopts an in depth- qualitative approach 
drawing on ethnography and auto-ethnography methods, thematic, and secondary analysis 
of qualitative data. In terms of epistemology this thesis deploys a constructionist 
epistemology which views knowledge as socially constructed through people’s meaning-
making, and also considers the relationship between knowledge and power (Potter, 2006, 
p. 80). In the following sections I analyse the methods I deployed in order to conduct the 
research and the methodological tools I used in order to collect and analyse my data. I also 
provide a detailed account of the ethical issues and barriers I confronted throughout the 
research process. 
2.1 Pathways of Inquiry: The Research Approach 
Qualitative research and its methodological tools (ethnography, participant observation, 
qualitative interviews) (Bryman, 2016, p. 377, 378) are considered to be the most suitable 
approach, when researching sensitive topics such as border crossers’ lived experiences of 
the multilayered forms of harms in Lesvos. Qualitative research can provide insights not 
easy to attain by other means. According to Denzin and Lincoln a generic definition for 
qualitative research is as follows, 
 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of 
a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices 
transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field 
notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003, p. 4). 
 
Qualitative research is a pathway of inquiry which the researcher traverses in order to 
“understand the world through the eyes of the participants”  Bryman 2016, p. 401) by 
focusing on people’s own meanings, understandings and interpretation of their experience 
and the world (see Bryman 2016, p. 3).  Mason argues that, 
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Through qualitative research we can explore a wide array of dimensions of the social world, 
including the texture and weave of everyday life, the understandings, experiences and 
imaginings or our research participants, the ways that social processes, institution 
discourses or relationships work and the significance of the meanings that they generate 
(Mason, 2002, p. 1). 
 
A combination of mixed methods/multi-method described also by the term “triangulation” 
(Bell, 1999; Bryman, 2016; Denzin, 1970) is also deployed in this research. Based upon 
the fact that “objective reality can never been captured” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 5), 
qualitative research’s multi-method “nature” in practice reflects the anxiety of the 
researcher to reassure and secure the validity of her/his findings. According to Flick 
 2002), “the use of multiple methods or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-
depth understanding of the phenomenon in question” (in Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 5). 
However, Flick notes that triangulation mainly serves as an alternative way of validation. 
In order to analyse and deeply understand the range of social harm border crossers 
experience on Lesvos and also in order to highlight the continuum of violence in time 
(past, present, future) and space I am deploying an ethnographic research approach which 
includes observation and semi-structured interviews. At the same time my research also 
has aspects of auto-ethnography which is mainly deployed through the technique of 
vignettes (see Section 2.6.1), which occupy separate sections in the beginning of each 
chapter. Through vignettes, I am placing myself and my lived experiences -as local, 
activist and aid worker on Lesvos in the past- into the research. 
2.1.1 Ethnography 
Ethnography is a research approach commonly deployed in social anthropological research 
and principally includes the involvement of the researcher in the “social life of those he or 
she studies” (Bryman, 2016, p. 422). According to Jennifer Mason ethnography is “about 
the study of culture (or similar concepts), and is based on an epistemology which says that 
culture can be known through cultural and social settings” (Mason, 2002, p. 55). 
Ethnographers are often described as immersing themselves within the field or social 
setting for an extended period of time (full-scale ethnography). Ethnographic immersion 
into the field or a social setting has been described by Bronislaw Malinowski; in his essay, 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski wrote, “Imagine yourself, suddenly set 
down surrounded by all your gear, alone on a tropical beach close to a native village, while 
the launch or dinghy which has brought you sails away out of sight” (Holmes & Marcus in 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2018, p. 1099). However, not only did Malinowski see the importance 
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of a researcher’s emergence in the field or social setting but he also saw the importance of  
becoming “native”, that is to say to do participant observation by living with the 
informants and experiencing their way of life. The term “going native” is linked with 
Malinowski and has become the origin of field work and field method  in O’ Reilly 2009). 
Although, the idea of “going native” has been challenged as an indication of bias and “loss 
of all objectivity”  in O’ Reilly 2009) as well as an example of a language and attitude 
linked with colonial anthropology  Narayan, 1993, p. 672; O’ Reilly, 2009), emphasis is 
given on the importance of researcher’s first-hand experiences and observations (Atkinson 
et al., 2001, p. 5; Bryman, 2016; Mason, 2002). Furthermore, as Atkinson et al. (2001) 
note, fieldwork apart from observation entails other forms of collecting data by combining 
other forms of interaction. According to Atkinson et al., 
In principle, indeed, the ethnographer may find herself or himself drawing on a very diverse 
repertoire of research techniques – analysing spoken discourse and narratives, collecting 
and interpreting visual materials (including photography, film and video), collecting oral 
history and life history material and so on (2001, p. 5) 
Bryman distinguishes four types of ethnography depending on whether the social setting 
under research is open or closed and consequently if the access to it is easy -and thus the 
role of the researcher overt- or restrain and thus the role of the researcher covert (Bryman, 
2016, p. 425). Mason on the other hand distinguishes the following types of ethnography. 
The “interpretivist approaches” which are based on people, their interpretations, 
perceptions, meanings and understandings, as the primary data source (Mason, 2002, p. 
56). The “biographical, life history and humanist approaches” wherein people and 
specifically their life stories are the primary source of data which according to Mason can 
be told in verbal, documentary or other visual ways (ibid.). The “Conversation analysis and 
discourse analysis” where a central and common feature is the emphasis on talk and text as 
main source of data and not human action (Mason, 2002, p. 57). The “psychoanalytic 
approaches” within which as Mason argues, “People are, therefore, data sources, but the 
methods used – be they interviews or otherwise – have to provide access to the inner or 
unconscious subject” (Mason, 2002, p. 58). Atkinson et al., however, challenge the various 
typologies and categorisations of ethnographic research which are grouping and producing 
generalisations through “lists” because as they argue they can ultimately do more harm 
than good. As Atkinson et al. note, “They can serve useful pedagogical functions, but can 
ultimately do violence to the complexities of research and its historical development” 
(2001, p. 2). 
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2.1.2 Autoethnography 
In their essay Autoethnography: An Overview, Carolyn Ellis, Tony Adams and Arthur 
Bochner define autoethnography as “an approach to research and writing that seeks to 
describe and systematically analyze (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to 
understand cultural experience (ethno)” (in Ellis et al., 2011, p. 273). One key feature, 
which all autoethnographies share is the use of researchers’ personal experiences 
throughout the research process in order to examine and understand the cultural experience 
(Holman Jones, Adams, & Ellis, 2016, p. 22). By using ethnography and personal/ 
autobiographical features autoethnography as a method consists of both a process and 
product (Ellis et al., 2011, p. 273). As Ellis and Adams argue, 
Autoethnography refers to research, writing, stories, and methods that connect the 
autobiographical and personal to the cultural, social, and political. This approach considers 
personal experience as an important source of knowledge in and of itself, as well as a 
source of insight into cultural experience (2014, p. 2). 
 
Autoethnography challenges the notion of “silent authorship”, which practically connotes 
an oxymoron; the “absence presence” of the researcher and researcher’s voice from the 
research process and within the presentation of findings (Denshire, 2014; Holt, 2003). 
Often researcher’s “squeezed presence” only prevails within a short section in a 
methodology chapter. In autoethnography on the contrary, the researcher includes herself 
in her own work. In this sense the researcher becomes a part of, and also data, within the 
research process (Ellis & Adams, 2014; Ellis et al., 2011; Pace, 2012; Wall, 2006). 
Autoethnographies are, after all, “highly personalised accounts that draw upon the 
experience of the author/researcher for the purposes of extending sociological 
understanding” (Custer, 2014; Ellis & Adams, 2014; Pace, 2012; Sparkes, 2000, p. 21 in 
Wall 2006, p.2). Auto-ethnography’s main features are reflection or reflexivity, empathy 
and introspection. Alvesson and Sköldberg in year 2000 distinguish “reflection” from 
“reflexivity” in empirical research although in the foreword of their book they suggest a 
common definition for both. As Alvesson and Sköldberg argue, 
 
Reflection (reflexivity) is thus above all a question of recognising fully the notoriously 
ambivalent relation of a researcher’s text to the realities studied. Reflection means 
interpreting one’s own interpretations, looking at one’s perspectives from other 
perspectives, and turning a self-critical eye onto one’s own authority as interpreter and 
author (2000, p. vii).  
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However, reflexivity, introspection, self-consciousness, empathy are main features of the 
ethnographic research which expands, as Carolyn Ellis argues, in order to include the heart 
along with the autobiographical, and the artistic text. Through this lens ethnography 
becomes a “heartful” autoethnography (Ellis, 1999; Ellis & Patti, 2014). As Ellis and 
Adams argue autoethnography can be deployed with multiple, variable ways 
 
Claiming the conventions of literary writing, autoethnography features concrete action, 
emotion, embodiment, self-consciousness, and introspection portrayed in dialogue, scenes, 
characterization, and plot. Autoethnography can take a variety of forms, including short 
stories, poetry, performance, new media, art, and multivoiced work, such as collaborative 
autoethnography (Chang, Ngunjiri, & Hernandez, 2012), co-constructed narrative (Bochner 
& Ellis, 1995), and collaborative witnessing (Ellis & Rawicki, 2013) (2014, p. 2). 
 
Autoethnography engages with a body of scholarship opposed to the “neutrality” and 
“objectivity” of traditional social research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Ellis, Adams & 
Bochner, 2011; Ellis & Adams, 2014) and which also rejects as Ellis and Adams argue, 
“the idea that ethnographers should hide behind or perpetuate an aura of objectivity and 
innocence”  Ellis & Adams 2014). Autoethnography echoes the “crisis of representation” 
period in social inquiry and raises the problematic issue of “empirical science’s hegemony” 
(Clough, 1998, p. 8 in Denzin & Lincoln 2005, p. 27; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Ellis & 
Adams, 2014, p. 8) and the production and construction of knowledge on behalf of the 
researcher. Bias and social and hierarchical power relations based on class, gender and race 
are more than likely to be produced during the research process. As Richardson puts it, 
Wherever text is being produced, there is the question of what social, power and sexual 
relationships are being reproduced? How does our writing reproduce a system of 
domination and how does it challenge that system? For whom do we speak, and to whom, 
with what voice, to what end, using what criteria? (1998, p. 57).   
 
Autoethnography addresses the issue of ethics of researching and representing others in the 
epicentre, a key feature which emerged in the aftermath of moral violations in traditional 
social sciences scientific fields and the potential exploitation of people being studied (Ellis 
& Adams 2014, p. 9). Questions that emerged have to do with the moral responsibility of 
the researchers towards people and populations they study, and the boundaries within the 
research practice under which the approach of “the end justifies the means” is challenged. 
At the same time, as Ellis and Adams observe, “Concerns about research being an invasive 
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and oppressive colonialist enterprise is directly connected with the ethics of researching 
and representing others”  2014, p. 11).  
 
Autoethnographic and ethnographic approaches focusing on the lived experiences of border 
crossers have been successfully used in previous studies (Khosravi, 2007, 2010, 2017; 
Andersson, 2014; Squire, 2014, 2017; Dutta, 2015; Hasselberg, 2016). In terms of this 
thesis I chose to deploy ethnographic research with aspects of autoethnography and thus to 
explore “subjectivity”, that is to say, as Ellis and Flaherty argue, the “human lived 
experience and the physical, political and historical context of that experience” (1992, p. 1). 
This thesis is not dealing exclusively around my personal stories and lived experiences but 
mainly on the lived experiences and the voices of border crossers -the oppressed, survivors 
and revolting agents of the cruel border regime. My first-hand lived experiences are mainly 
presented in the form of vignettes, which are evocative narratives in the beginning of each 
chapter (see Section 2.6.1). The reason for that is, firstly, in order to provide “illuminate 
nuances” (Ellis & Rawicki, 2013 in Ellis & Adams 2014, p. 12) from my experiences as 
local, activist, and social worker supporting border crossers on Lesvos; and secondly, in 
order to focus on and highlight the lived experiences of border crossers as well as, in Ellis 
and Rawicki’s words, “to honor and respect those being studied and to work alongside and 
with them rather than to invade and do research on them” (Ellis & Rawicki, 2013 in Ellis & 
Adams 2014, p. 12). In this respect in this autoethnography I am exploring and analysing 
border crossers’ lived experiences concerning violence and harm alongside my personal 
lived experiences as; 
 a former human rights worker with various Non-Governmental Organisations at 
Lesvos Island between 2008 and 2013.  
 an activist and politically involved in grassroots and human rights movements at 
Lesvos, between 2008 and 2015, and  
 a student, who returns to the field with the identity of the researcher in order to 
understand and explore the range of social harm inflicted upon border crossers. 
 
Throughout this thesis I deploy autoethnography’s principles “ …) personal experience, 
acknowledging existing research, understanding and critiquing cultural experience, using 
insider knowledge, breaking silence, and maneuvering through pain, confusion, anger, and 
uncertainty” (Ellis & Adams, 2014, p. 49). In this respect, I am not just situating myself 
within the research, but I am introspecting, reflecting and analysing upon my own 
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positionality and various different positionalities within time and space. In this regard, 
emotions, personal thoughts, reflections, prejudices, ethical, political considerations and 
dilemmas will be critically discussed and will challenge the way my presence as a 
researcher, my bias and prejudices can emerge into the field and construct the knowledge 
being produced. That is to say, I recognise “the role of the researcher as part and parcel of 
the construction of knowledge”  Bryman 2016, p. 3  , see also Walls 2006). Furthermore, 
drawing upon “the concept of witnessing” (Khosravi, 2011, p. 6) I am not just locating 
myself within the research process. I serve also as an eyewitness, as one who confirms 
what participants say by testifying what I know from my first-hand experiences as a 
researcher, local, activist and former social worker. As Khosravi argues, “the significance 
of the voice of the witness is that the witness has been there, has seen what happened. 
Witnesses have themselves lived the disaster and might themselves be victims. They can 
retell the story and unfold the event with first-hand authority”  ibid.).  
Between 2008 and 2015, prior to my research I have experienced and witnessed 
multilayered forms of harm and violence due to activism in grassroots movements and 
local networks supporting border crossers on Lesvos as well as due to the aid work in 
detention centres for border crossers in Greece and particularly on Lesvos. During these 
years I have not only witnessed and documented systematic abuses and violations of 
human rights, the pain and suffering of others, and deaths of people seeking international 
protection by the hands of the Greek authorities and more broadly by the proliferating 
border regime. During my work as social worker in Pagani Detention Centre on Lesvos I 
have also been sexually harassed, exposed to verbal violence -in the form of shouting and 
screams- and other forms of symbolic violence and “punishments” by the Greek authorities 
and other staff, which amounted to degrading, humiliating and dehumanising treatment. 
Furthermore, my exposure to violence was continuous even beyond the institutional walls 
of detention and came into being through practices of everyday intimidation and 
permeation in the sphere of my private life. I was watched, stalked and harassed, receiving 
life threats, and photographed without consent in public spaces of Lesvos by the Greek 
authorities. My personal experiences in relation to violence and harm were in many cases 
comparable to many border crossers’ experiences before and throughout the research 
which I analyse in the following chapters. 
2.2. Research Setting: Lesvos Island 
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The case study of my research is Lesvos Island in Greece. Over the last decade Lesvos 
constitutes a main entry point for border crossers, escaping from conflicts, wars, 
authoritarianism and violence in order to seek for sanctuary in Europe. Although, there are 
also other Greek islands, like Samos and Chios, in proximity to Turkey, the vast majority 
of border crossers are arriving to Greece mainly through Lesvos. During 2015, more than 
850,000 border crossers arrived by sea to Greece and approximately 500,000 via Lesvos 
(see Chapter 1). Currently, there are approximately 30,000 border crossers arrived in 
Greece through the Greek islands and (UNHCR updates as with 9 December 2018). 
Whilst, approximately 14,214 people are currently trapped on Lesvos (ibid.) in limbo and 
precariousness inside open access camps, packed into hotspots, police stations or living in 
homelessness and destitution. 
Lesvos is located in the North-Eastern Aegean Sea at the borders with Turkey (see map 
below). It is the third largest island in Greece with a general population of 86,436. The 
capital of Lesvos is the city of Mytilene. During 2015, in the aftermath of the so-called 
refugee crisis, approximately 100 International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) 
arrived, semi-settled and operated at Lesvos, in order to assist to the management of 
migration flows (Skleparis & Armakolas, 2016). At the time of writing, the numbers of 
INGOs which operate at the island have been decreased due to the declining number of 
border crossers arriving. In the aftermath of the refugee crisis, Frontex and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) enhanced their operations in order to prevent 
unauthorised border crossing (NATO, 2016). Greece and Lesvos Island play and will 
continue playing a pivotal role as the external European frontiers, as a manifestation of 
Fortress Europe.   
 
Image 1. Map of Greece and Lesvos (Source: “Lesvos Map/ Google Maps,” n.d. reproduced in Gillespie et 
al., 2016)  
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My research was mainly held in the city of Mytilene. The reason I chose Mytilene is 
because all public services are there, as well as the central Police station, the central 
Coastguard, Frontex’s and Non-Governmental and International Organisations’ offices. 
Furthermore, within Mytilene is the only port which links the island with Athens (the 
capital of Greece) and North Greece. The port of Mytilene is the main exit option from the 
island and a space of control, whereas police officers and coastguard officers are always 
located in order to watch police and control the daily movement of people and goods. 
Therefore, the port of Mytilene is an invisible border in which the vast majority of border 
crossers are gathered, so as to make their travel arrangements, legally and sometimes 
illegally, in front of the eyes of the authorities. Additionally, in the city of Mytilene and the 
surrounding areas one can find the two camps of PIKPA Solidarity and Kara Tepe as well 
as the Moria hotspot. Mytilene’s public sites and squares are spaces of struggle and 
resistance where protests, demonstrations and (hunger) strikes are taking place. They are 
also spaces of socialisation where various social events take place. At the same time, 
Mytilene’s public spaces and squares are places where border crossers socialise, hang 
around and generally wait.  
2.3 Research process 
The research process entailed four main phases. Each phase involved two inseparable 
processes; the process of “entering the field” and “negotiating access” to people and sites.  
I am distinguishing the following phases; 
 A “scoping” phase between 17 October and 31 October 2016 
 A field trip phase between 17 January 2017 and 2 February 2017 
 A second field trip phase between 8 May 2017 and 1 June 2017 
 A ‘Leaving the field’ phase  
Each phase’s main characteristic was a perpetual struggle in gaining access to people and 
sites. I say “struggle” because negotiating access was sometimes easy but at some other 
times was very difficult and painful. This particular issue emerged and re-emerged 
multiple times throughout the research process by highlighting how my “nativeness” itself 
can become a problem, barrier and obstacle in gaining access to people and sites. Within 
this context it also raises the question, “how native a native researcher is” (Narayan, 1993). 
“Negotiating access” and “entering the field” were not accomplished all at once. I 
repeatedly had to proceed in “negotiations” with the same or multiple agents by being in a 
constant and systematic preparation, by contacting people both formally and informally 
before and during each phase and within the whole research process. I confronted multiple 
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barriers, boundaries and invisible borders throughout the research process and during the 
field work to such an extent that I can speak for multiple “enterings” into the field. In this 
sense, there is no strict and clear “research phase typology” which I followed, since within 
each phase there were several different and smaller phases to which I had to adapt. Thus, 
the “research phase typology” I present here is more for methodological clarity and not a 
precise reflection of reality.  
Furthermore, during the research process I spent time doing observation in social events 
and workshops organised by activists and other agents. At the same time, I spent time with 
activists, volunteers, and border crossers from my pre-established network in open access 
camps, social and public spaces. In many instances people from my pre-established 
network served as key informants, since a rapport was already achieved. During the fourth 
phase I left the field after a large amount of data, interviews, field notes, visual data 
(photos and videos), and primary written material had been gathered.  
2.3.1 Entering the field 
In order to carry out the research I initially conducted a scoping journey of two weeks 
duration in Lesvos. During this phase I was more concerned to explore what kinds of data I 
could collect, to identify and approach participants, to identify potential barriers and 
restrictions in gaining access to sites and people in order to think and design alternatives 
which would help me to overcome such barriers. During the scoping phase, I chose to 
approach my informants indirectly and informally, mainly from my pre-established 
network, as I thought it would be easier for them to give me an interview anonymously and 
with no prior approval and involvement from the NGOs’ headquarters. During the scoping 
phase I spent a lot of time conducting participant observation at social events taking place 
in public spaces, protests and demonstrations, collecting visual data (photos and videos). 
From my observations and in-depth field discussions I kept detailed field notes. Data from 
field notes and in-depth field note discussions, and observations is analysed in this thesis. 
From this scoping phase several different sites were identified and chosen to be included in 
the research process, as follows. 
PIKPA Solidarity Lesvos Camp: PIKPA camp is coordinated by activists and volunteers. It 
is an autonomous and self-organised site which mainly hosts families with children and 
border crossers with serious health problems (Solidarity Lesvos, 2018). PIKPA is not a 
space of control and provides sanctuary, social and medical support to people. Because 
PIKPA is not a space of control, people staying there are calmer, relaxed and keen to be 
interviewed. 
 [35] 
 
Mosaic Social Support Centre: Mosaic is coordinated by activists and volunteers. Many of 
Mosaic’s members are also members of PIKPA Solidarity Lesvos Camp. Mosaic is not a 
camp but a social centre which is self-organised and autonomous, whilst its members 
support border crossers through various cultural activities, for instance, free language 
courses, yoga classes, guitar lessons, poetry workshops, social events, screenings, and 
political discussions (Mitsou, 2018). Mosaic hosts the Legal Centre Lesbos -a network of 
lawyers who provide free legal aid to border crossers (Legal Centre Lesbos, n.d.)- as well 
as the lifejacket workshop in which abandoned lifejackets and dinghies are collected and 
recycled into bags (Gillespie, 2018; Solidarity Lesvos, 2018). Mosaic is an open space for 
both border crossers and locals.   
Kara Tepe Camp: Kara Tepe camp is coordinated by the Municipality. It mainly hosts 
families with children and “vulnerable” people. Although, the coordination of the camp is 
in the hands of Lesvos’ municipality, there are also various NGOs which are involved in 
the daily operation of the space. Border crossers move freely inside and outside the camp, 
can walk to the city centre and return to Kara Tepe. Two cantinas are permanently 
operating outside the camp where border crossers hang around and wait. Kara Tepe is not a 
space of control in the narrow sense since it is not a prison. There are no police and people 
move freely in and out of the camp. There are however gatekeepers who monitor by 
allowing or not the access to the site. Furthermore, the camp is surrounded by fences. 
Moria Hotspot: The Moria hotspot is a closed site for some border crossers and an open 
site for others (see Chapters 5 and 6) which currently operates in Lesvos. It is a complex 
space of control where various agents, services and organisations operate; the Police, 
Frontex, the Asylum Service, UNHCR, IOM, various NGOs, public servants, non-
permanent staff, and G4S, a private security company (see Chapter 4). The hotspot is 
located in a former military base where the army has a discreet role and presence. Inside 
Moria hotspot the identification, screening, registration, asylum and various other 
bureaucratic and administrative procedures take place. Additionally, the hotspot includes a 
detention commonly referred as the “Section B” and while some border crossers are 
detained there some others are free to move outside and hang around at the various 
cantinas which operate near the hotspot. 
The Port: The port was an interesting site for observation since throughout the research 
process it operated both as a port and an informal prison for border crossers. Iron bars were 
located in the periphery of the port making the port look like a cage and a closed detention 
centre. Police officers were located there as gatekeepers, whilst a former old navy ship was 
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anchored there and served as a refugee camp accommodating approximately 300 border 
crossers. The port was also a space of daily transactions and arrangements, of hope and 
cancellation (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2) since many border crossers gathered there in 
order to find a way to hid in a truck and board to a ship for Athens. 
Public Spaces, the Streets and Walls: Public spaces, squares, the streets, and coffee shops 
where border crossers, activists, volunteers and NGO staff gathered, worked and were 
generally hanging around were a very important part of my research and a valuable source 
in terms of data collection. Sappho’s Square at the main street of the city of Mytilene is a 
meeting point for local and non-local people. Border crossers gather there and socialise, 
whilst several social events and protests take place there (hunger strikes, protests, 
demonstrations and occupations to social and collective cooking with provision of free 
meal to all people) (see Chapter 6). Public spaces, squares and streets are sites of political 
struggle and resistance. Anti-fascist, anti-racist festivals and protests take place in public 
spaces as well as protests against the “financial crisis”. The walls of the buildings within 
the main streets and sideways of the city of Mytilene were a valuable source of data too. 
Since 2015, the walls within the city centre have been monopolised by numerous colourful 
political slogans, posters, graffiti and street art which altogether form another kind of 
narrative concerning everyday violence, social harm, the refugee crisis and of course the 
normalised financial crisis. At the same time, the walls were narrating and revealing untold 
and unseen aspects of border related harms. As Shahram Khosravi argues, 
What appears on the walls (written, drawn, in the form of a poster or a sticker) are central, 
in Ranciere’s  2010) meaning, to politics since they redistribute the sensible by visibilizing 
the invisible and making the inaudible audible. This politicises the walls, no matter if the 
message is a political slogan, graffiti, or a job notice in the informal sector. Walls hide what 
is behind them but, at the same time, display the unseen (2017, p. 173).  
Important public spaces were, for me, the coasts and beaches surrounding the city centre of 
Mytilene. Coasts and beaches have been gradually transformed into landfills and 
cemeteries of abandoned life jackets, plastic dinghies and other personal belongings of 
border crossers – the refugee waste (Gillespie, 2018, p. 150). These sites and abandoned 
objects are for me hallmarks of the thousands of border crossings and exemplars of violent 
borders and death produced by the border regime (Chapter 4 and 7). Similar to the graffiti 
on the walls, abandoned lifejackets, plastic dinghies and personal belongings revealed 
another aspect and narrative of harm and violence, the most macabre, degrading and 
dehumanised one; human lives as waste, and the wasted lives due to the thanatopolitical 
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border regime (Chapter 7). I also conducted a fieldtrip to the Lifejacket’s Graveyard, 
which is a dump where lifejackets and dinghies are disposed (Gillespie, 2018). 
After scoping and exploring possibilities, barriers and restrictions I continued with the next 
phase of my research which was to negotiate access. This phase was complex and a non-
linear one. 
2.3.2 Negotiating access 
Prior to and throughout the whole research process and phases I traversed both formal and 
informal pathways in order to gain access mainly to International and Non-Governmental 
Organisations, the authorities, other state services and sites. In order to do that, I sent 
Invitation Letters and Consent Forms to INGOs, Frontex, the Mayor’s office to request 
interviewing the Mayor and access to Kara Tepe Camp, the European Asylum Office 
(EASO), the Asylum Service and to the First Reception Centre Service to request access to 
Moria hotspot and an interview with the coordinator (see Appendices). In some cases, I 
contacted state services offices’ and key gatekeepers by phone or in person in order to 
request access. I was mainly advised by them to contact gatekeepers and services by email. 
In most of the cases where the state 
2
 was involved access to people and sites was denied to 
me since my formal requests were ignored with responses still pending. The state was the 
most important gatekeeper within the whole research process along with a few NGOs. In 
some instances, I must admit that I overcame the state’s and other gatekeepers’ power who 
were constantly raising (invisible) borders by preventing me gaining access to sites and 
people due to serendipity and persistence. 
2.3.3 Leaving the field 
I completed a two months fieldwork with in-between “breaks” back to the UK. During the 
“break” periods, I transcribed the data I had collected during each visit. I also undertook an 
initial thematic analysis by identifying emerging issues deriving. By the time I completed 
the final phase of my fieldwork, between 8 May 2017 and 1 June 2017, I had already 
collected 60 in-depth interviews (Section 2.4), 445 photos of graffiti, disposed lifejackets 
and objects at the shores, 35.831 words of field notes and other primary data like 
information leaflets, leaflets and political brochures. Due to the complex and capricious 
nature of the field, the law and policies which surround the phenomenon of the 
unauthorised border crossing in Greece and Lesvos and the plethora of data concerning the 
scale of harm and violence I decided to put an end to the data collection by acknowledging:  
                                                 
2
 Depending on whose jurisdiction, I am referring both to the local authorities and the Greek authorities in general. 
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 the limitations of my research project.  
 the amount and content of the data I had already collected was immense and rich 
and if I would collect more I would not be able to handle and manage it. 
 that I would not be able to handle the emotional risk which is overwhelming when 
one researches sensitive topics. 
2.4 Population of Interest 
Within this research setting the main population of interest is the people who fall into the 
legal (non-) status of the “border crosser”. However, due to the complexity and difficulties 
arising from the sensitive nature of my research and in some instances related to gaining 
access to this population, other agents were also identified, approached and included into 
my research. In this regard, I interviewed people from; (i) International and Non-
Governmental Organisations (INGOs); (ii) Activists and volunteers who advocate and 
support border crossers; (iii) Border crossers; (iv) FRONTEX; (v) The Asylum Service; 
(vi) The Medical Forensic Examiner; (vii) Imams. Recruitment of participants was based 
on their relevance to the research questions that my study aimed to explore (see Bryman, 
2016, p. 408). In order to recruit potential participants I deployed a combination of 
theoretical and snowball sampling. Therefore, participants were border crossers (adult 
women and men), who have moved through Lesvos or were living at Lesvos (mainly in 
Mytilene, the capital of Lesvos), inside detention centers and/or (open access or makeshift) 
camps and/or public sites, waiting to regularize their legal status or to make arrangements 
to continue their journey further into Europe. Thus, participants were identified and 
approached in these sites and in the first instance they were verbally informed about me and 
my research and were asked if they consent to participate.  
According to Atkinson et al.,   
theoretical sampling means going back to the field to gather specific data to fill gaps 
within categories to elaborate the analysis of these categories, and to discover variation 
within and between them. This sampling is aimed to develop a theoretical analysis or to 
fill out ethnographers’ accounts or stories, not to approximate any statistical 
representation of the population parameters (2001, p. 168) 
As I explained in section 2.3 I conducted my research process in stages. Each stage was a 
continuous and parallel process of collecting data, transcribing, coding, analysing and 
deciding of what next in order to develop the theory as it emerges (see Bryman, 2016, p. 
408). Furthermore, at the end of each phase I was evaluating my data in order to assess 
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whether or not saturation has been accomplished (ibid.). By the end of the final fieldtrip to 
Lesvos there were no any new emerging themes with the additional data identified and, 
therefore, saturation and variation was established (ibid.). After the data analysis procedure 
came to an end a variety of themes emerged and the process of inclusion selection was 
based upon which themes were repetitively coming into view.  
2.4.1 Border crossers 
Border crossers were identified and approached firstly, via my pre-established network 
(mainly activists, volunteers and human rights workers); secondly, outside of Moria 
Hotspot, Kara Tepe Camp, Pikpa Solidarity Lesvos, Mosaic Social Support Centre and in 
other public spaces; and thirdly, via snowball sampling. Gaining access to border crossers 
was easier than I expected and the only barriers I was confronted with were those erected 
by gatekeepers (I)NGO practitioners and the state. Due to the complexity of the situation 
surrounding the phenomenon of unauthorised border crossing at Lesvos Island and due to 
the fact that asylum and bureaucratic procedures were and still are constantly shifting, thus 
affecting the legal status of border crossers, I had to pursue a series of simultaneous 
pathways. Firstly, I had to identify and distinguish those who were trapped within an “old” 
asylum system in a state of limbo (between the “old” and the “new” asylum system), and 
those who were trapped within the “new” asylum system (Chapter 5). Participants who 
were trapped within the old asylum procedure were in a state of enduring “stuckedness”, as 
Ghassan Hage phrases it (Hage, 2009a; see Chapter 5 and 6) waiting in a constant 
negotiation of their (legal) existence and (legal, social) status for more than a decade. 
Secondly, I identified participants according to the emerging issues and themes which 
emerged during the research process. I decided to interview border crossers who apart from 
being trapped in multiple limbos (territorial, legal, bureaucratic, social, mental, existential) 
undertook various complex tasks, such as interpreting, intermediating, raising awareness, 
speaking with journalists, researchers and the press, and representing their community in 
meetings with the authorities (Chapter 6). Some others performed the macabre rituals of 
giving care to dead bodies, burying the dead, performing the funeral rituals and 
coordinating the border crossers’ cemetery (Chapter 7).  Overall, I conducted 24 in-depth 
and 2 additional follow-up interviews with adult border crossers, two women and twenty 
men, between 18 and 55 years old. The participants were people who were trapped in the 
new asylum system and six out of them were trapped in the old system. The average length 
of the interviews were between forty minutes (shortest) and one hour and a half (longest). 
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All participants’ names were anonymised. All the names which are used in the thesis are 
pseudonyms.    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Adult border crossers who were interviewed, by Country of Origin and Gender 
 
Country of 
Origin 
Gender 
New Asylum System 
Afghanistan Woman 
Afghanistan Man 
Afghanistan Man 
Pakistan Man 
Pakistan Man 
Iran Man 
Iran Man 
Iraq Man 
Palestine Man 
Eritrea Man 
Mali Man 
Syria Man 
            Syria Woman 
           Syria Man 
Ghana Man 
Ghana Man 
Ghana Man 
Nigeria Man 
Old Asylum System 
Afghanistan Man 
Afghanistan Man 
Afghanistan Man 
Afghanistan Man 
Morocco Man 
Afghanistan Man 
  
 [41] 
 
2.4.2 International and Non- Governmental Organisations 
International and Non- Governmental Organisations’ staff was approached both formally 
and informally. I initially approached practitioners from my pre-established network 
during the scoping phase but also throughout the research process. Due to my long term 
experience in working with NGOs I knew from first-hand that the headquarters of NGOs 
do not easily approve interviews directly with staff themselves, but only with 
spokespersons. I also knew that many organisations either ignore formal requests from 
students or avoid taking part in researches by claiming heavy work-loads. In this respect, 
and in order to avoid wasting time only to be eventually ignored or declined I thought that 
it would be relatively easy to conduct interviews with NGO staff by following an informal 
pathway, and then through snowball sampling I would be able to approach and interview 
more practitioners. However, in practice throughout the fieldwork I engaged with both 
formal and informal pathways in order to identify and approach my participants, mainly 
depending on the participants’ personal circumstances and needs. Before I approached and 
recruited any of the (I)NGO staff I explored which organisations were operating at Lesvos 
Island in order to identify which were relevant to my research. Then an invitation letter, an 
information leaflet and consent form (see Appendices) was sent to each recipient. Some 
NGO practitioners preferred to speak anonymously and/or without being recorded. I 
conducted 10 in-depth interviews and 2 supplementary follow-up interviews in order to 
clarify issues and answer questions which emerged after the transcription and the initial 
thematic analysis. The participants were 7 women and 3 men between 26 and 45 years old. 
The average length of the interviews was between one hour (shortest) and one hour and a 
half (longest). All participants and the names of their organisation are anonymised. All the 
names which are used in the thesis are pseudonyms.      
2.4.3 Activists and Volunteers 
Personal accounts and experiences of activists and volunteers supporting border crossers 
were essential in my research. Activists and volunteers are “bare witnesses” of the multiple 
forms of violence and harm which border crossers experience in their everyday life. I 
followed both an informal and formal pathway in order to approach activists and 
volunteers. Initially, I approached people, activists and volunteers from my pre-established 
network. Then with a snowball approach I was able to identify and conduct interviews with 
other activists and volunteers. I conducted 11 in-depth and 2 supplementary follow-up 
interviews with 8 women and 3 men, between 20 and 35 years old. The supplementary 
interviews were conducted in order to explore and clarify issues which emerged after 
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transcribing and analysing the data. The average length of the interviews was between one 
hour (shortest) and one hour and a half (longest). All participants and the names of their 
organisation are anonymised. All the names which are used in the thesis are pseudonyms.     
2.4.4 Frontex 
Interviewing the authorities (Greek police, port police, and Frontex) was not central to my 
thesis and due to the fact, that gaining access to them is difficult I only approached 
Frontex. Frontex has various tasks on Lesvos since it undertakes sea patrols and also 
screening, registration, identification and debriefing procedures (Chapter 4 and 5). By 
interviewing Frontex staff I was mainly interested in exploring broader questions and 
accessing more personal points of view, concerning the so-called refugee crisis and how it 
has affected them as professionals. As Aas and Gundhus phrase it, I was interested in 
putting “their experiences in their own frames of reference” (2015, p. 3). Although, gaining 
access to Frontex was difficult -as one of Frontex’s interviewee emphasised, “We are 
approached by various people who say that they are students or researchers but in reality 
they are journalists”- I received a positive response to my request. In order to conduct 
interviews with Frontex I sent a formal Invitation Letter to the Headquarters of Frontex. I 
conducted 4 interviews, one interviewee was a woman and the other three were men, 
between 35 and 45 years old. The average length of the interviews was between forty 
minutes (shortest) and one hour (longest). All participants’ names were anonymised. All 
the names which are used in the thesis are pseudonyms.     
2.4.5 The Asylum Service 
The Asylum service manages the bureaucratic asylum procedures. I was mainly interested 
in interviewing the coordinator of the Asylum Service as well as administrative staff who 
were involved in the administration and asylum procedures. I was also interested in 
interviewing experts on asylum procedures of the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO), also operating in Moria hotspot. Interviews with staff are important in order to 
explore the bureaucratic aspect of border crossers’ registration and asylum procedures, the 
nature of these procedures and the problems, social harm and suffering, which these could 
bring upon refugees’ lives (Chapter 5). In order to gain access an invitation letter was sent 
to both the Asylum Service and EASO. Due to the fact that both services did not respond 
to my invitation I eventually utilized people from my pre-established networks who were 
practitioners there. I conducted one interview with a 45 years man practitioner working in 
the asylum service, and a supplementary follow-up interview. Both interviews lasted one 
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hour. The supplementary follow-up interview was conducted in order to explore and 
clarify issues which emerged after transcribing and analysing the data. 
2.4.6 Miscellaneous 
During the research process the issue of the border related deaths emerged. Apart from the 
macabre aspect surrounding the issue of death itself I also came across the long, 
impersonal and bureaucratic aspect which surrounds border crossers’ deaths management; 
the thanatobureaucracy (Chapter 7). In this respect I decided to interview people who are 
managing the macabre phenomenon of death in order to highlight the supplementary harm 
and violence that thanatobureaucracy brings upon people, not least through 
dehumanisation, degradation and de-personalisation. I conducted one interview with the 
medical examiner, a 50years old man. The length of the interview was one hour. I also 
conducted interviews from the two Imams responsible for the funerals and the religious 
rituals. Both interviewees were men between 25 and 35 years old. The length of both 
interviews was one hour. In order to gain access to them I utilised key contacts from my 
pre-established network. 
 
Overall, I conducted 60 interviews in an 8-week period extending from:  
(i) 17 October 2016 - 31 October 2016 
(ii) 17 January 2017- 2 February 2017, and  
(iii) 8 May 2017- 1 June 2017.  
The average duration of all interviews was one hour. The shortest interview was forty 
minutes and the longest one hour and a half. The breakdown was as follows: 
 24 in-depth and 2 supplementary follow-up interviews with adult border crossers, 
two women and twenty men, between 20 and 45 years old 
 10 in-depth and 2 supplementary follow-up interviews with NGO practitioners. The 
participants were 7 women and 3 men between 26 and 45 years old. 
 11 in-depth and 2 supplementary follow-up interviews with activists. The 
participants 8 women and 3 men, between 20 and 35 years old.  
 4 interviews with Frontex staff, one interviewee was a woman and the other three 
were men, between 35 and 45 years old 
 1 in-depth and 1 supplementary follow-up interview with a 45-year-old man 
practitioner working in the asylum service. 
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 1 interview with the medical examiner and 2 interviews with the imams. All 
interviewees were men between 25 and 50 years old 
2.5 Research Tools and Techniques 
During my research, I employed several research tools. These were used to gather data 
from several sources, and to aid the understanding of the range of social harm and violence 
from border crossers point of view. Each of these tools is considered below. 
2.5.1 Non-Participant Observation, Field notes and Document collection 
 
Due to the sensitive issue of violence and harm in relation to border crossers, I deployed a 
non- participating observation with interaction approach. According to Bryman this means 
that the researcher,  
 
Observes  sometimes minimally) but does not participate in group’s core activities. 
Interaction with group members occurs, but often tends to be through interviews which, 
along with documents, tend to be the main source of data (Bryman 2016, p. 437). 
 
I chose a non-participating observation with interaction approach as the best option and 
throughout the research procedure I engaged as an overt researcher. Ethnographies are 
usually related and linked to overt or covert participant observation (see Section 2.1.1). 
Due to the fact that I was living, working and was involved in activist networks supporting 
border crossers in Lesvos for more than a decade, covering my role as a researcher would 
be impossible. Most importantly, covert participation would be ethically unjustifiable too. 
In this way, I followed the ethical principles guidelines of the Open University which 
states that,  
Researchers should be open and honest about the purpose and content of their research and 
behave in a professional manner at all times  …). Deception or covert collection of data 
should only take place where it is essential to achieve the research results required, where 
the research objective has strong scientific merit and where there is an appropriate risk 
management and harm alleviation strategy” (Human Participants and Materials Ethics 
Committee, 2006). 
For the aforementioned reasons by respecting the circumstances, the context in which the 
participants were living in, participants’ mental health and wellbeing, I deployed overt 
participation by revealing my identity as a researcher to all participants (Bell, 1999; 
Bryman, 2016; Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee, 2006; Yin, 2011). 
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Both Kara Tepe camp and Moria hotspot are in reality closed camps since in both cases 
access is controlled by the Greek authorities. The Greek authorities allow or refuse access 
by performing the role of the gatekeeper. Thus, how could I conduct a covert participant 
observation when I was not even able to formally gain access in both sites even for a few 
minutes? Additionally, many of the border crossers live in precariousness and destitution 
outside the registration camp or confined into hotspot’s closed detention centers. Most of 
my interviewees were living in Moria hotspot with the ability of moving to the city centre 
and returning back for the night (Chapter 5). This “generosity” provided by the Greek state 
is framed by the majority of my participants as the “Mytilene Paper” (ibid.). This state of 
being is a state of precariousness. Furthermore, the legal and social context surrounding 
unauthorised border crossing in Greece and Lesvos is precarious, fluid and capricious. This 
fact affects the access to sites and people as well as the mental health and well-being of my 
participants. All the aforementioned factors made participation in group’s core activities as 
a full member almost impossible.  
Within this context my non-participant observation with interaction approach included 
“hanging out”  with border crossers, volunteers and activists, and NGO staff) and “hanging 
around”  the Moria hotspot, Kara Tepe Camp, PIKPA camp and Mosaic Support Centre). 
My aim was to apply the basic principle which (auto) ethnography imposes, meaning to 
immerse myself into the field. As Bryman argues, “the participant observer/ ethnographer 
immerses him-or-herself in a group for an extended period of time, observing behaviour, 
listening to what is said in conversations both between others and with the field worker, 
and asking questions”  2016, p. 423). From this “hanging out” and “hanging around”, 
observations and interviews - I was keeping full field notes either right away (whenever 
this was possible) or immediately after I was leaving the sites, spaces and people. Bryman 
(2016, p. 442- 444) suggests the following field notes’ classification; (i) “Mental notes” 
when it is inappropriate for the researcher to be seen taking notes; (ii) “Jotted notes” where 
the researcher keeps very brief notes on pieces of paper or notebooks and write more 
detailed notes later; (iii) “Full field notes” which include detailed notes made immediately 
after the observation and discussions; (iv) “methodological notes”, which include separate 
observations on methodological decisions and experiences in the field . Although, my main 
aim was to keep full field notes throughout the research process there were instances when 
this was impossible. Thus, I decided to keep multiple forms of field notes according to the 
circumstances. I kept mental notes during coffee breaks without being seen. I also kept 
jotted notes which involved phrases, quotes, key phrases and important events in a small 
notebook I was always carrying with me. Also, by the end of every day I was keeping 
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detailed notes in my research diary. I also kept methodological notes by mainly recording 
experiences and barriers I confronted in the field. Overall, my field notes included 
observations, in- depth field discussions and my own thoughts, emotions and reflections. 
As Daniel McCulloch argues, referring to Clifford Geertz (1973), “this was an attempt to 
capture ‘thick description’ of research experiences” (McCulloch, 2015, p. 117). Keeping 
detailed field notes was particularly useful especially during the interviews with 
gatekeepers and state’s agents. Through my full field notes I managed to capture, analyse 
and give meaning to awkward and intimidating moments, which my audio recorder would 
not capture including moves, gestures, gazes, unpredictable incidents during the interview 
process. 
2.5.2 Qualitative Interviews with Participants 
 
In addition to the field notes and observations I conducted interviews which are widely 
used in qualitative research in order to highlight aspects which cannot be perceived by 
observation only. Qualitative interviews are a very interesting methodological tool because 
of the flexibility of the interview process and the capacity of providing information from 
the participant’s point of view (Warren, 2002; Yin, 2011; Leavy & Brinkmann, 2014; 
Bryman, 2016). I deployed in-depth interviews by mainly having prepared a guide with 
topics or themes. According to Melanie Pearson in-depth interviews, 
 commence with an open, very broad question, which enables the interviewee to talk about 
their experiences, explain how they feel or what they mean, and provide examples to 
enhance this explanation. This type of interviewing is particularly useful in studies 
researching some vulnerable populations, as they can provide a form of therapy  or “give 
voice”) to the interviewee  201 , p. 6).  
The interviews were held in the form of conversation during which interviewees talk about 
themselves, their work and their points of view concerning the “refugee crisis” and the 
range of harm which border crossers experience. In many cases I shared my own personal 
experiences with the interviewees as I realised that this helped in building rapport and 
trust. As Karen O’ Rally argues, “conversations encourage reflexivity on both parts, enable 
the time it takes for participants to explore their own beliefs, and to express contradictory 
opinions, doubts, fears, hopes, and dreams”  O’ Reilly, 2009). All interviews were 
conducted over one session and lasted between one hour and one hour and a half. In four 
cases I conducted supplementary follow-up interviews in order to clarify things and fill in 
gaps which I identified during the transcription process (see Sections 2.4.1-2.4.6). The 
interviews were carried out during the three research phases; the “scoping phase” and the 
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two “field trips” in January and May. In all the cases participants were given the option 
whether or not to have interviews recorded. Many of the participants were happy to be 
recorded but others preferred not to be recorded and in these cases I kept notes during the 
interview and also more detailed notes immediately after the interview had finished.  
2.6 Qualitative Data Analysis 
In terms of the analysis of the data I have collected throughout the research I am deploying 
the strategy and tools of grounded theory (Bryman, 2016, p. 572; Charmaz, Thornberg, & 
Keane, 2018). Grounded theory is a method of qualitative inquiry in which as Denzin and 
Lincoln argue, “data collection and analysis reciprocally inform each other through an 
emergent iterative process” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018, p. 317). Grounded theory is a 
flexible comparative, inductive and adductive method of shaping the theory from data. 
According to Charmaz, Thornberg and Keane grounded theory “begins with inductive 
data, involves simultaneous data collection and analysis, relies on comparative methods, 
explicitly focuses on analysis and theory construction, checking and strengthening an 
original analysis” (2018, p. 412). I adopted an iterative approach when collecting and 
analysing my data. Bryman describes as iterative the “repetitive interplay between the 
collection and analysis of data” (2016, p. 570). Throughout the research process and in the 
times between each research phase I transcribed the data I had collected, and I undertook 
thematic analysis and coding. This process helped me to shape the next steps of the long 
data-collection research process. After the research finished I completed the process of 
data transcription and coding process. During this process I transcribed and printed in 
hardcopy all interviews (both the ones which were digitally recorded and the ones which 
were handwritten) in order to continue with a final thematic analysis and coding. All data 
was stored in the safe drive of the Open University with only me having access to them. 
Transcription was verbatim, but I also considered other non-verbal manifestations, for 
instance poses and pauses. Interviews were also interpreted through a combination of 
literal, interpretive and reflexive mode (Mason 2002). Coding followed transcription. As 
Charmaz argues, “Codes serve as shorthand devices to label, separate, compile, and 
organize data” (1983, p. 186 in Bryman 2016: 573).  
Through the whole process, a researcher diary and memos were kept in order for notes and 
ideas to be written down and to be evaluated, elaborated and conceptualised. Indexing and 
analysis followed by using NVivo qualitative software package, which is broadly used in 
qualitative research as a useful tool in storing, organizing, coding, indexing, writing/editing 
and analysing data (Yin 2011; Bryman 2016). A narrative analysis approach will be 
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adopted since “…narrative analysis seeks to put together the “big picture” about 
experiences or events as the participants understand them”  Shutt 2011: 339), whilst 
emphasises on the interpretation of data. 
2.6.1 Vignettes, Epiphanies and Flashbacks Analysis 
 
At the beginning of each substantive Chapter (3-7 inclusive), I have included smaller 
sections titled as “vignettes”. Vignettes include my own lived experiences, reflections and 
observations during the fieldwork in relation to both past and present key events and 
dramatic situations I have experienced and witnessed, concerning the scale of harm and 
violence within the context of the “refugee crisis”. Vignettes in this sense are selected 
“epiphanies” which I deploy within my thesis as a “device” similar to cinematography, in 
the form of “ memory) flashbacks”. I use them as “a device in the narrative of a motion 
picture, novel, etc., by which an event or scene taking place before the present time in the 
narrative is inserted into the chronological structure of the work” (Dictionary.com, n.d.). 
Vignettes are commonly used within autoethnography in order “to reveal layers of 
awareness that might otherwise remain experienced but concealed” (Pitard, 2016, p. 1). 
Epiphanies are selected, reflexive and introspective narratives and stories based on first-
hand lived experiences and key events which are/were dramatic. Norman Denzin argues 
that epiphanies are “dramatic events with beginnings, middles and endings. Epiphanies 
represent ruptures in the structure of daily life” (cited in Holman Jones, Adams & Ellis, 
2016, p. 132). As the words “dramatic” and “rupture” imply, epiphanies entangle events 
wherein life is interrupted, and after which life is not the same anymore. Epiphanies are 
narratives of traumatic experiences.  
 
“ Memory) flashbacks” play a binary role within epiphanies and within vignettes. The first 
role is related to the fact that flashbacks link past with present key events. By using 
memory flashbacks, I am evoking personal lived first-hand experiences and bare 
witnessing from the past and I am linking them to the present. Memory flashbacks in this 
sense are helpful “in bringing the past into the autobiographical present” (Holman Jones, 
Adams & Ellis, 2016, p. 126). In this sense, one of the key ideas in this thesis the 
continuum of violence in space and time (past and present) is narrated via epiphanies and 
memory flashbacks. The second role is related to memory flashbacks’ own nature: “A 
flashback is a piece of traumatic memory” (Nugent, 2013). The memory flashback is a 
phenomenon deriving from psychiatry and is defined as a symptom strongly related to 
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post-traumatic disorder. According to the Royal College of Psychiatrists, memory 
flashbacks is the state when,  
You find yourself re-living the event, again and again. This can happen both as a 
“flashback” in the day and as nightmares when you are asleep. These can be so realistic that 
it feels as though you are living through the experience all over again. You see it in your 
mind but may also feel the emotions and physical sensations of what happened - fear, 
sweating, smells, sounds, pain. Ordinary things can trigger off flashbacks. For instance, if 
you had a car crash in the rain, a rainy day might start a flashback (The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, no date). 
In this respect, by using memory flashbacks as narrative devices within my research I 
emphasise and analyse my own post-traumatic stress disorders, unpleasant “awakenings” 
of traumatic and post-traumatic experiences as an activist and practitioner in the past and 
as a researcher in the present. Traumatic and post-traumatic experiences possess a special 
position within my own position(alities) in time and space. Vignettes and thus my selected 
epiphanies are not pleasant stories. On the contrary, they are painful and agonising ones 
since they all entail and explore the unendurable state of being overwhelmed from social 
harm, suffering and violence. In this sense, vignettes-epiphanies-memory flashbacks are 
lived experiences of traumatic events and post-traumatic disorders which changed the 
course of life. These states of being have affected all the participants, including me, both 
directly and indirectly, both in past and present, through and within the passage of time. 
Both epiphanies and memory flashbacks entail the issue of memory, trauma and post-
traumatic disorder and how trauma along with violence and harm is a continuum within 
space and time. The selected epiphanies derive from multiple sources; mainly from my 
(auto)ethnographic diary, field notes, introspective and free writing (Ellis, 2004) during my 
research, as well as my first-hand lived experiences and bare witnessing as local, activist, 
human rights advocate at Lesvos the last decade.  
2.7 Ethical considerations and Principles 
There is an extended discussion and consideration within the field of social research 
concerning the way a researcher can engage in (mis)conduct and transgress ethical 
boundaries within the fragile relationship between her/himself and the participants. The 
 in)famous cases of Milgram’s social experiment  1963) (Milgram, 1974) and Humphreys’ 
‘tearoom’ study (1970) are illustrative examples of these considerations. The ethical 
principles underline a basic moral issue within social sciences, research and human 
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relations in generally; that is, a rejection of “the end justifies the means” standpoint. There 
are four main ethical principles which I considered and respected throughout the research 
process, relating to harm or risk to participants, deception and exploitation, invasion of 
privacy and informed consent. 
2.7.1 Harm or Risk to participants 
“Harm” or “risk” to participants can reveal itself through multiple ways in the course of the 
research process. It is not always possible and easy to identify whether and when harm is 
likely (Bryman 2016, p. 127). Harm sometimes reveals itself via emotions, embodied, 
stress and anxiety, post-traumatic disorder, trauma, distress, pain and suffering. My 
research topic is a double-edged sensitive topic, since on the one hand, I explore the lived 
experiences of border crossers who have bared multiple forms of harm and violence in 
their countries of origin, on their way to Europe and while they are waiting within camps 
and transit zones. On the other hand, by investigating, exploring and interviewing already 
traumatised border crossers then the moral issue of re-harming and re-traumatising by 
unintentionally making participants revive and re-live harmful experiences is lurking. As 
Elmir et al., and others suggest, in research concerning sensitive topics empathy, 
reciprocity and building rapport by the researcher is pivotal in cultivating a suitable 
environment in order to minimize any risk to the participants (Lee & Renzetti, 1990; Elmir 
et al., 2011). In order to minimise the harm and risk to my participants throughout the 
research process I relied on my long-term, previous working experience, as a humanitarian 
worker for Human Rights Organisations, at a Shelter for women border crossers, survivors 
of torture, trafficking and domestic violence and at detention centres for border crossers. 
My main duties there were to detect and provide social support (including psychological 
support) to survivors of war, persecution, torture and trafficking, rape, pregnant women, 
children, unaccompanied minors, elder people. During my long-term professional 
involvement within this field I had received professional training and expertise related to 
issues of violence, sexual violence, trafficking and torture. Hence, I am qualified, trained 
and experienced on the one hand, in conducting interviews, recording personal histories, 
being cautious and alerted during the interviews and, on the other hand, to handle with 
care, sensitivity and empathy people who have survived violence and live in 
precariousness.  
2.7.2 Informed Consent 
The lack of informed consent can cause harm to participants (Bell, 1999; Bryman, 2016; 
Yin, 2011). I achieved a valid consent with all the participants by distributing information 
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sheets and consent forms (see Appendices). The information sheet included the aims and 
purposes of the research and also explained why participant’s involvement to the research 
was pivotal and important for my project. Due to the fact that during my research I 
conducted interviews with various people, the content of the information sheet and the 
research process was adjusted to each participant’s circumstances. In order to conduct 
interviews with border crossers I read the information leaflet and consent form to 
interviewees with the help of interpreters - all people from my pre-established network. 
This was the only way to ensure that participants who do not speak English or are illiterate 
will be able to understand and genuinely give consent. On the same grounds and in order to 
avoid any kind of distress, mistrust, fear and misinterpretation, I requested interviewees’ 
verbal consent (instead of a signature on consent form) to be recorded. I demonstrated a 
particular consideration of what an information and consent form, and generally a “paper” 
could signify to each participant. Firstly, because a “paper” can connote and evoke 
negative and traumatic experiences especially to populations whose future and state of 
being is dependent on “papers”, “documents” and “credentials”.  The “Mytilene paper” is 
for instance a common metaphor border crossers use in order to refer to one of the 
“papers” which makes their life difficult and unbearable, since it connotes their 
geographical restriction and their lack of autonomy of movement (Chapter 6). Secondly, 
because some of the participants might have been misinformed or deceived by information 
leaflets and “papers” distributed by various people (for instance smugglers).  
2.7.3 Deception and Exploitation 
In order to avoid exploitation and deception of the participants I was open and honest 
about the nature and purposes of my research. I included my full contact details as a 
principal researcher of the project and of my supervisor, in case the participants wished to 
contact for queries or to declare problems concerning the interview process or the 
researcher. I asked for permission for the interviews to be digitally recorded. Furthermore, 
participants were informed, and permission was requested concerning the results of the 
research and their dissemination, for instance that the results will be used in public 
conferences or in scientific papers. It must be highlighted here that because of the fact that 
violence (explored in this research) is a highly sensitive issue, which during the interview 
could have emerged through pain, mental pain, anxiety and distress, the prospective 
participants were not obliged in any way to participate to the research. This is something 
that was made very clear to the participants from the beginning. Within the Information 
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Sheet I included information concerning the participants’ right to stop and withdraw from 
the research, in particular if they feel any kind of distress and emotional pain.   
2.7.4 Invasion of Privacy 
I demonstrated particular caution and care in order not to invade the privacy of the 
participants (see Yin, 2011). In order to achieve this, I made sure that the participants were 
aware and understood why they were identified and approached and what participating in 
my research involved. Throughout the process I kept an open and honest position of who I 
was. At the same time, in order to preserve the privacy of my participants I kept the 
content of the interviewees confidential and maintained the anonymity of the identities of 
the participants (Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee, 2006). Within the 
research process, transcription, data analysis and presentation of findings pseudonyms are 
used instead of real names. Care was also taken in case “findings are being presented to 
ensure that individuals are not identified or identifiable” (Bryman, 2016, p. 127; Human 
Participants and Materials Ethics Committee, 2006; Potter, 2006). The anonymity of the 
place of my case study was not possible to be kept, due to the pivotal role that the place 
currently plays concerning the phenomenon of unauthorised border crossing, harm and 
violence. Although, extensive care and precaution will be taken in order to avoid harm to 
participants, it must be admitted that sometimes it is not possible to “identify in all 
circumstances whether harm is likely”  Bryman 2016, p. 127).  
2.7.5 Ethical Considerations 
My research topic falls within the category of “sensitive topics” –topics “that have the 
potential to cause harm to participants, eliciting powerful emotional responses such as 
anger, sadness, embarrassment, fear and anxiety”  Elmir et al. 2011). Some scholars 
highlight the issue of how “ ‘sensitivity’ arises within the research process” (Lee & 
Renzetti, 1990). Scholars denote the psychological and mental consequences of forced 
migration and political violence, violations of human rights, abuses and torture upon 
human lives, as well as the post-traumatic stress symptoms, anxiety and depression (Miller, 
Kulkarni & Kushner, 2006; Silove et al. 2002; Silove, 1999; Cunningham, Silove & Storm 
1990).  
How should one research the scale of social harm, violence, and suffering based on 
personal accounts and lived experiences of people surviving, coping and trying to move on 
with their lives? How can one explore this without enabling, eliciting and “wakening” 
unpleasant and dreadful experiences of harm? How one can talk about these with a 
population, whose arrivals and departures from one transit point to another and from one 
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border to another is traversed with violence and, within this context, violence and harm is 
routinised and normalised? Furthermore, a great number of border crossers are 
experiencing violence inside camps and reception centers in host countries. On these 
grounds, how one can explore the lived experiences of people concerning harm and 
violence, when these are routinised by influencing their well-being (Schweitzer & Steel, 
2008)? How one can research these issues with sensitivity and empathy, but also without 
putting one’s self into emotional risk and being “burnt out”? How one can investigate 
one’s own lived experiences on violence and harm, as autoethnography dictates, without 
one causing harm and risk to oneself? In other words, how sensitive topics tailor-made for 
sensitive researchers can be investigated? 
Scholars exploring sensitive topics have argued that pain, harm, risk and suffering are 
identified not only to the participants but also to the researchers. Elmer et al. recognise the 
difficulty in taking emotional distance. In particular they note that, “Researching in 
sensitive areas has the potential to pose threat to researcher’s well-being particularly if they 
have strong feelings or have lived experiences of the phenomena under investigation”  see 
Lee in Elmer et al. 2011, p. 15). The authors refer to “researcher’s burnout” and to 
“vicarious traumatisation” in order to describe the emotional engagement of the researcher 
with the participants to such an extent that researcher’s well-being is effected (Elmir et al., 
2011, p. 15). Although, I am very experienced in interviewing refugees who have survived 
violence (torture, trafficking, physical and emotional abuse) and, thus, I am capable in 
managing emotions in order to avoid any kind of burnout and vicarious traumatisation, 
following Elmer et al. suggestion of “debriefing”  p. 15), I had have enough time between 
interviews and discuss any distress that come up both with my supervisors and people I 
trust. Discussion has proved cathartic and a helpful cope- strategy in the past. Furthermore, 
since 2008 I have attended training workshops on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
held by UNHCR in collaboration with the Medical Rehabilitation Centre for Torture 
Victims in Greece. In 2016 I attended another workshop on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) which was held on Lesvos by the NGO BABEL and Lesvos Solidarity activist 
network. In 2018 I also attended a four-weeks training workshop on “Understanding and 
Coping with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder  PTSD)”, which was held in Milton Keynes 
by the NHS. Throughout these training workshops I learnt skills and techniques in 
identifying the symptoms and managing (post-) traumatic experiences and secondary 
trauma. 
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2.8 Problems and Barriers during the Research Process 
From 2015 onwards, Lesvos Island is in the epicentre of a severe refugee crisis to such an 
extent that the term “refugee crisis” has become a synonym to Lesvos. Within this context 
Lesvos attracted a lot of attention, media publicity positive comments on local people’s 
solidarity but also negative criticism concerning violence, human rights abuses, and the 
inhuman and degrading living conditions of border crossers. The suffering of thousands of 
border crossers became a spectacle (see Chapter 1). Suddenly, EU representatives, 
journalists, TV channels, film makers, artists, actors and actresses, researchers and even 
the Pope Francis himself, “parade” in refugee camps at Lesvos (Gillespie, 2018, see also 
Chapter 1). At the same time, surveillance and military bodies (the Greek Police, Coast 
Guard and Army, FRONTEX and NATO) as well as (I)NGOS and Greek and EU 
bureaucrats (Asylum Service staff, EASO) operate and paradoxically peacefully coexist 
under the same “roof”. From 2015 onwards, Lesvos has been turned into a very securitised 
and politicised space. Whilst, in terms of social research an over-researched one. As the 
negative criticisms from some human rights organisations, mainstream media and 
independent journalists are increasing, politics and processes of silencing increased too. In 
this respect I can identify one main problem and barrier I confronted with throughout the 
research process. The one barrier had to do with the fact that I found myself researching an 
over-researched location and an over-researched population. The second barrier had to do 
with the fact that this location is both a very securitised and politicised space where 
accessing to people and sites was controlled by the state. Gatekeepers erected invisible 
walls mainly through rambling bureaucratic structures and forcible processes of silencing. 
Thus, the second barrier had also had to do with the situation of when the state through 
various gatekeepers hides information (see Maillet, Mountz & Williams, 2017, p. 930).  
2.8.1 An Over-Researched Location and Population 
The magnitude of the phenomenon of border crossing at Lesvos from 2015 onwards 
attracted much attention. Both amateur and professional journalists and filmmakers, 
reporters and TV channels from all over the world overflowed Lesvos. NGO practitioners, 
other professionals, activists and volunteers, local people and of course border crossers 
themselves found themselves in a difficult and uncomfortable situation. On the one hand, 
they had to cope with the fatigue of the overload of work, whilst border crossers had to 
cope with the enduring waiting in unbearable living conditions. Local people had to cope 
with the shock of witnessing thousands of people being washed ashore in the whole island. 
For this reason most of the local people I talked to during my research when referring to 
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2015 told me, “You cannot imagine what was going on here”. The spectatorship of 
suffering of all border crossers at Lesvos and the exoticism in terms of representation of 
local people’s solidarity by the mass media mobilised a whole industry. In terms of 
researchers concern although the academic literature and research until 2014 concerning 
the refugee issue was very limited this was translated in a variety of papers published 
having as a case study Lesvos Island. 
On the other hand, they all had to deal with the research fatigue and the state of being 
interviewed, photographed, and filmed over and over again (Clark, 2008) with or without 
being prior asked and consent. Lesvos as location and the local and refugee population 
became over-researched. According to Tom Clark, “research fatigue can be said to occur 
when individuals and groups become tired of engaging with research and it can be 
identified by a demonstration of reluctance toward continuing engagement with an existing 
project, or a refusal to engage with any further research” (2008, p. 955). 
 
As Sukarieh and Tannock denote the issue of over-research is likely to arise anywhere. 
However communities which are more likely to become over-researched are the 
communities which are marginalised and/or are within a crisis in terms of a natural 
disaster, war or genocide, and communities which due to their geographical location are 
accessible to researchers (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2012, p. 496).  In this respect, one of the 
problems I encountered related to over-research was in Sukarieh and Tanock’s words with 
“the expectations and promises of social change” (2012, p. 496). Many of the border 
crossers I interviewed were interviewed multiple times by numerous professionals and had 
expectations that the interviewer will change the situation they were trapped in (Clark 
2008). One of my interviewees, Mohammad a border crosser from Syria, noted ironically,  
Initially, I volunteered and I add my name to the list for people wishing to be interviewed 
by journalists. But now I have stopped doing this. One of the journalists publicised my 
personal information although I had requested not to do so. Also, I have being interviewed 
so many times but still my situation remains the same.  
At the same time, professionals either due to “naivety” and/or “irresponsibility” were 
giving promises (see Sukarieh and Tannock, 2012, p. 500) which they could not even hold. 
The failure of all the previous professionals to live up to the expectations and promises to 
my participants, overwhelmed me with feelings of guilt and shame. It was clear in some 
circumstances that my participants positioned me too as “one of them”. Apart from guilt 
and shame I felt I was charged of carrying an inappropriate burden of responsibility due to 
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the misconducts and unethical activities of other professionals including researchers. Not 
only “were my participants failing to see any connection between research and positive 
social change” (ibid.) but I was failing to see that connection too. It is possible for 
communities to feel over-researched in some regards and under-researched in others; a 
volunteer in a refugee camp during my visit there, started shouting right after I traversed 
the threshold of the camp, “I wonder why there is no any researcher to come to ask 
volunteers about the consequences of working in this context in the passage of time.” 
In many instances when I was interviewing NGO staff I sensed fear, suspicion, mistrust 
and in many cases unwillingness to discuss some specific issues. One of the NGO staff told 
me that if I had not been introduced to her by a mutual friend she would not have spoken to 
me in the first place. Whilst, throughout the research process some of the NGO 
practitioners openly admitted that they had received strict orders from their Organisations 
and they were also obliged with a rule within their contracts of not disclosing what is going 
on inside Moria hotspot. “I am going to lose my job and there are penal consequences”, 
one of my interviewees noted. On several occasions, I had to repeat to NGO staff –both to 
unknown people and to people from my pre-established network- that I was not a journalist 
or a “spy” but just a student doing her research. One spokesperson of a well- known 
International Organisation, however, underlined this, “Do you know how many journalists 
requested an interview from us by pretending to be students?” This doubt, mistrust and fear 
underlined also another important issue; the fact that I had entered an over-researched 
place and I was trying to conduct interviews with an over-researched population on 
Lesvos, where incidents of malpractice and misconduct by journalists had already taken 
place. All these made me consider how NGOs’ interviewees, practitioners and border 
crossers themselves by disclosing information, doubting and criticising the researcher from 
fear or mistrust they were undermining and affecting the outcomes of my research. After 
reflecting and thinking a lot I realised that this barrier had provided me with useful insights 
about the processes of silencing. These also made me consider that within the research, 
participants’ silences are also important as their voices. 
Another crucial gatekeeper, as I mentioned above, was the state itself. Two of the three 
main camps in the island were controlled by the Greek state. The ruling party of SYRIZA 
had a migration-friendly policy and had several times criticised and condemned previous 
governments for not allowing access to camps to journalists and the civil society. 
However, when SYRIZA was elected, it followed the same policies with the previous 
governments. As a native, local, activist and professional at Lesvos I never nurtured any 
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kinds of illusions that my identities or the topic of my research which includes state 
violence, would be kept in secrecy. I did not however expect that members of SYRIZA 
government playing key roles inside Moria hotspot, people I knew in person and who were 
actively involved in grassroots movements in Lesvos the previous years, would ignore or 
disapprove someone they already knew.  
I never managed to formally gain access to Moria hotspot and Kara Tepe camp although I 
personally knew the coordinators at both sites. It was easier to gain access to Frontex staff 
than to sites and people in Moria and Kara Tepe. Access to Kara Tepe camp and Moria 
hotspot was eventually achieved by slipping through state’s authorisation and attention. 
Despite the police all over the place and the private security of the G4S I managed to 
traverse the threshold of Moria hotspot with the assistance of a person of my pre-
established network who was working there. Thus, I managed to enter this close setting 
Moria Hot Spot, spend some hours there, observe and keep full field notes. Concerning 
Kara Tepe Camp an appointment with the coordinator was booked by phone. I managed to 
reach Kara Tepe accompanied by a person from my pre-established network who had 
unlimited access to the camp. We went through the gate and we entered the camp by her 
car. No one asked me who I was and if I had any authorisation to enter the place. Filareti 
served in a sense as my passport to enter Kara Tepe. As we waited for the coordinator to 
come I managed to walk around within the site, observe and keep detailed field notes. The 
coordinator never came to the appointment. I tried to arrange a new appointment with him 
to enter the site as “I should”, meaning formally, but the coordinator never responded to 
my calls. In this regard, I was not able to formally gain access neither to Moria hotspot nor 
to Kara Tepe camp. As one of my interviewees emphasised, “If you were working for BBC 
you would see how easy the coordinators would talk to you” by denoting the fact that 
gaining access in people and site was also a matter of my social status too.  
This awkward and unconventional entering to Moria hot spot and Kara Tepe demonstrated 
the lack of organisation and control in one of the most important sites currently operating 
in Europe. With a little bit of serendipity anyone potentially could enter the hotspot. As 
one researcher I spoke to told me, “I entered Moria without any authorization. I just found 
the gate open and I entered. No one told me anything. I walked inside by holding my 
coffee and then quietly I left”. This awkward and unconventional entering to Moria hotspot 
and Kara Tepe was the only way to manoeuvre and omit the control and the invisible walls 
raised by the powerful. After all, “Where there is power, there is resistance”  Foucault, 
1978: 95-96). 
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CHAPTER 3  
A History of Continuum of Violence in Time and Space 
  
In the previous chapter I analysed the methodological pathways I traversed in order to 
conduct the research, collect and analyse my data. I also focused on the problems and 
barriers in accessing people and sites and how I overcame these challenges throughout the 
research process. The purpose of this chapter is to challenge the refugee crisis discourses 
which have been proliferated since 2015 onwards (Chapter 1) and which chronologically 
place Greece and Lesvos in its epicentre after Alan Kurdi’s death in 2015 (Chapter 1; see 
also Iliadou, 2017). Drawing on the concepts of “continuum of violence” (Scheper-Hughes 
& Bourgois, 2004, p. 1) in time and space, “everyday violence” (Scheper-Hughes, 1997, p. 
471), and “traces and tidemarks” (Green, 2009, p.13) I will show that the refugee crisis of 
2015 is not the one and only event in the contemporary history of Greece and Lesvos in 
relation to border crossing. This Chapter focuses on the multiple processes and border 
crossings of people before the so-called refugee crisis. Greece and Lesvos have 
experienced similar crises in the past, long before 2015, a fact that is vividly depicted 
through the “refugee” and “migration” history of the country and the island itself (see 
Vignette). Greeks and people of Lesvos have been “refugees” or descendants of “refugees” 
-all Anatolian Greeks who arrived in Greece and Lesvos in the aftermath of the Asia Minor 
Catastrophe. Also, due to the fluctuating socio-political and economic conditions Greeks 
have been migrants themselves to Egypt, USA, Germany and other countries. Since the 
1990s, Greece and Lesvos has been an important gate for unauthorised border crossers 
from Albania, as well as from Asian and African countries. In this chapter I will do the 
chronicle of the past key events prior to the so-called refugee crisis of 2015 in order to 
emphasise that violence and harms have been unfolding as a continuum in time and space 
in a routinised, normalised mode. Moreover, drawing on personal first-hand lived 
experiences as a descendant of Asia Minor Catastrophe refugees, and as an activist, local, 
and social worker for border crossers on Lesvos for more than a decade I aim to show that 
the lived experiences and the multiple, multilayered forms of violence and harms unfold 
slowly, silently and quietly in space and time as a continuum.  
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This chapter paves the path for the rest of the chapters, which focus on the “aftermath”; the 
post-refugee crisis era, events, responses, series of policies and political decisions which 
were made, proliferated and enforced, as well as their “collateral casualties” (Bauman, 
2004) in human cost upon border crossers lives. 
Vignette: Border Crossing Monuments 
 
Lesvos Island, May 2017. From where I am standing I can see the Turkish coast. During 
the night one can also see the lights on the other side of the Greek-Turkish border. The 
other side. The other side, as well as the people of the other side, is so close but at the same 
time so far away. The Greek and Turkish borders touch each other at a cognitive vertical 
line, dividing the sea through the middle, but at a point where the eyes cannot see – some 
4.1 miles away. The beach underneath me is full of waste- border crossing waste. The ruins 
of a grey plastic boat, half buried under the sand, are left there as monuments and 
reminders of the thousands of border crossings. The ruins of a grey plastic boat are left 
there as an evidence of a “crime”. Τhis is how “irregular migration” is coldly defined 
according to the criminal law; as a criminal act. Clothes are lying on the beach. Large sized 
clothes. Small sized clothes. Adults’ clothes. Children’s' clothes. A child’s lifejacket is 
floating in the sea. It capsizes and finally drifts away on the waves. I cannot help but feel 
that I have just entered a crime scene. How many people, I wonder, have lost their lives on 
this little piece of earth alone? How many lives have been wasted here? Wasted lives and 
dreams are silently lying there, underneath my feet. The macabre feeling that I will 
confront a dead body washed ashore by the sea has overwhelmed me. 
The statue of the Asia Minor Mother - the symbol of the massive forced displacement of 
Anatolian Greeks of 1922 - holding her children is standing still behind me. It has become 
unnoticeable to people and looks forgotten by both people and time. Her back is turned to 
the sea and faces the city. Her gaze cries out, “Don’t you remember me?” (Khosravi, 2016) 
connoting the unequal game between collective memory and oblivion. I look at her and 
wonder; has she just arrived? Has she just fled and been washed ashore in one of the ruined 
plastic dinghies underneath my feet? As I stare at the lifejackets floating in the sea and at 
the Asia Minor Mother statue holding her children, I cannot help but think that I am 
standing between two different border crossing monuments in time and space; the Asia 
Minor Catastrophe of 1922 (Neos Kosmos, 2013) and the refugee crisis of 2015. Both 
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border crossings monuments connote and manifest refugee journeys, massive deaths, 
forced displacements, unrecognised genocides, suffering and trauma. Both might be 
described within a “continuum of violence” (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004) in time 
and space. After all, “There is no document of culture which is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism” (Benjamin, 1999 [1940] in Khosravi 2010, p. 131). 
3.1 Continuum of Violence in Time and Space 
The concept of continuum of violence or violence continuum is introduced by Nancy 
Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois in order to define violence as a process which is 
characterised by nonlinearity, repetition, and continuity. According to Scheper-Hughes and 
Bourgois, “Violence is  ...) nonlinear, productive, and reproductive...Violence gives birth 
to itself. So we can rightly speak of chains, spirals, and mirrors of violence -or, as we 
prefer- a continuum of violence” (2004, p. 1). Violence is a process which unfolds in the 
ordinary and mundane, everyday social, public and private spaces, in a visible and 
invisible, legitimate and illegitimate form “in times that can best be described as neither 
war nor peacetime” (ibid., p. 4). There is neither one type nor a strict violence typology 
people live through, due to the fact that violence also manifests through rituals, acts, 
practices and processes of everyday humiliation, degradation and dehumanisation. 
According to Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, “Violence can never be understood solely in 
terms of its physicality-force, assault, or the infliction of pain –alone. Violence also 
includes assaults on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the victim”  ibid.. 
p. 1). The concept of continuum of violence emphasises the everyday organised, 
legitimised and routinised acts, practices and processes of humiliation, degradation and 
dehumanisation, which are misrecognised as violence due to familiarity and normalisation. 
The practices and processes of “everyday violence” are rendered invisible and tolerated, as 
Scheper-Hughes emphasises, “not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, 
but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are 
those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted” (Scheper-Hughes, 
1997, p. 473). Everyday violence refers to practices and processes which render and reduce 
some lives as unworthy, inferior and disposable, and gives emphasis “to the ease with 
which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons 
and assuming the license –even the duty- to kill, maim, or soul-murder” (Scheper-Hughes 
& Bourgois, 2004, p. 19) 
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The concept of continuum of violence operates synergistically with the concept of 
everyday violence. The two concepts intersect and overlap and they both encompass 
practices, processes and acts of “social exclusion, dehumanisation, depersonalisation, 
pseudo-speciation, and reification which normalise the atrocious and the otherwise 
unthinkable” (Scheper-Hughes, 1997, p. 472). The degrading, humiliating and appalling 
reception and living conditions, the chaotic asylum and bureaucratic procedures which 
border crossers experience in the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis in Europe are 
part of a continuum which unfolds in time and space. The concept of “continuum of 
everyday violence in time and space” is underlying the fact that violence, social harm and 
their consequences upon the wellbeing of people and their communities can unfold 
gradually, slowly, silently and quietly within space and (historical, past, present and future) 
time. The Greek and Lesvos case demonstrates that the continuum of violence and social 
harm, suffering and trauma is constantly omnipresent and evident in the locale through the 
remnants and traces of its refugee history of 1922. The historical monuments and statuses, 
the migration museum dedicated to the Asia Minor refugees, the “refugee” neighborhoods 
of the city centre and the other parts of the island (i.e. Pano Skala, Skala Sykamias), the 
narratives of survivors of the Asia Minor Catastrophe of 1922 prove the existence of past 
coerced displacements which have left their marks and traces upon Lesvos through 
collective memory and trauma. The concept of continuum of violence in time and space as 
I deploy it here bridges physical and non-physical, conventional and non-conventional 
forms of violence with time and the concepts of continuity and replication, normalisation, 
routinisation, suffering and trauma which one finds in the everyday violence and genocide 
literature (Duschinski, 2010; Green, 1994; Nagengast, 1994; Sabo et al., 2014; Taussig, 
1984). In this regard, the concept of continuum of violence in time and space suggests that 
violence takes place in a repetitive, continuous, mundane and uninterrupted mode within 
the everyday life to such an extent that becomes normalised and unnoticeable. 
Furthermore, as part of the “everyday violence” the concept of “continuum of violence” 
includes the features of consensus, justification, informalisation, immunisation (Nagengast, 
1994; Taussig, 1984), legitimisation and illegitimisation, dehumanisation, anonymity 
(Duschinski, 2010), naturalisation, normalisation, and routinisation (Green, 1994; Sabo et 
al., 2014; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004, p. 1). The multiple, multilayered forms and 
range of harms are produced and reproduced as a never-ending continuum of complex 
events and experiences which they progressively deteriorate. The continuum of violence in 
time and space, hence, is a perpetual, enduring, inter-temporal process which traverses the 
lives of people trapped within it (in this case border crossers and locals in Lesvos Island). 
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The concept of continuum of violence apart from having an (inter) temporal nature, it also 
indicates locality, space.  
 
The refugee crisis of 2015 onwards can be described as part of this continuum of violence 
and harms in time and space since it is not the one and only hallmark of the phenomenon 
of unauthorised border crossing in the history of Greece and Lesvos Island. As Sarah 
Green argues, 
 ...) today’s performance of border exists in the company of past performances of border 
that linger, not only in people’s memories, activities and understandings, but also in 
theories, places and things. That generates connections and relations as well as 
disconnections and separations, across space and time. If performing border means 
classifying and defining people, things and places in a particular form, then that is done not 
only by the separation and disconnection that renders borders visible, but also by 
connection that can remake them differently and even erase them from view (2010, p. 264). 
 
If one casts a glance in history, one will discover that the phenomenon of unauthorised 
border crossings transcends the last 30 years. Greece has received an important number of 
unauthorised border crossers from Albania, since the 1990s. Indifference, social problems, 
intolerance, anti-migration politics and lack of migration policies, racialisation processes, 
dehumanisation, xenophobic violence, violations of human rights and state violence were 
taking place since then and Albanian unauthorised border crossers were the first being 
exposed to them. Although Albanian border crossers suffered in Greece and even though 
they constitute one of the largest migration ethnic groups, they have become in a sense a 
forgotten, an “invisible group” in Greek society’s margins. Wars, conflicts, authoritarian 
regimes, internal instability, terrorism in Asian and Middle Eastern countries produced 
unauthorised border crossings, which after 2000 gradually increased in Greece (Bacas, 
2010; Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2013). Stigmatisation, racism, dehumanisation, intolerance 
and multiple forms of violence and harms were inflicted upon the new border crossers 
coming from Asia and African countries, to such an extent that Albanian border crossers 
were almost “forgotten”. This in a sense is a common fate globally border crossers 
experience. That is, when a new refugee crisis dominates the headlines, previous “crises” 
are “forgotten”, whilst the people affected become “invisible”. Border crossers experience 
common never-ending nightmares and fate with previous border crossers (semi) settled in 
Greece and Lesvos and they will also gradually become invisible. In the section below, I 
focus on the Asia Minor Catastrophe of 1922 and the coerced displacement of Anatolian 
Greek population from Turkey to Greece and Lesvos. This past displacement due to its 
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significance, as part of the collective memory and trauma, is something that I repeatedly 
came across during the research. Many of my Greek research participants, even myself, 
were descendants of Anatolian Greek refugees of 1922 (Gillespie, 2018, p. 155; 
Papataxiarchis, 2016, p. 5). As I will show below Asia Minor refugees lived through 
similar, overlapping experiences with the ones border crossers are experiencing now.  
3.2 The Asia Minor Catastrophe 
In the aftermath of the Greek-Turkish war (1918-1922) an approximately one and a half 
million people, all Anatolian Greek minorities who were living in Turkey, fled by seeking 
sanctuary to Greece and other neighboring with Turkey countries (Hernadez, 2016). Due to 
the national cleansing operations launched by Young Turks (nationalists), all Christian 
populations (Armenian, Assyrians, Pontian and other Anatolian Greeks) were forced to 
leave in order to survive from atrocities, massacres, and violence (Pontian Society of 
Chicago, 2006). The atrocities and massive killings on behalf of the Turkish state, against 
the Armenian and Pontiac Greek populations remain until today genocides which are 
denied. The Pontian Society of Chicago offers a few estimates, 
As a consequence of the deliberate and systematic policy of Turkification of the Ottoman 
Empire, it is estimated that more than 2.75 million Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks were 
slaughtered outright or were victims of the “white death” of disease and starvation -a result 
of the routine process of deportations, slave labor, and death marches (Pontian Society of 
Chicago, 2006) 
The collective trauma and harm of the genocide, violent uprooting and forced displacement 
that Asia Minor refugees experienced was so deep, that in Greek history, the historic 
narrative and collective memory of this period is imprinted and referred to as Catastrophe.  
After 1922 in the aftermath of Lausanne Treaty and the population exchange (Green, 2010, 
p. 266) approximately 1.2 million refugees were settled in Greece. According to the 
historical data, the resettlement of refugees in Lesvos and generally in Greece was not 
easy. Racism, hostility, dehumanisation and discrimination were some of the main features 
that Asia Minor refugees confronted (Baldwin-Edwards, 2014, p. 1). Although, Asia Minor 
refugees were Christian Orthodox (dominant religion in Greece), Greek speakers and they 
contributed to the host society’s industrial, trade, cultural development and science they 
initially faced Greek society’s hostility (Pantelia, 2016). At the same time, their 
“genuinity” as Greeks was challenged. Τhis fact is illustrated in a common dehumanising 
and degrading name which was attributed to them; “turk-seeds” (τουρκόσποροι) 
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(Carstensen, 2015). In Lesvos, about 45.000 Asia Minor refugees arrived by boats and 
settled in various parts of the island, like Skala Sykamnias on the North part of Lesvos, 
Epano Skala in Mytilene (Papataxiarchis, 2016, p. 5). The 60% of people resident at 
Lesvos now, are descendants of the Asia Minor refugees of 1922 (Carstensen, 2015; 
Pantelia, 2016). “Turk-seeds” was a common degrading feature attributed to them also by 
Lesvos people who doubted Asia Minor refugees’ “Greekness”. During my research, I also 
documented the belittling local term “προσφυγάρες”  prosfyghares) [from the Greek word 
“prosfyghas” which means “refugee”], being used in some parts of Lesvos when referring 
to Asia Minor refugees. Asia Minor refugees were perceived as threats and were 
accommodated in very poor conditions (Carstensen, 2015). The area of Epano Skala in 
Mytilene, hosts the statue of the Asia Minor Mother as a remembrance of the refugee past 
of the locals. The statue represents a mother holding a baby in her hug while a young boy 
and a young girl are holding her from her legs. This statue is dedicated to all the mothers 
coming from Asia Minor who crossed the borders and fled to Lesvos in search of sanctuary 
in the aftermath of the Asia Minor Catastrophe (see Vignette).  
3.3 Greeks as Migrants 
Migration is a lived experience for Greeks. Not only they are decedents from refugees, but 
they have also been migrants themselves. After the financial crisis in Greece (2010 
onwards) many Greeks are migrating to Western European Union countries in a search for 
a better future. Historically, there are several arrivals of unauthorised border crossers to 
Greece, but also several departures of Greek border crossers from Greece to other 
countries, like Egypt, America and Germany. In the period 1890-1914, almost a sixth of 
the population of Greece emigrated, mostly to the United States and Egypt. Greece 
gradually became a receiving country during 19 0’s by receiving migrants from Africa, 
Asia and Poland. According to Charalambos Kasimis and Chryssa Kassimi, between 1950 
and 1974 more than one million Greeks migrated to Western Europe, the U.S., Canada, 
and Australia. Between 1974 and 1985, almost half of the emigrants of the post-war period 
had returned to Greece (Kasimis & Kassimi, 2004). As Kasimis and Kassimi argue,  
Economic and political reasons often motivated their move, both connected with the 
consequences of the 1946-1949 civil war and the 1967-1974 period of military junta rule 
that followed. Official statistics show that in the period 1955-1973 Germany absorbed 
603,300 Greek migrants, Australia 170,700, the U.S. 124,000, and Canada 80,200 (Kasimis 
& Kassimi, 2004)  
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In the next section I document the chronicle of a series of key events and processes which 
since the 1990’s has been unfolding by leading to the severe so-called refugee crisis. As 
already stated the increased flows, the violence and border crossers’ deaths, which have 
shaped the context of the refugee crisis, are neither something new nor accidents. They 
are all an outcome of political decisions and policies intentionally enforced and 
proliferated in a continuum in time and space. 
3.4 A Chronicle of the so-called Refugee Crisis 
 
Between 1990 and 2015, gradually unfolds a long period, as far as the unauthorised border 
crossings concern, which I call as an unknown or disremembered humanitarian crisis. I 
locate the beginning of this period between 1990 and 2002, when the increased influx of 
Albanian unauthorised border crossers took place. It then traverses the next two decades 
and overlaps with unauthorised border crossings of people from Asian and African 
countries, between 2002 and 2014. This long period is crossed from a plethora of 
systematic violations of human rights, abuses, discriminations, (institutional) racism, and 
multiple forms of violence (see sections below). The multiple and everyday forms of 
violence have systematically being condemned and reported by International and Non-
Governmental Organisations and attracted mass media’ attention. However, this period has 
not managed to attract so much publicity to the extent the refugee crisis of 2015 did. 
Previous humanitarian crises were either ignored, remained unknown or disremembered 
and cloaked with oblivion, apathy and indifference. This disremembered period is the 
keystone, which has molded the context, social conditions and foundations of the 2015 
refugee crisis. Social harm and suffering, abuses, violations, deaths and violence we are 
eye-witnessing and experiencing, from 2015 onwards, is a continuum of that previous 
periods; a continuum of acts and crimes of omissions, commission and negligence of the 
past two decades. The chronicle of the forgotten humanitarian crisis is in this sense a 
chronicle of remembrance, memory and counter-memory, witnessing and testimony. The 
section below analyses the first phase of the ignored and disremembered humanitarian 
crisis, which unfolds between 1990 and 2004, and documents the overwhelming 
unauthorised border crossing of Albanian border crossers to Greece and the range of 
violence and harm they lived through. 
3.4.1 Albanian Border crossers 
In the early 1990s Greece gradually becomes a major entry point for border crossers, 
mainly coming from Albania  Dalakoglou, 2016; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010a, p. 5). 
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As Médecins Sans Frontières argues, “Greece as the eastern ‘gate’ of the EU, with 
extensive coastlines and thousands of small and big islands faces a particular challenge in 
managing migration flows to Europe”  Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010a, p. 5). The 
increased influx of this human mobility took place in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
former Communist bloc in 1989 and the collapse of the pyramid banking system in 
Albania as well as the civil war that followed in 1997 (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004, p. 1; 
Dalakoglou, 2016, p. 180; Kasimis & Kassimi, 2004; Maroukis, 2005, p. 214; Tsaliki & 
Chandrinos, 2008). Greece, as Thanos Maroukis highlights, from an immigration country 
had turned into an emigration country (Maroukis, 2005). However, Baldwin-Edwards 
notes the inadequate immigration policy of the Greek state, a fact which is mirrored on the 
lack of approximate data surrounding the extent, types and trends of immigration into 
Greece. As Baldwin-Edwards argues, 
This deficit has been caused by three distinct problems: the great extent of illegal (and 
therefore immeasurable) immigration; the extreme chaos surrounding the three legalisation 
programmes, and a lack of reliable data relating to these; the holding of discrete datasets by 
separate Ministries with little or no communication between them, and in particular, the 
problem with homogeneis [ethnic Greeks without Greek citizenship] (2004, p. 3).  
Albanian border crossers who arrived to Greece were mainly men who were employed in 
the informal economy by working in the construction sector, farming, manufacturing, 
while women were employed in domestic work and tourist sector (Kasimis & Kassimi, 
2004; Maroukis, 2005, p. 214; Tsaliki & Chandrinos, 2008, p. 4). According to Kasimis 
and Kasimi,  
in the 1990 to 2001 period of mass immigration to Greece, immigrants arrived in two 
waves. The first was that of the early 1990s, in which Albanians dominated. The second 
arrived after 1995, and involved much greater participation of immigrants from other 
Balkan states, the former Soviet Union, Pakistan, and India (Kasimis & Kassimi, 2004).  
The involvement of the Albanian border crossers into the labour market was so 
overwhelming that, as Lisa Tsaliki and Konstandinos Chandrinos highlight, the notion of 
the immigrant worker became a synonym to “Albanian” (Tsaliki & Chandrinos, 2008, p. 
3). During the period of 1990s, Albanian border crossers suffered in Greece since they 
were not accepted by the Greek society (ibid.). They experienced multilayered forms of 
violence in their everyday life, such as social exclusion, racism, xenophobia, exploitation, 
marginalisation, abuse, and exclusion from citizenship (Tsaliki & Chandrinos, 2008). Ill-
treatment by the police and violations of fundamental human rights and freedom are some 
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very common features of the violence Albanian border crossers experienced. Due to the 
absence of a migration policy, Albanian unauthorised border crossers were managed by the 
Greek state through the lens of criminality and public order (Baldwin- Edwards, 2014, p. 
1). The criminalisation of the Albanian border crossers was enhanced by their negative 
media representation, degradation and dehumanisation in a “hysterical”, as Baldwin-
Edwards notes, extent resulting in the construction of the stereotype of “the criminal 
Albanian”  Baldwin- Edwards 2014, p. 1). Albanian migrants were demonised as the 
absolute evil, whilst they were blamed for criminality. Media stigmatisation and 
representation perpetuate this image to such an extent that the word “Albanian” became a 
synonym of inferiority, belittlement and criminality (Tsaliki & Chandrinos, 2008, p. 5). 
This stigmatisation was so overwhelming that since I was a child the dehumanising and 
devaluating slogan, “Albanian, Albanian you will never become Greek,”  “Δεν θα γίνεις 
Έλληνας ποτέ, Αλβανέ, Αλβανέ”) (Golfinopoulos, 2007), which football fans and also 
Greek citizens were commonly saying when referring to Albanian border crossers, is 
deeply imprinted within my memory.  
A mechanism of control and regulation which was implemented against Albanian border 
crossers during the 1990s was the so-called “sweeping operations3” and “massive 
evictions” from Greece (Albanian Helsinki Committee, n.d.; Baldwin-Edwards, 2014). 
However, according to the Albanian Helsinki Committee the most severe and common 
form of violence that Albanian border crossers experienced was the excessive use of force 
by the police and the border police, which even included the use of fire arms. As the 
Albanian Helsinki Committee notes, 
The most severe violations of human rights involve use of force against Albanians living 
and working in Greece, legally or illegally. Cases of psychological violence exerted against 
them have emerged as another form of violation of human rights, apart from the use of 
physical violence. Documented cases speak of incidents involving even the use of firearms 
against Albanians attempting to cross the border illegally. These cases have often proved 
fatal for the illegal immigrants. Use of firearms by the Greek police in such incidents is a 
violation of international standards, which limit the use of firearms to life threatening 
situations and/or serious injury or define them as a means of last resort (n.d, p. 3). 
                                                 
3
 See also Chapter 6 on how the repressive and harmful surveillance measure of sweeping operations has 
been deployed again under the name Operation Xenios Zeus in order to frame stop, search, arrest and deport 
practices. 
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The “massive evictions” of border crossers or coerced deportations from Greece to Albania, 
were politically correct framed as readmissions
4
. Readmissions were arbitrary expanded 
and enforced even to Albanian border crossers with residency and work permit in Greece 
(Albanian Helsinki Committee, n.d., p. 3). According to the Albanian Helsinki Committee, 
“The rights of Albanian immigrants are violated especially at the moment of their arrest 
and detention, during the investigations as well as criminal proceedings against them” 
(ibid.). The negative representation of the Albanian border crossers from the media had 
succeeded in formulating a xenophobic and hostile context. A very important aspect of that 
period is the racist and xenophobic manifestations, fatal hate crimes against them also by 
Greek citizens (Baldwin-Edwards, 2014). In Lesvos Island, during the 1990s according to 
local interviewees, Albanian border crossers were mainly employed at local people’s 
allotments and olive groves; many of them used to sleep in their employers’ stables, they 
were paid less than the minimum wage and were usually referred by the locals as “the 
Albanian” and never by their names. The range of violence that Albanians border crossers 
experienced particularly during the first wave of their immigration to Greece is aptly 
summarised in the Albanian Helsinki Committee report as follows, “Albanian immigrants 
living and working in Greece suffer the majority of human rights violation cases among all 
Albanian immigrants all over the world” (n.d., p. 12). 
The increased unauthorised border crossing of Albanian people is followed by the 
progressive arrivals of border crossers from other countries. From 2000 onwards, Greece 
becomes one of the largest migratory pathways and a gateway of border crossers from Asia 
and African countries to Europe (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 36; Bacas, 2010a, p. 154). 
Between 2004 and 2010, Lesvos Island increasingly becomes the main gate for border 
crossers seeking sanctuary to Europe. Simultaneously, a great number of border crossers 
were crossing the land Greek-Turkish border via Evros River (Triandafyllidou, 2014, p. 3). 
The following section focuses on the second phase of the ignored and disremembered 
humanitarian crisis, which is between 2000 and 2014, and encompasses a detailed account 
on the social and political context which shaped the conditions leading to the so-called 
refugee crisis of 2015. 
                                                 
4
 See Chapter 5 on how the concept of “readmissions” has been deployed again in order to frame the coerced 
removals of border crossers to Turkey in the aftermath of the EU-Turkey Statement (March 2016) and the 
state of emergency which the refugee crisis generated. 
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3.4.2 Unauthorised Border Crossings in Greece and Lesvos (2002-2014): 
Political and Social Context 
Between 2002 and 2014 the arrivals of border crossers in Lesvos were less in numbers 
(Bacas, 2010a) in comparison to 2015 when the refugee crisis started unfolding. However, 
similarly to the period of the refugee crisis of 2015, a main characteristic of this period was 
the lack of reception services for border crossers arriving to Greece. Reports from 
international and Non-Governmental Organisations illustrate the unsuitable reception and 
the degrading, inhuman and appalling living conditions border crossers were facing by 
entering the Greek territory as well as the insufficient laws surrounding the asylum and 
reception procedures (Amnesty International, 2013a; European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010c; 
UNHCR, 2009). As a result, the sites that were used in order to host border crossers were 
initially monasteries and churches, police stations, former prisons and military bases or 
former warehouses and public buildings (Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2012, p. 285; Iliadou, 
2012, p. 325). In the early 2000, PIKPA camp  a children’s summer camp) on Lesvos was 
initially used in order to host border crossers mainly coming from Iraq (Carstensen, 2015; 
Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2012, p. 285; Green, 2010). Whilst, during 2004 a former 
military base, outside of the city centre, was used in order to host mainly Iraqis and Afghan 
border crossers (Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2013, p. 95). During 2004, Lesvos Island 
receives an increasing number of border crossers. During 2004 the NGO Greek Council for 
Refugees documented an increased number of Afghan unaccompanied minors living in 
Lesvos’ detention centre under degrading and humiliating living conditions (2004, p. 6). In 
2005 under the vague administrative coordination of the Municipality of Lesvos and the 
Police, border crossers were “hosted” in Pagani detention centre, which was a former 
warehouse building located in an industrialised zone 4km away from Mytilene city centre 
(Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2013, p. 95; Iliadou, 2012, p. 325). The detention centre 
operated between 2005 and 2010, whilst it was condemned as the worst detention centre in 
Europe during 2009 (ibid.). “Reception” centres within the Greek mainland and Lesvos 
before the refugee crisis era have systematically been condemned for the appalling, 
inhuman and degrading living conditions and for human rights’ abuses (Amnesty 
International, 2010, 2012a, Carr, 2012, 2015, p. 92; Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2012, p. 285; 
Iliadou, 2012, pp. 323, 325). In the end of 2009, Pagani was condemned as “worse than 
Dante’s inferno”  sic) (Carr, 2015, p. 94; Sarantidis, 2018b) by the former Deputy Minister 
Spyros Vougias who after visiting Pagani detention centre also declared, “What I have 
seen today is a human tragedy, with conditions in which no human being should be kept” 
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(in UNHCR, 2009). The living conditions there were so appalling that on the 5th April 
2011, the 1st section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled in judgment of 
the case Rahimi v. Greece (8687/08) that, “the conditions of detention in the centre, 
particularly with regard to the accommodation, hygiene and infrastructure, had been so 
severe as to undermine the very meaning of human dignity” (2011, p. 3). The seven 
Judges added that these conditions “irrespective of the length of the detention of the 
applicant, amounted to degrading treatment in breach of article 3” (ibid., p. 2). Pagani was 
closed in 2010 after protests of activists of the No Border Movement, and also allegations 
for physical abuse on behalf of the police against detained border crossers (Georgoulas & 
Sarantidis, 2013, p. 95; Iliadou, 2012, p. 325; Welcome to Europe, 2009).  
Although between 2004 and 2010, the unauthorised border crossings were relatively low, 
in comparison to 2015, the main features of that period included the following features. 
The deliberate and systematic practice of prolonged detention in structurally violent, 
humiliating, appalling and degrading living conditions within closed detention centres; 
lack of facilities, lavatories, bathrooms, beds, mattresses; detention in overcrowded 
facilities; lack of sanitary conditions; contagious health and skin diseases related to 
detention and the living conditions; enduring queuing and waiting for hours in order to use 
the bathroom and the toilet; lack of warm water during winter; lack of  free access to the 
yard; isolation due to lack of access to telephone booths, communication with the outside 
world, and the right to have visitors; restricted access to legal aid and information about 
international protection; lack of interpretation; humiliating and degrading treatment from 
the Greek authorities, systematic physical and psychological abuses on behalf of the 
police; the systematic prolonged detention of unaccompanied minors; the systematic 
violations of human rights, the inadequate access to healthcare and medical treatment; lack 
of shelters for unaccompanied minors, survivors of rape, torture, trafficking, LGBTQ 
people, older people, pregnant women, people with disabilities and families; separation of 
families (for a detailed account of the aforementioned see Amnesty International, 2010; 
Carr, 2015, p. 92; Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2012, 2013; Iliadou, 2012, pp. 330–332; 
Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010c, p. 5, 2010a; Pro Asyl, 2009). That period was 
characterised by International and Non-Governmental Organisations as “a continuing 
humanitarian crisis” (Committees on Foreign Relations of the US, 2012, p. 1532).  
During 2010, the migratory pathway which leads to Europe changed and the flows 
diminished from Lesvos, and dramatically increased at North Greece (Carr, 2015, p. 96; 
McDonough & Tsourdi, 2012, p. 1). According to Paul McDonough and Evangelia 
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Tsourdi, “Overall, by the end of 2010, about 90% of people detected irregularly entering 
the EU arrived first in Greece” (2012, p. 3; see also European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2011, p. 4). Through this lens, Frontex’s Deputy Executive Director 
described Greece in 2010 as the “hottest area of illegal immigration in Europe” (Carr, 
2015, p. 88). This period was also framed as a “humanitarian crisis” (Pro Asyl, 2014). 
During this period, many deaths of border crossers attempting to cross Evros were 
recorded. In this respect, Evros River, the natural border between Turkey and Northern 
Greece, became an enormous graveyard for hundreds of border crossers (Pro Asyl 2014, p. 
88). Fylakio Detention Centre in Evros region which was used to “host” border crossers 
was then condemned, similar to Pagani in Lesvos, for the humiliating and degrading 
conditions, for abuses, and violations of human rights (Greek Helsinki Monitor, 
SOKADRE, Minority Rights Group-Greece & OMCT Network SOS-Torture, 2011, p. 10; 
Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010c, 2010b). According to the NGOs Greek Helsinki 
Monitor, SOKADRE, Minority Rights Group-Greece, and OMCT Network SOS-Torture, 
Especially in Evros, both at the organised Fylakio detention centre and the detention 
facilities of border police stations, there are overcrowding, dire hygiene conditions, lack of 
access to yards, lack of communication with the outside world, absence of interpretation 
services, lack of information about rights and obligations while mixed detention (minors 
and women being held in the same cell with adult men) is a frequent phenomenon (2011, p. 
10). 
In the aftermath of the emerging humanitarian crisis in Evros region the Greek 
Government builds a fence in order to prevent the unauthorised entries from Turkey to 
Greece. This was one of the first fences which were raised by an EU member state in order 
to prevent and deter unauthorised border crossings (see Chapter 4). This action fired 
demonstrations from activists, political movements, citizens and International and Non-
Governmental Organisations (Pro Asyl, 2011). Moreover, its efficiency as a deterrent 
measure was challenged. Indeed, the only thing that was accomplished was to make the 
route more militarised, securitised, expensive, dangerous and fatal for border crossers (Pro 
Asyl 2014).  
During 2012, unauthorised border crossings changed again. Greece’s and EU’s fence, the 
“wall of shame” in NGO Pro Asyl words (Pro Asyl, 2011), as a deterrence policy at Evros 
River had much to do with this relocation of the flows from Evros to the Greek Islands 
again. The relocation of unauthorised border crossings from Evros to Lesvos from 2012 
onwards overlaps with two more parallel processes which are escalating and deteriorating 
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until today. That is, the process of an escalating racialised violence from the Neo-Nazi 
Golden Dawn (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Papanicolaou & Papageorgiou, 2016a) and the 
dehumanisation, criminalisation, xenophobia and extreme institutional violence from the 
Greek policy makers and the police (Amnesty International, 2012b; Human Rights Watch, 
2012, p. 36; Karamanidou, 2015, p. 21; Pro Asyl, 2012, p. 10). This xenophobic context 
was more intense in the mainland, and particularly Athens and Patras since most of border 
crossers were moving from the islands there, by staying in abandoned buildings and/or by 
sleeping rough in public parks and squares, in order to work and finance the smuggling and 
trafficking networks for another pathway to Europe (Pro Asyl, 2012, p. 5).  
Simultaneously, the Neo-Nazi political group Golden Dawn, although initially a 
marginalised subgroup existing since the 1990’s (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 22; Xenakis, 
2012, p. 445), by taking advantage of the ongoing financial crisis and the anti-migration 
sentiments became very popular and managed to be elected in the Greek Parliament 
(Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 7; Papanicolaou & Papageorgiou, 2016a, p. 400; Xenakis, 
2012, p. 446). On  the first and second elections of May and June of 2012 Golden Dawn 
gained 6,97%, and 21 seats,  on the elections of January 2015 gained 6,28%, 388.387 votes 
and 17 seats and on the elections of September 2015 gained 6,99%, 379.722 votes, 18 seats 
(Ministry of Interior, 2012, 2015). Golden Dawn committed several hate, racial motivated 
crimes and murderous attacks against border crossers (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 7), 
who were trapped in Greece for years due to the hostile EU (and national) migration laws, 
policies and treaties (such as Dublin I, II, III) all enforced by the Greek governments. In 
the year of 2012, so-called self-appointed “citizens’ groups5” in Athens city centre by 
claiming that their neighbourhoods were occupied and ghettoized by homeless border 
crossers formed safeguarding watch units by organising patrols in order to “clean”, as they 
claimed, their neighbourhoods and protect their properties and families from criminality 
and contagious diseases (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 7). 
At the same time racist discourses publicly articulated by the Greek policy makers and at 
the same time racist policies were enforced. A common humiliating and dehumanising 
attribution which was used both by government’s representatives and the media when 
referring to border crossers, was the term “lathrometanastis” (clandestine or illegal migrant 
in Greek), a humiliating, degrading term which dehumanises and objectifies border 
crossers (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 19; Konstantinidou & Michailidou, 2014, pp. 93, 129). 
Apart from racist language the Greek state also adopted (far-right) nationalist, militarist, 
                                                 
5
 Concerning the re-emergence of self-appointed so-called citizens’ groups which in reality are affiliated to 
Golden Dawn and are responsible for many hate crimes particularly in Lesvos see Chapter 6. 
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medical discourses and metaphors concerning unauthorised border crossing, such as 
“invasion”, “hygienic bomb”, “re-occupation” (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 36; Pro 
Asyl, 2012, p. 10). At the same time, violent and repressive control enforcements were 
implemented like the notorious Operation Xenios Zeus which was enforced in early 
August 2012 and is in force up to now (see Chapter 7). According to Human Rights Watch 
its aims were threefold, 
“1) deterring illegal immigrants by sealing the border with Turkey; 2) identifying 
undocumented migrants, particularly in urban centers, and returning them to their home 
countries; and 3) remaking Athens a city of law and improving the quality of life for 
residents and visitors” (2013, p. 13).  
Operation Xenios Zeus was a stop, search, arrest and deport practice combined with the 
use of physical abuse (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 4) and was criticised as a “racial 
pogrom” (Karamanidou, 2015, p. 25). The name Xenios Zeus was adapted by the ancient 
Greek God Zeus who, ironically, was the symbol of hospitality and the protector of all 
guests and foreigners. Operation Xenios Zeus was informally called “sweep operation” 
capitalising the will of the Greek government to restore the public order and manage the 
unauthorised border crossers through “sweeping” and “cleaning”, meaning through 
violence and coerced deportations. The deliberate choice of naming this violent and hostile 
practice against border crossers as Xenios Zeus on behalf of the Greek State was nothing 
else than a manifestation of policy makers’ perverted minds and cruelty.  
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011 both 
former colleagues and I working on Lesvos before the so-called refugee crisis, became 
witnesses and documented many testimonies from border crossers who had started 
arriving, saying that there are thousands more waiting at the Turkish coasts in order to 
come to Greece. During that period, I also remember that the police officers were also 
commenting the numbers of border crossers waiting at the other side of the border so as to 
come to Greece. In the end of 2012 border crossers, mainly from Afghanistan and Syria, 
started entering in Greece through Lesvos. During that period, I remember that the Greek 
authorities (the police and the port police) were refusing to arrest border crossers arriving 
and do all the necessary identification, registration and bureaucratic procedures which 
would allow them to travel to the mainland. Gradually, Mytilene’s public spaces, parks and 
streets were full of border crossers sleeping rough and who were paradoxically desperately 
requesting to be arrested by the police. Greek authorities’ deliberate denial and inaction to 
arrest border crossers and provide them with reception, accommodation and documentation 
 [74] 
 
resulted in their violent abandonment to destitution, homelessness and the racialised 
violence of the local Golden Dawn. On February 2013, I witnessed one of the first serious 
violent attacks from Golden Dawn members who were throwing stones against a group of 
border crossers sleeping rough in the port of Mytilene. As a result, a pregnant woman was 
severely injured.  
Although the main crisis-discourse locates the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015 
(Chapter 1), the period between 2012 and 2014 was a hallmark and a processor of the 
severe refugee crisis which is going to become visible and a spectacle later on 2015 
onwards in Europe having Greece and particularly Lesvos Island as its epicenter. The crisis 
was already visible for Greek and Lesvos people from 2013 onwards. Since 2013 border 
crossers never stopped arriving to the island. Another aspect of this crisis, before the so-
called refugee crisis of 2015, concerns the chaotic, inconsistent, confusing and maze-like 
bureaucracy surrounding the registration, identification and asylum procedures. This is 
another bitter story of the continuum of everyday violence in time and space which is 
materialised through (mis)management, violent abandonment and inaction until today (see 
below and Chapter 5).  
3.4.3 Reception, Registration, Asylum and Bureaucratic Procedures 
The registration, identification and asylum procedures in Greece and Lesvos show 
significant shifts since the 1990’s until the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement on 
March 2016 (European Council & Council of Europe, 2016) which inaugurated a new era 
as far as human rights concern (see Chapter 4). In 2008 when I started working in Pagani 
the bureaucratic and administrative, identification (screening), registration and asylum, 
procedures were in the hands of the police. A main feature of this period is the deliberate 
inconsistency, chaotic, lengthy, mentally exhausted and maze-like bureaucratic asylum 
procedures, uncertainty and enduring waiting of border crossers within closed detention 
centres in absence of any other open reception facility (Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2012, 
2013; Iliadou, 2012). During that period, the police was responsible for many and 
contradictory tasks a state which Stratos Georgoulas and Dimos Sarantidis call as “a 
conflict of interest position” (2013, p. 97). On the one hand, police were responsible in 
managing and completing the bureaucratic asylum procedures, which practically meant: To 
inform all border crossers about their right to seek for international protection; to receive 
the asylum application forms from the applicants; to issue and renew border crossers’ 
documentations; conduct the interview process for international protection; and finally 
make the decisions upon international protection. On the other hand, police were 
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responsible for the identification and registration procedures, which included the collection 
of biometric data (i.e. fingerprinting), which were saved in EURODAC database. At the 
same time, the police were responsible to arrest, detain and deport. How could the police 
manage, examine, judge, apply the international law by providing protection to border 
crossers without their assessment being objective or biased, when its substantial role as 
surveillance body was repression, policing, controlling and preventing unauthorised border 
crossings? The fact that the police themselves were responsible for managing the whole 
asylum procedures, was demonising the phenomenon of the unauthorised border crossing 
as a crime. Furthermore, how could police officers, who had no expertise and knowledge 
of how to conduct an interview with border crossers seeking international protection 
including survivors of torture, rape and trafficking, decide on an individual’s legal status 
and thus life? As Georgoulas and Sarantidis argue,  
for an objective assessment regarding the applications for international protection there 
must be a substantial knowledge of refugee law and continuing information on socio-
political developments in countries of origin of applicants. The fulfilment of these 
conditions is demanding for these decision-making and consultant bodies, which are, 
however, charged both with numerous other police and administrative functions, and have 
not the appropriate scientific training in order to judge fairly on asylum applications (2013, 
p. 97). 
During that period the percentages related to the recognition of border crossers’ legal status 
in Greece was less than 2% (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 36). Border crossers, while 
waiting for the police to complete the asylum and bureaucratic procedures, were coerced to 
live confined in overcrowded, degrading and humiliating conditions. After enduring 
waiting in vain many of them were deterred and either withdraw their claims or never 
applied for international protection in the first place. Deterrence was taking place in such 
extent that, as Georgoulas and Sarantidis note, after a point the detainees themselves in 
Pagani “were deriding anyone who decided to make an asylum application”  2013, p. 102). 
The aforementioned examples are outcomes of an early “bureaucratic deterrence” which 
was enforced as a deliberate policy and which I discuss in more depth in Chapter 5. 
Between 2013 and 2016, without the main problems actually being resolved and overcome, 
the asylum procedures partially passed to the hands of a new established Asylum service 
(Law 3907/2011) (Asylum Information Database, 2015, p. 21) whilst, the reception 
procedures to the hands of the First Reception and Identification Service (K.E.P.Y) (Law 
3907/2011, Presidential Decree No. 102/2012). Although, the Asylum Service was 
established in 2011 it was only during June 2013 when it officially started operating with 
 [76] 
 
main duties to “receive, examine and decide on all applications for international protection 
lodged in Greece” (Campaign for the Access to Asylum Network, 2015b). Until 2015, 
there were only six Regional Asylum Service Offices within Greece located in Athens, 
Lesvos, Rhodes, Thessaloniki, Northern and Southern Evros and three Asylum Units 
located in the city of Athens, Patras and Xanthis (Asylum Information Database, 2015, p. 
22). The continuing involvement of the police in the asylum procedures seemed to have 
come to an end. This proved to be a dream since an “old” asylum procedure continued 
taking place parallel to a “new” (Chapter 5). The unlovable involvement of the police 
within the asylum procedures did not after all end. The continuity of the “old” asylum 
procedure under the jurisdiction of the police perpetuated the bureaucratic, legal and thus 
existential limbo of backlog cases. Border crossers, in many instances, found themselves in 
despair when realising, that after living for more than a decade in Greece, their files were 
lost by the police and thus they had to begin the procedure all over again (see Chapter 6). 
The parallel systems caused a lot of confusion, uncertainty, suffering and discomfort to 
border crossers since even the Asylum Service created more problems than solved. Since 
its formal operation, in 2013 until the end of 2015, the Asylum Service could not guarantee 
the free access of border crossers to international protection (Asylum Information 
Database, 2015, p. 24). Border crossers were obliged to go in person to one of the Regional 
Asylum service offices and seek for international protection.  
This proved to be very challenging for border crossers who could not travel to one of the 
Regional Asylum Service offices, due to the fact that they did not possessed any travel 
document, passport or visa. Thus, border crossers did not have free access to the asylum 
procedures and were banned from international protection. Because of that they were 
confronting the danger of being arrested, detained and deported. The lack of interpreters 
and other working staff, even at the headquarters of the Asylum Service in Athens 
(Asylum Information Database, 2015, p. 23), made the asylum procedures slow if not 
impossible. At the same time, the implementation of Skype service in order border crossers 
to lodge their intention of seeking international protection and book an appointment with 
the Asylum service, made people’s lives  especially those who were living in camps in 
isolated areas) very difficult, since in most of the cases brought no result (Greek Council 
for Refugees, 2016d). Queuing and enduring waiting outside the main Regional Asylum 
office in Athens caused discomfort, complains and demonstrations (Campaign for the 
Access to Asylum Network, 2015a). Even people with serious medical conditions were 
forced to present themselves repeatedly before they finally had their asylum claim 
registered although the registration of such cases is prioritised (Asylum Information 
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Database, 2015, p. 25; Campaign for the Access to Asylum Network, 2014). As Asylum 
Information Database notes, “Persons in need of international protection who do not 
manage to lodge their application are not protected from arrest, detention and deportation” 
(2015, p. 25). This has been an unpleasant moment for people desperately wishing to seek 
for international protection but due to lack of access to the Asylum Service, they were 
remaining without documents in precariousness excluded from international protection, 
rights and welfare benefits. As a result, many people were arrested by the police 
(Campaign for the Access to Asylum Network, 2015b) and detained for prolonged periods 
of time.  
From March 2016 onwards, when the EU- Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016 was applied 
the asylum procedures are managed by various national and European bodies; the Greek 
Asylum Service and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), whilst the registration 
and identification procedures are managed both by Frontex’s staff and the Greek 
authorities (the Police and Port Police) (see Chapter 4 and 5). The reception procedures are 
managed by the First Reception and Identification Service (K.E.P.Y) with the involvement 
of various International and Non-Governmental Organisations. Although, the “old” asylum 
system gradually fades there is a parallel “old” and “new” asylum system, which traverses 
the whole system until today, and is framed as backlog. Until 2016 there were 
approximately 30,000 backlog cases in Greece whose application for international 
protection is still pending for more than a decade (CNN, 2016).  
3.4.4 The Continuum of the Politics of Detention 
The politics of administrative detention of people seeking international protection in 
humiliating, degrading, harmful and life threatening conditions in Greece, Lesvos and 
elsewhere is neither something new nor an exception to the rule which was re-enforced 
under a state of crisis, exception or emergency (see Chapter 4). The deliberate and 
systematic administrative detention of people seeking international protection (including 
unaccompanied minors, survivors of torture, violence, trafficking, gender and sexual 
harms) in unsuitable sites and in appalling, harmful and life-threatening living conditions 
has been the norm within the management of unauthorised border crossing for the last 
twenty years in Greece (see previous sections). The politics of systematic administrative 
detention dates from at least the 1990s, ever since the massive unauthorised border 
crossings of Albanian people to Greece (Cheliotis, 2017; Dalakoglou, 2016). The politics 
of detention is characterised from an enduring, in Adriani Fili’s words, “detention 
continuum” (Fili, 2016) enforced until now at the expense of border crossers’ lives. The 
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politics of administrative detention is part of the wider politics of deterrence and “culture 
of control” (Bosworth & Guild, 2008), which includes detention and imprisonment, severe 
migration controls, restricted entry criteria, demonisation and “crimmigration” procedures 
and negative media representations of border crossers as illegal and criminals (Aas & 
Bosworth, 2013; Bosworth & Guild, 2008; Bosworth & Turnbull, 2014). Moreover, a 
culture of control includes administrative, managerial, and organisational operations, 
budget management, and prolonged detention, increasing discourse linking migration to 
crime, organised crime and terrorism. Finally, it includes a bureaucracy of migration 
system which neutralises individual’s problems by grouping all migrants to one category 
(Bosworth & Guild 2008, p.712, see also Fassin 2011). Through this lens, unwanted 
human mobility is defined and managed through the banner of illegality and crime (Aas & 
Gundhus, 2015; Aliverti, 2012; Fassin, 2011; Weber & Pickering, 2011). Combined with 
an illegality/criminality vocabulary too, all border crossers are represented and treated as 
criminals and not as people seeking international protection. Bosworth and Guild note the 
domination of a “culture of control” instead of a “welfare culture” (Bosworth & Guild, 
2008). 
According to the Greek Council for Refugees (2016c), administrative detention is a 
bureaucratic procedure and not a criminal sentence which is imposed for multiple purposes 
such as identification, national security, public order, expulsion and removal. As Dennis 
Broeder argues, “[administrative] detention is not a matter of criminal law and prison 
sentences, but rather a matter of administrative detention, a temporary, bureaucratic 
measure to enable the enactment of other policies, such as expulsion” (2010, p. 169). It is 
the administration that imposes the detention and not the criminal law. The length of 
administrative detention in Greece has changed several times. When I was working in 
Lesvos in 2008, administrative detention could last for up to three months. In 2009 this 
changed into a maximum period of six months and then changed again to 18 months. 
Border crossers, unaccompanied minors and the so-called “vulnerable groups” were the 
ones to suffer most from the duration of administrative detention and thus from time per se. 
As if seeking international protection was a red flag for the police (until 2011 responsible 
for the management of the asylum procedures), border crossers seeking international 
protection were punished for seeking asylum by being coerced to stay the whole 3 months 
within Pagani and sometimes even more in appalling, degrading and harmful living 
conditions (Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2012, 2013; Iliadou, 2012). And that was the rule. 
Due to inaction of the prosecutor relating to their “guardianship”, unaccompanied children 
could also spend three months within Pagani. Detention’s duration- time- did not make any 
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discrimination regarding people with severe mental and health issues. It was since then 
obvious that the politics of administrative detention (and the asylum per se) was/is an 
enforcement of the politics of suffering.  
By making detention facilities, as Andriani Fili (2016) notes, unlivable and the living 
conditions harmful, appalling, humiliating and degrading, policy makers were indirectly 
coercing border crossers who were already “in” to “get the hell out”. That is to say, to 
leave the way they came; within dinghies, hidden in lorries, on foot and seek for other safe 
havens as far away as possible from Fortress Europe, or even better to return where they 
came from in the first place. This harmful and violent, systematic and deliberate practice 
which is implemented within a continuum in time and space is vividly manifested through 
a public statement of Greece’s Head Police Officer Nikos Papagiannopoulos in 2013, 
“Make their lives unlivable” [Κάντε τους το βίο αβίωτο] (DOC TV, 2013; Fili, 2016; 
News 247, 2013). In Head Police Officer’s own words, “We must make their lives 
unlivable, meaning that one should realise that from the moment that one enters within this 
country one will be detained. Otherwise we do nothing. We [Greece] consist of an 
attractive destination place for migrants” (NEWS 247, 2013). 
By saying “make their lives unlivable”, the Head Police Officer was encouraging the 
police officers to demonstrate “zero tolerance” and therefore to exercise violence against 
border crossers in order to coerce them to leave from Greece (Amnesty International, 
2013b; Fili, 2016). Until 2013, all the asylum, bureaucratic, registration, screening and 
even reception procedures were at the hands of the police (see Greek Council for Refugees, 
2016d). Furthermore, from 2012 - due to the ongoing financial crisis - there was an 
increasing concern about the affiliation of many police officers with the Neo-Nazi political 
party, Golden Dawn (Karamanidou, 2004; 2015; Papanicolaou & Papageorgiou, 2016a; 
Vasilaki, 2016), notorious for the hate crimes against migrants in the Greek mainland and 
the islands (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2015; Human Rights 
Watch, 2012; Karamanidou, 2004, 2015; Racist Violence Recording Network, 2014). 
Make their lives unlivable dogma in practice was enforced at the expense of all border 
crossers and migrants with more violence, abuse, and violations of human rights (Human 
Rights Watch 2012, 2013; Amnesty International 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2010, 2015a; 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2015; Pro Asyl 2014). According to 
the Racist Violence Recording Network’s report, during 2014, 21 cases were recorded of 
refugees who were subjected to racially motivated violence exercised by police officers in 
Greece (2014, p. 13). At the same time, the European Commission against Racism and 
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Intolerance in 2015 recorded 109 cases of violence with a racist motivation exercised by 
the police (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2015). These recorded 
statistics however do not reflect the reality and the range of violence to which border 
crosser were and still are exposed to by the police on the mainland and in the border zones 
particularly Lesvos, the detention and reception centres, the streets and everyday life. 
Taken together, all of these are illustrative of the Greek Government’s politics of deterring 
border crossers by turning Greece “into an ‘unfriendly destination’ for those considering 
entering or staying in the country clandestinely” (Cheliotis, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
A hallmark of the politics of detention is the existence, multiplication and operation of 
numerous first reception and pre-removal centres and refugee camps within Greece and the 
Greek Islands (Chapter 5). The multiplication of detentions and the politics of 
administrative detention of border crossers is not only a Greek phenomenon but it also 
takes place in EU and beyond (Ceccorulli & Labanca, 2014; MIGREUROP, 2016a). The 
activist network MIGREUROP emphasises the increasing tension of the politics of 
detention within EU and neighboring countries. “From 2011 to 2016, the total known 
capacity of camps identified by the Network, has gone from 32,000 to 47,000 places” 
(MIGREUROP, 2016b). Within this map - and in any map being produced by 
organizations and networks - police stations are not included. Confinement of border 
crossers within police departments is a common and systematic practice in Greece. Due to 
the lack of facilities or due to lack of space and capacity within the existing ones, police 
stations’ cells are turned into informal “reception” centres within which border crossers 
rights’ are systematically being violated. According to MIGREUROP,  
Such forms of administrative confinement may be combined with alarming police practices 
(handcuffing, body searches, and confinement with ordinary prisoners) which criminalize 
and put these foreigners in a precarious situation; internment in such places is generally not 
subject to judicial control and often has no legal basis; interned people cannot always have 
access to migrant associations, or to doctors or lawyers (2016b, p. 1). 
As Filli highlights, “Historically, no Greek government has ever shown the political will 
to break with the detention continuum”  Filli 2016). At the same time, Michael Welch and 
Liza Schuster argue that, “(...) detention is among the gravest acts the state can take 
against people. The seriousness of detention is even greater under circumstances in which 
persons are held not on criminal or immigration charges but rather after fleeing 
persecution” (2005, p. 332).  
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Conclusion 
The timeline of key events I discussed in this chapter includes a plethora of violations of 
human rights, structural violence, intimidation and the infliction of an enduring social harm 
to border crossers. The problems surrounding the overall procedures in each different 
phase of border crossings, the reception, asylum and bureaucratic procedures were never 
actually resolved. On the contrary, the chaos, inconsistency and inefficiency surrounding 
the asylum and bureaucratic procedures, the reception and living conditions, were inherited 
from one phase to the other by formulating a genealogy, routine, ritual and a continuum of 
enduring misery, violence and harm in time and space. In this Chapter I argued that the 
phenomenon of the unauthorised border crossing in Greece is not new and traverses the 
history of modern Greece since the 1990s and even before. Greece and Lesvos have been 
important gates for unauthorised border crossers and faced multiple humanitarian crises 
prior to 2015. In this regard, this chapter is an account of the rituals and continuum of 
coerced border crossings, violence and harms of the bureaucratic and asylum procedures in 
space (Greece, Lesvos and Europe) and time (from the 1990s onwards). This chapter 
provides a detailed account of the border harms and violence border crossers were 
experiencing in Lesvos and Greece before the so-called refugee crisis of 2015.  
In the next chapter I will explore the EU border regime, the externalisation and 
internalisation policies which are enforced since the 1985 Schengen Agreement and have 
proliferated in the aftermath of the refugee crisis. I will show that the refugee crisis has 
been deliberately and systematically abused by the EU policy makers in order to enforce 
and legitimise brutal, obscene and violent politics as “extraordinary” and “exceptional” 
(Agamben, 2005) in order to deter and pre-emptively prevent border crossers from 
reaching Northern Europe.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 Externalisation, Internalisation and Deterrence 
 
 
In the previous Chapter I showed that the unauthorised border crossings in Greece are not 
new phenomena, rather old. The multiple unauthorised border crossings are traversing the 
history of modern Greece since the 1990s. In particular, Lesvos Island has been an 
important gate to Europe for unauthorised border crossers since the early 2000s. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter 3 although, both Greece and Lesvos were receiving an increasing 
number of border crossers due to wars, conflicts and the authoritarian regimes the 
reception, management, the identification, registration, bureaucratic and asylum procedures 
were characterised by inconsistency, uncertainty, enduring waiting and chaos, by 
producing violence and multiple forms of harms. In this chapter I argue that the refugee 
crisis discourse has been deliberately and systematically abused by the EU policy makers 
in order to impose and legitimise brutal, obscene and violent politics as extraordinary and 
“exceptional” (Agamben, 2005) in order to deter and prevent border crossers from 
reaching Europe. The politics which have been imposed are the politics of closed borders, 
deterrence, externalisation and internalisation. All the aforementioned politics are not 
something new and have been deployed within a space-time continuum. In Greece and 
Lesvos, those politics are mainly materialised through the EU-Turkey Statement, the 
Hotspot Approach and the Geographical Restriction Regime, combined with an enormous 
process of military and humanitarian intervention within the borders. The aforementioned 
multiple and multilayered policies are implemented in stages following border crossers as 
they traverse the various lands, seas and borders in order to reach Europe.  
In Section 4.1 I will show that in the first stage, the EU policy makers (via the 
externalisation of EU borders) aim to pre-emptively deter and prevent border crossers from 
reaching Europe in the first place by immobilising them within non-EU countries. Through 
this lens, in Section 4.2 I will show that in a second stage, the EU policy makers are 
targeting border crossers, who are already en route to Europe, and through militarised 
surveillance and controls are abandoned to be adrift in the borders of violence. Border 
crossers on transit routes in Europe face the violent and fatal (land and sea) borders, 
ruthless “gangs” and smuggling and trafficking networks, arbitrary push-backs. In Section 
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4.3 I will show that in the third stage the EU policy makers aim to deter border crossers, 
who finally manage to reach Greece, from moving further to Europe via internalisation 
policies which transformed Greece and particularly the Greek islands into “buffer zones”. 
The example of the EU-Turkey Statement, the Hotspot Approach and the Geographical 
Restriction Regime are indicative examples of internalisation. Furthermore, I will show 
that internalisation has turned Lesvos into a Prison island by immobilising border crossers 
there for uncertain time in multiple forms of limbo.  
Vignette: The Borders of Violence 
 
It was a very warm day of June 2008 in Pagani detention centre. The combination of the 
warm environmental conditions and the overwhelming heat deriving from Pagani’s cement 
yard made the situation suffocating. The place was also busy during that time. 
“Newcomers”  border crossers) had arrived the previous night and since there was not any 
employee on shift to give them dry clothes, blankets, and mattresses, they were coerced to 
stay in wet clothes by sleeping on the floor until the next day. The noise was intense. 
Through a small window of the warehouse which was located on the second floor, one of 
the two employees, who was assigned with the burden of distributing to border crossers 
their mattresses, was throwing the mattresses to another employee on the ground floor. 
Among the employees on the ground floor there were also two border crossers forced to 
help the employee to do his job. The employee did not do anything; he was just 
supervising the two “volunteers” by giving them orders on how to do his job. A few steps 
away another employee was distributing by literally throwing from a distance toothpastes 
and soaps to border crossers. He was wearing a surgical mask and gloves and he was 
yelling at them, “Take this. Come on take it, you asshole”. Within this overwhelming 
combination of shouting and verbal violence I heard a man’s voice requesting me to 
approach. “Hey, Miss come here”. The man was a border crosser from Somalia who was 
detained in Pagani. He had just arrived the previous night. The man passed his hands 
through the blue bars of his cell which were standing as a border between us. The right 
hand first and then his left was stretched towards me by reaching me. Then, he started 
showing me his marks and bruises; on his hands, his neck and also the ones who were 
expanding from his neck towards his back. “They tried to kill us”, he whispered in order 
not to be heard by anyone and especially the police, whose office was just a few steps 
away from his cell. His name was Omar. Omar crossed the border the previous night with 
19 more people. As he repeatedly said their plastic boat was small, too small to carry all of 
them. When they crossed the Greek-Turkish sea borders and traversed the Greek territory 
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they were detected by a Greek Coast Guard’s vessel. As Omar said, “We thought that they 
were going to rescue us”. As he continued narrating me his experience during the search 
and “rescue” operation by the Coast Guard, he added, 
 
They [coast guard] pulled us all out of the boat but instead of rescuing us they beat us, they 
they tied our hands, they made a hole on our boat and throw us again in the sea. They 
abandoned us there with a flooding plastic boat. They left us there to die. We were eventually 
being rescued by a Greek rescue team.   
 
As he was speaking the other men who were travelling with him in the same boat 
approached and confirmed what Omar’s was saying. Omar then added, “There was also a 
woman travelling with us. They beat her too”. The incident was formally reported, and 
allegation was made against the coastguard for abusing and abandoning them during the 
search and rescue operations. From fear of their personal safety as they were locked within 
the cell in Pagani and also from fear of retaliation on behalf of the Greek authorities in 
Pagani and or later, Omar and the rest border crossers were hesitating to report it (see also 
Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2013, p. 97). Georgoulas and Sarantidis have documented a 
similar case of police violence against border crossers in Pagani detention centre. As they 
argue, “the witnesses had informally claimed that they had been threatened by the police in 
order not to mention any of the real incidents that took place” (2013, p. 98). Five days after 
the allegation was made, Omar and the other 19 border crossers mysteriously vanished 
from Pagani detention centre. This disappearance was even more awkward considering the 
fact that the vast majority of border crossers were usually facing prolonged detention 
(Chapter 3), before they were eventually released. As a result of the mysterious 
disappearance of the “victims”, I was left without the “victims-witnesses” to testify during 
the administrative inquiry under oath (ΕΔΕΕ) which was conducted one month later at the 
Coast guard offices in Mytilene. 
During the administrative inquiry under oath (ΕΔΕΕ), I had to testify all alone within a 
small and uncomfortable room in the Coast Guard’s building. The organisation I was 
working for did not provide me with any legal aid or advice. Neither my coordinator nor 
anyone else came at least for support. I still remember this inquiry as frightening and 
intimidating. The inspector at some points was yelling instead of speaking making the 
whole process look like as interrogation. The inquiry-interrogation lasted for five hours 
during which the inspector was constantly asking me, “Why are you doing this? These 
coastguards are family men who are serving their country”, by implying that patriotism and 
 [85] 
 
the protection of national security was above all and that it was also an ultimate value. 
Therefore, who was I to challenge these ultimate values? What interests was I serving? 
Who I was to harm the reputation of the Coast Guard? The outcome of the inquiry, 
conducted by both a high and lower rank Coast Guard officer showed that there was not 
such a thing as an abuse or abandonment. The “family men” were found innocent, and how 
would they not? The impunity of state officials is overwhelming, and it is also the norm 
since in cases of formal allegations the audit and the auditor is the same. As Georgoulas 
and Sarantidis highlight, “the administrative examination by the police of cases concerning 
police misconduct is highly problematic, since it has to do with the legal paradox that 
auditor and audited are from the same organisation” (2013, p. 90). 
I will never forget the inspector who was forcing me to identify the survivors by 
demonstrating me their pictures from the day of their arrest. “Did you think that we would 
not be able to trace them?”, the inspector was sarcastically asking me. I was forced to 
identify their faces and even the clothes they were wearing. It was a terrifying experience 
which even ten years after still generates feelings of horror, pain and guilt. The mysterious 
disappearance of border crossers made the feeling of guilt worse through the passage of 
time. What have I done? Have I put their lives in even more risk due to the allegation? Are 
they still alive? Have they been arbitrary deported back? I never learned what happened to 
them and I cannot stop but think that I am responsible for whatever happened to them. 
This case of violence and abandonment within the liminal border zones and thresholds is 
not the first and not an isolated incident. It is one of the multiple incidents that occurred 
and still take place while border crossers traverse the various land and sea border (see 
Section 4.2). 
4.1 “Good Fences Make Good Neighbours”: Deterrence and the 
Externalisation of the Borders 
In 2003 a policy paper under the name “A New Vision for Refugees” emerged, which 
included Tony Blair’s vision concerning the management of the unauthorised border 
crossings within Europe (Travis, 2003). This was Blair’s proposal in the EU-Thessaloniki 
Summit about the establishment of a regime of Regional Protection Areas, Protection 
Zones or Safe Havens, as well as Transit Processing Centres (TPCs) for border crossers on 
transit routes on Europe (Amnesty International, 2003; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Noll, 
2015; Travis, 2003). Blair’s ambivalent scheme would involve denial of entry to 
unauthorised border crossers and “economic migrants” by returning them within the Safe 
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Havens; within countries outside the EU and close to border crossers’ homelands 
(Johnston, 2003; Noll, 2015; Travis, 2003). Safe Havens countries would serve as 
containment for border crossers arriving for the first time there, for deportees from other 
EU countries and for returnees for possible resettlement to EU (Antonakaki, Kasparek, & 
Maniatis, 2016; Hess & Kasparek, 2017, p. 63; Kuster & Tsianos, 2016). According to 
Jennifer Hyndman the notion of “safe spaces” is not something new. It is a post-Cold War 
phenomenon which has been enforced in 1991 to Northern Iraq, Haiti and Rwanda 
(Hyndman, 2003; Long, 2013). Safe havens reflect the deliberate political intention of a 
“preventive protection” (Hyndman, 2003, p. 168), meaning the provision of humanitarian 
relief as far away as possible, within or closer to displaced populations’ home countries 
(Long, 2013). This demonstrates the determination of policy makers “to bring safety to 
people rather than people to safety, by force if necessary” (Newland 1999 in Hyndman, 
2003, p. 169). The EU management of the so-called refugee crisis -as it is particularly 
demonstrated via the Greek case- echoes Blair’s vision of safe havens. 
4.1.1 Externalisation 
Through this lens, the increased deaths at the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea, the suffering 
and violence at the Greek-Macedonian borders, particularly since 2015 onwards, triggered 
an awkward and oxymoronic response on behalf of the EU policy makers. By using the 
language of “crisis” and “emergency” (De Genova & Tazzioli, 2016) humanitarianism and 
care (Ticktin, 2016), EU policy makers announced their intention to “protect” border 
crossers’ lives from the criminal trafficking networks, culpable for the border-related 
deaths, and prevent more deaths within the land and sea border crossroads (Valletta 
Summit on Migration, 2015a, 2015b). From this angle, on November 2015 EU policy 
makers stated during the Valletta Summit on Migration, 
We are deeply concerned by the sharp increase in flows of refugees and border crossers, 
which entails suffering, abuse and exploitation, particularly for children and women, and 
unacceptable loss of life in the desert or at sea. Such an increase places the most affected 
countries under severe pressure, with serious humanitarian consequences and security 
challenges (2015b, p. 1).  
 
Although one would expect that their “deep concern” would be demonstrated via “safe 
passages”, as scholars and activists have advocated  Arsenijević et al., 2017; Jeandesboz 
& Pallister-Wilkins, 2016, p. 316; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2015; Newsweek, 2016; 
Ponthieu, 2017; UNHCR, 2013), which would allow border crossers to safely reach to 
 [87] 
 
European soils, an overwhelming “preventive protection process” (Hyndman, 2003, p. 
168) was enabled instead at and within the borders (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2016; Tazzioli & 
Garelli, 2018). Médecins Sans Frontières note that “safe passages” should encompass,   
 
Legal crossing of sea and land borders should be authorised into and inside the EU and 
transportation facilitated. Humanitarian assistance and access to functioning asylum 
procedures should be provided at entry points and along migratory routes. Dignified 
reception conditions have to be offered for all (2015, p. 1). 
 
The preventive protection response involved the proliferation and fortification of borders, 
the erection of fences, intense securitisation, militarisation of the borders (De Genova & 
Tazzioli, 2016, p. 10; Fassin, 2011), as well as an overwhelming humanitarian 
intervention as the Greek and Lesvos case demonstrates (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017). The 
range of the humanitarian intervention particularly in Greece and Lesvos was so intense 
that, according to Howden and Fotiadis, “it became the most expensive humanitarian 
response in history, according to several aid experts, when measured by the cost per 
beneficiary” (Howden & Fotiadis, 2017).  
 
This symbiosis between surveillance and humanitarian care, prevention and protection is 
framed by Miriam Ticktin as “armed love” (2016, p. 257). The armed love process also 
encompassed processes of externalisation and internalisation, which were pushing the 
borders of Europe both outwards (externalisation) and inwards (internalisation) 
(Andersson, 2014b, p. 5; De Genova & Tazzioli, 2016; Frelick, Kysel, & Podkul, 2016; 
Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 
24). The Greek and Lesvos case is an indicative example of the simultaneous outwards 
and inwards shifting of borders (Section 4.3). As I argue below this ambivalent armed 
love, the outwards (externalisation) and inwards (internalisation) shifting of borders and 
border controls beyond the physical borders of EU, are not something new (Akkerman, 
2018; Hess & Kasparek, 2017). Neither are the violence, harms and deaths of border 
crossers who are trapped in this suffocating armed love. One thing to note is that the 
outwards shifting and expansion of border controls beyond EU territory is unfolding since 
the 1985 Schengen Agreement (Collyer, 2007; Jones, 2016, pp. 16–22), which since then 
was focusing “on fortifying borders, developing ever more sophisticated surveillance and 
tracking of people, and increasing deportations while providing ever fewer legal options 
for residency despite ever greater need” (Akkerman, 2018, p. 2). The externalisation of 
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the borders policies have dramatically increased since the 1990’s but they saw an 
overwhelming flourish in 2015 onwards, in the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis 
(Akkerman, 2018; Collyer, 2007; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Noll, 2015; Ruhrmann & 
FitzGerald, 2016).  
 
Externalisation is pivotal within the European Migration Agenda of 2015 (European 
Commission, 2015a) established via the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 which recognises 
Turkey as “safe third country” or “a first country of asylum”  see Section 4.3). 
Externalisation involves the proliferation and fortification of borders, expansion and 
implementation of migration controls, policing and surveillance beyond EU, bilateral 
agreements with non-EU countries to manage the asylum procedures and deportees 
beyond the EU territorial borders (Akkerman, 2018; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016). As 
the UN Special Rapporteur François Crépeau notes, externalisation “effectively involves 
shifting the responsibility of preventing irregular migration into Europe to countries of 
departure or transit, especially through capacity-building activities in third countries 
towards stopping irregular migration”  Crépeau, 2013; see also Frelick et al., 2016, p. 
193). From this angle, EU policy makers in order to “protect” but mainly to control and 
pre-emptively stop border crossers before they even reach the EU territory (Akkerman, 
2018; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016; Triandafyllidou & 
Dimitriadi, 2014b), imposed immobility via “immobilisation strategies” (Aas, 2007; 
Weber & Bowling, 2008) and “remote control tools” (Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016, p. 
4) by stranding border crossers inside transit and buffer zones. Externalisation via 
deterrence is re-enforced as “a solution  …) that migrants are better protected by being 
deterred from undertaking the journey in the first place” (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 
2014a, p. 149). This oxymoron is core to the politics of deterrence. Externalisation 
policies are shifting the borders of EU outwards and even further (Ruhrmann & 
FitzGerald, 2016, p. 11; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 25) -far from Europe’s shores and 
media, there the collateral casualties in human cost are almost completely invisible to EU 
citizens (Akkerman, 2018, p. 2). 
4.1.2 Deter, Prevent, Protect “No Matter What” 
The toolkit of externalisation, deterrence and control includes, firstly, the Safe Countries of 
Origin, and the Safe Third Countries or First Country of Asylum. The concept of safe 
countries involves the recognition of non-European countries as safe by the EU policy 
makers (European Commission, 2015b; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016, p. 7). The safe 
country concept has a direct effect on the asylum procedures which can take place within 
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the safe countries. Through this lens, Turkey and Afghanistan were recognised as safe 
(European Council & Council of Europe, 2016; European Union, 2016), whilst, an EU-
Turkey Statement-like deal has been agreed between the EU countries and Libya 
(European Commission, 2017a). Secondly, it includes bilateral and readmission 
agreements with non-EU countries. Countries which were traditionally considered as 
transit -with an exchange of development, capacity building in terms of technical support 
for building infrastructures and financial aid- are now turned into “buffer zones”, by 
keeping border crossers stranded there. In this regard, buffer states are turned into the 
watchdogs of fortress Europe (Akkerman, 2018; Fekete, 2001), with no safeguards, “any 
promises of protection for the human rights of migrants”  Crépeau, 2013; see also 
Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2014a). After all, their ends justify the means, and by 
paraphrasing Frost’s quote; “good deals and bilateral agreements make good neighbours” 
(Frost, 1914; Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2014a, p. 152). Additionally, externalisation 
includes the deployment of maritime patrol operations within the Mediterranean and 
Aegean Sea (i.e. Frontex, NATO, EU Naval Force Med) (BBC NEWS, 2016; Frontex, 
2015; Garelli & Tazzioli, 2016; NATO, 2016), as well as the establishment of a European 
Border and Coast Guard  EBCGA) which “would consist of the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency, an enhanced Frontex, and the national border authorities, which are 
to share responsibility for European integrated border management” (Ruhrmann & 
FitzGerald, 2016, p. 25). 
Externalisation has in practice generated an enormous rise in death tolls, since the EU 
militarised borders made the border crossings more perilous, risky and expensive 
 Akkerman, 201 , pp. 2, 4; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2015, p. 1). Externalisation policies, 
also, coerced border crossers to address to the smuggling and trafficking networks, which 
have boosted their business at the expense of border crossers’ lives. Meanwhile, fences and 
walls, have been gradually erected within Europe by making the act of seeking sanctuary 
and international protection almost impossible (Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 20). After 
the fall of Berlin’s Wall which was a symbol of the Cold-War era, Greece is one of the first 
EU countries which erected a Wall in order to deter and prevent unwanted human mobility 
(Baczynska & Ledwith, 2016; Reuters, 2016). As Bill Frelick, Ian Kysel and Jeniffer 
Podcul argue,  
One of the cruel ironies in recent years is that a number of countries that have developed 
rights-sensitive standards and procedures for assessing protection claims of border crossers 
within their jurisdictions have simultaneously established barriers that prevent border 
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crossers from setting foot on their territories or otherwise triggering protection obligations 
(2016, p. 191) 
The aforementioned features are not the only obscene aspects of externalisation policies. 
In order to halt, deter and prevent border crossers from reaching Europe, EU policy 
makers are making deals and businesses with authoritarian countries, which 
systematically violate human rights, by providing them funding and even selling them 
weapons (Akkerman, 2017, 2018). As Mark Akkerman argues, 
The European Union in all its policies has a fine rhetoric on the importance of human 
rights, democracy and rule of law, but there seems to be no limits to the EU’s willingness to 
embrace dictatorial regimes as long as they commit to preventing ‘irregular migration’ 
reaching Europe’s shores. As a result there have been EU agreements and funding provided 
to regimes as infamous as Chad, Niger, Belarus, Libya and Sudan. (2018, p. 3) 
Thus, EU is culpable for the birth of more conflicts and violence as well as the production 
of more refugees, since “the same industry selling arms to the Middle-East and North-
Africa, fuelling the conflicts, repression and human rights abuses that have led refugees to 
flee their homes is also the key winner of EU border security contracts” (Stop 
Wapenhandel & Transnational Institute, 2016, p. 1). Multinational, military corporations 
(i.e. Airbus, Finmeccanica, Thales, Safran) have benefited from the increased militarisation 
and securitisation of EU borders, but have also actively been involved in lobbies by 
formulating policies and practices (Akkerman, 2018; Andersson, 2014a, p. 15; Vaughan-
Williams, 2015b, p. 22). Military and security corporations which manufacture and/or 
provide arms and equipment to border guards, private security corporations, intelligence 
and surveillance multinationals corporations have made profits from EU militarisation and 
securitisation policies  Andersson, 2014a, p. 14; Loewenstein, 2016; O’Donnell, 2016; 
Stop Wapenhandel & Transnational Institute, 2016, p. 12). Frontex’s role on the 
surveillance of EU borders has been extensively enhanced and so has its budget (Stop 
Wapenhandel & Transnational Institute, 2016, p. 11). According to Akkerman, 
The budget finally adopted for 2016 is even an astonishing 67% higher than that for 2015. 
According to the proposal for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, this will be 
the minimum budget for the new agency in the coming years. For 2017 an extra 31.5 
million euros have been requested, including 10 million Euros to purchase small and 
medium size operational equipment (2017, p. 14). 
The politics of the closed borders, externalisation and deterrence in place, instead of 
protecting border crossers’ lives by tackling the criminal trafficking networks as policy 
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makers were claiming, made things worse by making the migratory pathways through land 
and sea, more violent, risky, perilous and fatal (Brian & Laczko, 2016; Data Analysis 
Centre, 2017; International Organisation for Migration, 2016; Médecins Sans Frontières, 
2015). Externalisation pushed border crossers to the violent land and sea borders where 
they are confronted with more violence, push-backs, shipwrecks and death. This fact is 
vividly mirrored in Médecins Sans Frontières’ statement to the EU policy makers, “Your 
Fences Kil”l in 2015. As Médecins Sans Frontières observe,  
These policies have turned a foreseeable and manageable influx of refugees into a 
humanitarian crisis on Europe’s beaches, borders, train stations and motorways. The current 
approach of “non-reception” and closed borders has caused death, injury and chaos. The 
only way Europe can stop this misery is to replace the smugglers with a safe, legal and free 
alternative (2015, p. 1). 
In the following sections (4.2 and 4.3) I discuss how the politics of externalisation and the 
militarisation of the EU borders brought the exact opposite results from the ones which 
were initially promised  “to end the human suffering, restore the public order and tackle 
the criminal trafficking networks”). Externalisation, militarisation and internalisation 
strengthened rather than tackled the criminal and trafficking networks (Akkerman, 2018, p. 
34), made borders even more violent and inflicted more suffering, violence, border-related 
harms and deaths.  
4.2 En Route: Violent Thresholds and Harmful Borders 
 
“Behind every death there was a dream, and then a tragedy.”  
(NewStatesman, 2008) 
According to the United Nations Office of the Higher Commissioner, “Policies aimed not 
at governing migration but rather at curtailing it at any cost, serve only to exacerbate risks 
posed to migrants, to create zones of lawlessness and impunity at borders, and, ultimately, 
to be ineffective” (OHCHR, 2014, p. 2). As Roxanne Lynne Dotty argues, “geographical 
border areas are the prototypical ‘margins of the state’, i.e. spaces where law and order are 
simultaneously rigorously enforced and elided and where tensions are often the most 
obvious and the most extreme” (2011, p. 599). The politics of deterrence, externalisation 
and closed borders created liminal geographical spaces –“zones of exception” and 
“thresholds”- of extreme, violence and exploitation (Agamben, 1998; see also Vogt, 2013). 
The proliferation, securitisation and militarisation of borders beyond EU territory, made 
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border crossings even more “spatial” and “fragmented” (Collyer, 2007, p. 668; Vogt, 2013, 
p. 764) complex, non-linear and lengthy throughout which border crossers move, stuck, 
wait, and again move. As Wendy Vogt argues, “migrants occupy a liminal space as they 
attempt to cross national borders, earn cash, secure shelter, eat, and make incremental 
movements toward their destination” (2013, p. 766).  
Borders are liminal spaces which are characterised by lawlessness and impunity, legally 
and geographically  De Le n, 2015, p. 27; Khosravi, 2011, p. 62; Prem Kumar & Grundy-
Warr, 2004, p. 38). According to Jason De Le n, “Border zones become spaces of 
exception-physical and political locations where an individual’s rights and protections 
under law can be stripped away upon entrance” (2015, p. 27). While crossing the one 
violent border after the other, border crossers simultaneously are traversing liminal 
thresholds and spaces wherein the law is suspended, the sovereign power deems to operate, 
and lives are reduced “bare lives” or “homo sacer” (Agamben, 1998). “Bare life” is a 
philosophical metaphor originating from the ancient Roman Law. According to Agamben, 
a bare life represents “the life of the “homo sacer” (sacred man), who may be killed and yet 
not sacrificed”  199 , p. 12). It represents a liminal figure who is depoliticised by being 
stripped from any social and legal rights and whose life is deemed by the sovereign as 
unworthy to enjoy rights and the protection of the law; thus her/his death is of little 
consequence (Agamben, 1998; see also De Le n, 2015, pp. 27–28; Doty, 2011; Chapter 5). 
As Nicolay B. Johansen notes,  
Homo sacer exists both inside and outside society, and thereby mirrors how sovereignty 
relates to the limits of law and territory. By the ‘inclusive exclusion’ of homo sacer, the state 
creates an ‘exception’. This exception is both a threshold between the inside and outside and 
a defining entity for the law and the state (2013, pp. 258–259). 
Bare lives are considered exceptions to the norm, and are consigned, excluded and 
abandoned to “zones of exception”, wherein the law is suspended by creating liminal 
thresholds (Agamben, 1998, p. 12) or “creates a juridical void which permits abuses and 
killings without punishment” (Doty,  2011, p. 602). Unwanted border crossers can easily 
be reduced to “bare lives” and thus potentially be abandoned, effaced and killed 
(Agamben, 1998). Due to the management of the unwanted human mobility through the 
banner of  security, threat, terrorism, illegality and crime (Aliverti, 2012; Bosworth & 
Guild, 2008) unauthorised border crossers have been demonised, dehumanised and 
racialised. The “zoopolitical” management of borders, the representation and treatment of 
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border crossers as animals (Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 80, 2015a) and their confinement 
in degrading and humiliating living conditions (see Chapter 4) lead to further 
dehumanisation by reducing border crossers deeper to “bare life”. In this sense, when a life 
is no longer a life and humans are “no longer humans” (Prem Kumar & Grundy-Warr, 
2004, p. 36), their expulsion and even death is legitimised and normalised.  
Legitimisation and normalisation of death and violence at the borders are vividly 
manifested via the systematic practice of push-backs and “left-to-die boats” (Vaughan-
Williams, 2015b, p. 64) (see Chapter 5). The borders as thresholds, as “zones of exception” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 12), where law is suspended, are operating as a moral alibi for the 
denial of any state responsibility for border-related deaths, violence and harms (Doty, 
2011) (see Chapter 5). 
4.2.1 Push-backs 
Arbitrary push-backs are not isolated incidents but a common, deliberate and systematic 
practice of the politics of closed borders and deterrence which are applied on various 
border zones from Melilla and Ceuta, the U.S-Mexico borders and Greek-Turkish borders. 
Push-backs are exercised by the authorities at the sea and land Greek-Turkish borders, the 
Greek-Macedonian (FYROM) borders and elsewhere (Amnesty International, 2015b, p. 
11; UNHCR, 2016). Greek borders and especially the river of Evros (Aggelidis, 2016; 
Greek Council For Refugees, 2018; Lee, 2018) and the Aegean Sea are the violent sites 
where these practices take place silently and quietly since the 1990’s, perpetuating in this 
sense the continuum of state violence, the violence of the politics of deterrence and closed 
borders in time and space. Various cases of illegal push-backs of border crossers at the sea 
as well as at the land Greek-Turkish borders have been documented by International and 
Non-Governmental Organisations as well as activist networks (Amnesty International, 
2013a; Asylum Information Database, 2015; Greek Council for Refugees, 2014; Pro Asyl, 
2012, 2014). Violent borders are the sites where atrocious acts of violence, gun shootings, 
physical abuse, torture, intimidation are taking place silently and quietly (Amnesty 
International, 2013a, 2015b; Asylum Information Database, 2015; Pro Asyl, 2014, 2016) - 
before the dawn and within the deep night, in remote/isolated territorial border areas, and 
where there are no witnesses to testify. Activist organisations, like Pro Asyl, have reported 
the systematic practices of illegal push-backs, human rights violations and state violence, 
the systematic impunity of the state agents committing all these crimes at and within the 
borders (Pro Asyl, 2012, 2014). According to the NGO Pro Asyl, 
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 …) illegal push-backs from the Greek sea and the land borders occur systematically. 
Greece has been accused of such blatant human rights violations before. However, the 
brutality and the extent of violations found in this report are shocking. Masked Special 
Forces officers are accused of ill-treating refugees upon apprehension, detaining them 
arbitrarily without any registration on Greek soil and then deporting them back to Turkey, 
in breach of international law. In fact, there are “grey” zones where refugees are detained 
outside any formal procedure; in practice these refugees don’t exist. Special units of the 
Greek coastguard abandon refugees in Turkish territorial waters without consideration for 
their safety (Pro Asyl, 2012). 
Apart from the push-backs within the sea, testimonies from border crossers note the 
existence of a border mafia consisted by thieves or paramilitary armed men, making the 
border crossing even more agonising and perilous. According to Arzoo, an Afghan border 
crosser woman,  
The boat was not very big, and we were approximately 60 to70 people including 
children 8, 10, 12 and 14 years old. When we were in the sea some Turkish people 
came inside the boat. They were thieves and they were asking for our money. We were 
almost drowned. When they approached the boat, they opened the engine in order to 
remove it from the boat. We were crying and begging them not to remove the boat’s 
engine and we gathered our money and gave it to them. After they took our money, 
these men finally did not remove the engine and left. This is a tragic experience and we 
were all very afraid. The three men were masked, they were speaking Turkish and they 
had their heads covered with scarves. 
In 2015 Human Rights Watch brings to the surface evidences of paramilitary people who 
were attacking border crossers’ boats within the sea (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Human 
Rights Watch recorded eight incidents where armed and masked men, who were identified 
as Greeks, attacked the boats and “deliberately disabled their boats by damaging or 
removing the engines or their fuel, or puncturing the hulls of inflatable boats. In some 
cases, the boats were towed to Turkish waters”  ibid.). 
4.2.2 Agency, Resistance, Survival 
“Thresholds” and border “zones of exception” might be liminal spaces which can reduce 
border crossers to “bare lives”, but they are also spaces of possibilities where anything can 
happen (Doty, 2011). From this angle, not all border crossers are necessarily reduced to 
“bare life”, since many of them resist and survive (see also Chapter 5/ Section 5.5.4 where 
I discuss agency, resistance, and survival within the border). Survival per se is a form of 
resistance (Doty, 2011, p. 610). Border zones as liminal spaces reflect the tension between 
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the increased fortification of borders, the externalisation, surveillance and control and 
border crossers who defy, disobey, and metaphorically speaking “mock” borders by 
crossing them. According to Reece Jones, “By refusing to abide by a wall, map, property 
line, border, identity document, or legal regime, mobile people upset the state’s schemes of 
exclusion, control and violence. They do this simply by moving.” (2016, p. 180). In the 
following section I will discuss how thresholds and border “zones of exception” allow the 
existence and flourishing of illicit activities of various agents; the criminal smuggling and 
trafficking networks, gangs, robbers and thieves, intermediates, paramilitary men and 
border guards. They also allow the impunity of the perpetrators often under the sanction of 
the state. I will also discuss how liminality allows a profitable and demanding neoliberal 
capitalist market to flourish, wherein border crossers’ bodies, labour and lives become 
useful objects and commodities for transaction, exchange and exploitation which may both 
gain and lose value within local conditions (Vogt, 2013, p. 765). Thus, I will discuss the 
issue of commodification of border crossers and the degradation of the value of human life 
per se, by echoing Veena Das’ argument that, “the ultimate fetish is the idea of life itself as 
an object of endless manipulation” (in Scheper-Hughes, 2003, p. 4). 
4.2.3 The Border Mafia of Land and Sea 
Various agents “work” at the border: the police, the state officials, border guards, military 
and paramilitary people, gangs, smuggling and trafficking networks, travel agents, hotel 
owners (Akkerman, 2018; EUROPOL, 2016; Shelley, 2014). As Shahram Khosravi 
argues by reflecting on his lived experiences, “We ‘illegal’ travellers were an easy source 
of income for many people we came across en route” (2007, p. 50). Sometimes these 
actors work independently but very often collaboratively by making the border crossings 
even more expensive, agonising and dangerous, a profitable trade at border crossers’ 
expense (Amnesty International, 2017c, p. 6). According to Keita, a border crosser from 
Syria on Lesvos, 
We lived in a smuggler’s house and we were robbed twice there by people who pretended 
to be the police. They threatened us that if we would not give them our money they would 
deport us. From fear that we were going to be deported we gave them all our money. One 
guy from fear that he is going to be deported jumped from the window and broke his waist 
and legs. I was about to do the same thing, but they did not let me do it. They grabbed me. 
And these people were not the police they were the mafia who were collaborating with the 
smuggler. 
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As Amnesty International notes “refugees and migrants have become a resource to be 
exploited – a commodity around which an entire industry has grown” (2017c, p. 6). 
Smugglers and traffickers are key actors within this border market because without them 
facilitating the journey, the journey cannot be fulfilled. Smugglers and traffickers are 
actors whose existence ends up being a “necessary evil” for border crossers in lack of safe 
passages. Smugglers and traffickers know the tricks, they have the “know-how”, they 
know the pathways through the mountains, and the “safe houses” along the way (Shelley, 
2014). They also know the “right” people, meaning all the other actors consisting of what I 
name as the “border mafia”; particularly police officers, customs officials and border 
guards, who are keen to turn a blind eye and allow border crossers to continue their 
journey but in exchange of labour, money or sex often in the form of rape  Falc n, 2001; 
Khosravi, 2011, p. 40). I am using the term border mafia both metaphorically and as part of 
a border vocabulary which I found that exists and is used among border crossers. Mafia is 
a term often used among border crossers, like Keita, in order to describe the various agents 
who, engage with illicit activities, organised crime and exploitation. Many of the stories 
border crossers have shared with me were lurid stories of border lawlessness, violence and 
exploitation en route to Europe by various agents, including the police, border guards and 
other state officials. Paradoxically, it is also the term mafia that border crossers use in 
order to refer to border guards and state officials who brutally exploit and abuse them. In 
doing so then, border crossers challenge mainstream policy makers’ discourses, which 
label the smugglers and traffickers as “mafias” and “ruthless criminal networks” 
(Andersson, 2014a, p. 14), by also revealing the corruption which is often state-sanctioned 
and state-involved. Border crossers also refer to smugglers/traffickers as “dal lals” 
(Khosravi, 2011, p. 56), “coyotes” (Khosravi, 2011, p. 104; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 
2007, p. 225), “qachaqbar” (Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit, 2005, p. i). 
“Qachaqbar” was one of the first Persian words I learned when I started working in Pagani 
detention centre. 
Trafficking and smuggling is one of the most profitable organised crimes along with the 
illegal trade of weapons and drugs (euro2day, 2013). Paradoxically, however this trade as 
Ruben Andersson notes, “grows alongside tougher [border] controls” (Andersson, 2014a, 
p. 14). During my research on Lesvos I interviewed Soltan, a border crosser from 
Afghanistan who told me that he had to spend several days sleeping at the mountains in the 
cold, risking dying from hypothermia, dehydration and starvation, 
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You know I came with a qacaqbar [smuggler] from Afghanistan. For five days I was 
travelling from Afghanistan to Turkey. All this time I was living on the mountains in the 
cold, without water and food. For five days! The qacaqbar did not allow us to light fire. We 
said, “Why we cannot light any fire? We will die from cold” and he said, “It is not my 
problem if you are going to die. You must wait here until I find a track to transfer you to 
another place”. We were waiting for five days on the mountains and after that the track 
came and transferred us to another place near the Turkish borders. 
Similarly, Mokhtar, a border crosser from Syria told me that his smuggler let him and his 
group to stay to a house without food and water for days,  
The smuggler took us to a house and we stayed there for one week. It was an abandoned 
place with holes on walls. You know in these places you might find yourself sleeping where 
sheep are living. In this house there was no water to drink and the smuggler gave us just 
coke-cola, no food just coke-cola and you know how bad coke-cola is for an empty 
stomach, particularly if you have not eaten anything for days. I have never drunk coke-cola 
again since then. 
Testimonies about the corruption and the involvement of state officials in the exploitation 
of border crossers within the border zones and transit countries are reported from activist 
groups and the border crossers themselves. Amnesty International has reported the 
corruption of the Libyan police officers who abuse, detain border crossers and extort for 
money in exchange their freedom (Amnesty International, 2017c, p. 8; Khosravi, 2011, p. 
20). Louise Shelley argues that state’s corruption plays a pivotal role within this industry, 
“Corruption is deeply connected to the problem of trafficking in Europe: travel agencies, 
border guards, customs officers, and other diplomatic personnel must be bribed or extorted 
for trafficking to be successful” (2014, p. 10). Abbas, a border crosser from Syria on 
Lesvos, told me that he had to bribe border guards in exchange of not being deported. As 
Abbas said, 
Once, police came in one of the smuggler’s houses. I was sleeping on the first floor when 
late in the night seven to eight police officers entered the house. I immediately informed all 
the guys who were living in the same house with me. The police officers arrested us and 
told us that we were going to be deported. We offered them 500 dollars in exchange of our 
freedom. This is how we got away from danger.  
Sams, a border crosser from Afghanistan told me that he was exploited and robbed by 
Iranian police officers, “We were arrested by the police at the borders who took us into a 
small room. They put spray in our eyes and as a result we were unable to see. After that 
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they stole our belongings. Some guys had money on them. Police officers took the money 
and then they let us go.” 
Border crossers are confronted with multiple visible and invisible, hard and closed borders 
all throughout their journey to Europe. Those borders are constantly being erected by the 
violent and harmful deterrence and externalisation policies implemented in the name of 
saving lives. Without having any other option of following safe passages which lead to 
Europe, border crossers are coerced to turn to the trafficking and smuggling networks and 
being exposed to multiple and multilayered border harms and violence. And although EU 
policy makers claim that the securitisation and militarisation of borders is implemented in 
order to tackle the criminal smuggling and trafficking networks according to Hein De 
Haas, 
While politicians and the media routinely blame “smugglers” for the suffering and dying at 
Europe's borders, this diverts the attention away from the fact that smuggling is a reaction 
to the militarisation of border controls, not the cause of irregular migration. Ironically, 
policies to ‘combat’ smuggling and irregular migration are bound to fail because they are 
among the very causes of the phenomenon they claim to ‘fight’ (De Haas, 2015). 
Neither trafficking/smuggling networks, nor the border mafia would exist if there were no 
politics of deterrence, externalisation and closed borders which have transformed mobility 
into a profitable human trade by pushing people directly into the wolf’s mouth. In section 
4.2.4, I will discuss the collateral casualties in human cost of the politics of closed borders, 
deterrence and externalisation implemented by EU in the name of care, protection and 
public order. I will show that the “care” of theirs has in practice generated and enforced a 
further commodification and devaluation of human lives and of what it means to be 
human.  
 
4.2.4 Coerced Choices, Autonomy Harms and Commodification 
 
The hardships we have gone through, the sea, the sufferings… We did 
not just pay with money; we paid with our blood, our souls. 
 (in Papageorgiou & Spathis, 2017)  
 
The concept coerced choices is deliberately introduced and deployed in this thesis. By 
doing so I am not claiming that border crossers are powerless, passive victims lacking 
agency and free will. All human beings have agency to formulate choices. The survival 
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strategies border crossers adopt throughout their border trajectories, as well as their 
defiance of the border regime, shows agency and autonomy. I am using here the concept of 
coerced choices in relation to extortion, bondage, and debt  O’Connell Davidson, 2013), 
and the obligation of paying it off as dominant features of the unauthorised border 
crossing. Extortion, debt and the obligation of paying it off play a crucial role in the 
formulation of border crossers’ choices, and thus their autonomy. Due to the overpriced 
journeys, debt is a means for border crossers to finance and secure a place within a car, 
lorry or boat which leads to Europe. However, being indebted in order to finance the 
journey and being obliged to pay off, highlights the asymmetrical power relations, 
extortion and dependency which exist between border crossers and the people who 
facilitate their journey. As Julia O’ Connell Davidson argues, 
Financing migration through debt can be an active choice without also being a ‘voluntary’ 
or ‘autonomous’ choice, and migrants’ decisions to take on debts that will imply heavy 
restrictions on their freedom are taken in the context of migration and other policies that 
severely constrain their alternatives (2013, p. 176). 
Coerced choices are thus highlighting this oxymoron; that border crossers are not victims 
and powerless, but at the same time their choices are not entirely free. Thus, coerced 
choices concept is also deployed here through a social harm perspective and, and are 
considered as autonomy (Pemberton, 2015, p. 29) and financial/ economic harms 
(Dorling et al., 2008, p. 15; Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; Tombs, 2019) inflicted upon border 
crossers (see also Chapter 1/ Section 1.2). Poverty, need and being indebted can lead to 
extortion and dependency by limiting border crossers’ autonomous choices, and coercing 
them to consent and engage in harmful activities which otherwise they would not. What I 
found during my research was various forms of debt for which border crossers were 
indebted, obliged and extorted to pay off with various forms of economic transactions so 
as to be allowed to cross the borders. As academic research shows due to the flourishing 
of the illicit human trade market the multiple forms of “clandestine migration services can 
lead a number of different forms of debt to a variety of different third parties”  O’Connell 
Davidson, 2013, p. 179). Three dominant types of transaction and extortion based on debt 
and the obligation of paying off are the financial debt, labour debt, and sexual debt. Here 
border crossers’ bodies and lives are playing a crucial role as objects, commodities or 
tokens of economic transaction and manipulation. As Nancy Scheper-Hughes argues, “a 
broad concept of commodification, encompassing all capitalised economic relations 
between humans in which human bodies are the token of economic exchanges  …)” 
(2003, p. 2). Due to the fact that this unauthorised human mobility is class structured it is 
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mainly the poor who are to suffer more exploitation and agonising mobility. The ones 
“who have nothing more to sell”, as Khosravi notes, “advertise their organs for sale” 
(Khosravi, 2017, p. 176). Border crossers’ bodies -through their labour, organs or sexual 
“services” often in the form of rapes- were used as a token or voucher of economic 
transactions within this (in)human trade. These features are related to the boosting of a 
profitable and demanding neoliberal capitalist human trade market which is 
merchandising border crosser’s bodies -in whole or in parts- as commodities. 
The oxymoronic term coerced choices is linked with the mobility of the poorest because, 
due to their structural and marginal position, they are more likely to be indebted, extorted 
and make unbearable coerced choices. Also, at the altar of profit of the obscene neoliberal 
capitalism  some) lives, mainly of the poor and marginalised, “can both gain and lose value 
during their journeys in material and embodied ways” (Vogt, 2013, p. 765). 
4.2.4.1 Financial Debt 
Border crossings are fragmented, expensive and not always successful, which means one 
might have to repeat them several times in order to reach one’s destination. Many border 
crossers are coerced to sell all their belongings and property, their allotments and homes in 
order to gather money and pay the smugglers. Arzoo told me that in order to gather money 
for the journey to Europe her family had to sell all of their belongings in Afghanistan. The 
debt not only burdens the travellers but also burdens those who are left behind, the family 
and friends (Chu, 2010). Therefore, not paying off the debt is not a choice. Due to the fact 
that border crossings are lengthy and fragmented, many of the border crossers I 
interviewed had to work for months and even for years in border zones and transit 
countries in order to gather money to pay (off) the smugglers. Many of them were 
confronted with more exploitation. Adam, a border crosser from Ghana told me that he had 
to stay for six months in Turkey to work in order to find money to pay the smuggler but he 
was exploited and attacked by gangs, “I stayed in Turkey for six months. I worked in a 
restaurant there, but I never got paid. They were always saying “next week, next week”. 
They are still holding my money. In Turkey I was attacked and robbed twice by a gang 
after returning from work.” 
Many border crossers are not able to pay the tariff to the smuggler and commit to pay off 
their debt when they reach Europe. Paying off the debt is inevitable. Smugglers/traffickers 
under the use or threat of violence against border crossers themselves and family members  
and under the threat of physical violence or even voodoo, as it often happens to women 
border crossers from various parts of West Africa (DW, 2010; Independent Advisory 
 [101] 
 
Group on Country Information, 2016), secure the collection of the debt. Other border 
crossers I interviewed on Lesvos in order to finance their journey were coerced to be 
indebted to the smuggler. Javid another border crosser from Afghanistan could not pay his 
smuggler in advance so he had to make a deal with him and pay in instalments, 
I paid the smuggler half of the money in cash and the other half was paid by both my 
parents and me when I found a work. I paid myself 400 EUROS to the smugglers when I 
reached Greece. One cannot avoid paying the smugglers because they can keep you as a 
hostage and they might even cut your fingers, nails or ears. Smugglers are capable of doing 
anything. They can find you. They have people who can find you. In every country that you 
are they have people and they can find you and harm either you or members of your family. 
The financial harms which are inflicted upon border crossers in order to overtake their 
journey to Europe cannot easily be measured, estimated and known. The property loss 
varies and is dependent on the real value of the property and the price which was eventually 
sold. Border crossers, for instance, can sell their main household in case they do not have 
cash to pay the traffickers/smugglers. This means that they can sell their house in any price 
because of need. This might also lead to the homelessness of the rest of the family which is 
left behind due to the fact that the border crossing is very expensive. Allotments are 
frequently sold too, which might lead to destitution and precariousness for the rest of the 
family which is left behind, since an allotment could be the only means for living. Cash 
loss varies too. The most common type is as described above and is related with the fact 
that border crossers are engaging with the informal economy and often become exploited 
by their employees. 
4.2.4.2 Labour-debt 
A common feature of labour-debt is that many border crossers are coerced to work as 
recruiters, facilitators and even as drivers of the boats in exchange for a free “pass” in the 
boat which leads to Europe. According to Khosravi, “many smugglers were themselves 
migrants or refugees who engaged in the business for a few years before going to the West. 
In addition, there was a number of dealers, middlemen and lackeys who worked for the 
smugglers”  Khosravi 2010, p. 39). Aarash, an Afghan border crosser interviewee, was 
coerced to engage in smuggler’s businesses in Turkey in exchange for a free pass to 
Greece. As Aarash noted, 
I worked for days in Turkey, but I could not gather the money I needed for the journey. I 
started then working for the smuggler. I was recruiting people. I had agreed with a smuggler 
to find ten people for him and he promised that if I do this, he would send me to Greece for 
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free. I did that, but he did not send me to Greece as he had promised. Then the smuggler 
told me to find five more people. I managed to find three. The smuggler found one more 
and the fifth person was me. Thus, he finally sent me to Greece. 
Many border crossers engage with smuggler’s businesses as facilitators or recruiters of 
other border crossers in order to pay off the debt and to be allowed to travel for free. 
However, this is risky since if they will be caught by the authorities they will be sentenced 
for many years as “smugglers” or “traffickers”. As Kamran, an Iranian interviewee 
observed, 
This is something usual because there are people in need like me who do not have money. 
And this is beneficial for the smuggler because he does not want to risk his life in order to 
recruit people and thus he uses refugees as recruiters of other refugees. The smuggler in 
order to convince refugees to collaborate with him asks the refugee-recruiter to advertise 
him to others as a good businessman, whose clients were sent to Greece without being 
deported or arrested by the police. In exchange, the smuggler guarantees a free pass to the 
boat. 
Other border crossers agree to drive the boat during the unauthorised crossing, risking 
arrest by the authorities and being charged with many years of incarceration as traffickers. 
As Kamran says,  
Often, the smugglers ask the refugees to drive the boat from Turkey to Greece in order to be 
allowed to travel for free. The boat usually operates with an engine and the only condition 
is the refugee to touch with his own hands the boat’s steering wheel. However, refugees 
who are arrested by the police driving the boat are punished. They are arrested and sent to 
jail as traffickers. These persons are going to prison for nothing, because they are not 
smugglers, they are refugees who simply do not have money to pay the smuggler and they 
are desperate to enter Europe. 
These are autonomy and financial harms inflicted upon border crossers who without 
having any other options of a safe passage to Europe and also without having the 
ability to control their circumstances, they are coerced to become smugglers’ 
“employees”, “recruiters” or “drivers”. 
4.2.4.3 Sexual debt 
Another harmful feature of this human trade is the “sexual debt”. In lack of any other 
option, due to destitution, asymmetrical power relations, and dependency border crossers 
are coerced or extorted to finance their journey by providing sexual “services” to the 
smugglers/ traffickers, border guards and the other intermediates. By considering the fact 
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that border crossers do not have alternative options, and thus the element of coercion and 
extortion is central and dominant within all aspects of their multiple journeys to Europe, by 
formulating the choices they have, I consider the practice of sex even when there is 
“consent” as extortion, coercion and thus rape. Border rapes are “a border tariff and border 
transgressors are raped to get permission to cross” (Khosravi, 2011, p. 40). Contra to other 
systematic rape practices which take place in genocides, ethnic cleansing, armed (internal) 
conflicts and wars as a strategy and military policy in order to terrorise, displace, defeat, 
“feminise”, humiliate and shame whole communities and populations (Amnesty 
International, 2014; Falc n, 2001; Reid-Cunningham, 2008), border crossers due to 
poverty and desperation, are extorted and “consent” to be raped by the smuggler s), border 
guards and others in order to be allowed to pass to the boat which leads to Europe 
(Amnesty International, 2016a; Andersson, 2014a; Khosravi, 2007). It must be noted that 
border crossers often are not “offered” the option to “consent” and finance their journey 
through “sexual debt” and are brutally raped from border station to border station, before 
and after the journey, en route and even within the boat. As Tasos, one of the volunteers I 
interviewed told me, “Raped women were so many that after a point we were distributing 
abortion pills to almost all refugee women arriving”. Border rapes are a manifestation of 
the obscene, gender, sexualised, patriarchal borders which obsessively target 
unaccompanied women, LGBTQ people, unaccompanied minors, and young men. 
The aforementioned forms of debt are not the only coerced choices which border crossers 
are forced to make in order to finance their journey to Europe, to survive and due to their 
hierarchically and structurally marginal position. Another form of debt is the “organ 
debt”. Border crossers in order to finance their journey or generally in order to survive are 
coerced to “consent” to organ removal, which are broadly circulated and sold as 
commodities in the organ trafficking and transplantation industry (Budiani-Saberi & 
Columb, 2013; Kannan, 2014; Panjabi, 2010). Furthermore, border crossers find 
themselves indebted and/or bonded into: coerced bonded labour in the agricultural sector, 
fishing industry; get enslaved into forced marriages; children on the move are enslaved in 
(sexual) labour, trafficking, and forced participation in armed conflicts as child soldiers 
(Adesina, 2014; Fein, 2016; Hynes, 2018; Lewis, Waite, & Lewis, 2015; Lowenkron, 
2015; Murphy, 2014; Puente Aba, 2018; Reichel & Randa, 2018; Simmons & Burnt, 
2013; Strauss, 2012; The Guardian, 2017, 2018b; UNODC, 2016; Wright, 2017). These 
forms of commodification and the range of harms which are inflicted upon border 
crossers will be analysed in more depth in the future. 
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4.3 Safe Havens and Prison Islands: The Internalisation of the 
EU Borders 
 
Humane law does not recognise any border. Borders are 
constructed by inhumane minds (in Khosravi, 2011, p. 108) 
In the aftermath of the refugee crisis, the violence and suffering against border crossers at 
the Greek- Macedonian (FYROM) borders, which was escalated after the shutting down of 
the Balkan Route (Human Rights Watch, 2016), and the increased border-related deaths 
into the Aegean Sea (International Organisation for Migration, 2016), EU adopted and 
implemented multilayered and multilateral policies in the name of humanitarianism, public 
order  “end the human suffering and restore the public order”  European Council, 2016: p. 
1) and responsibility to protect (International Commission on Intervention and State 
Soverignty, 2001; United Nations, 2005). According to the UN office on Genocide 
Prevention and Responsibility to Protect, 
The responsibility to protect embodies a political commitment to end the worst forms of 
violence and persecution. It seeks to narrow the gap between Member States’ pre-existing 
obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law and the reality faced by 
populations at risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
(United Nations, 2005). 
By drawing on the paradigm of externalisation, the EU implemented externalisation 
policies by pushing this time borders inwards (Hess & Kasparek, 2017, p. 63). This process 
is framed as “internalisation” of borders within European countries like Greece, and 
vividly echoes Blair’s vision of Safe Havens (see Section 4.1). Gradually, Greece due to 
the internalisation policies from a traditionally in-between country was turned into a 
protracted waiting room. The internalisation policies which crucially affected Greece and 
particularly Lesvos were the EU-Turkey Statement, the Geographical Restriction regime 
and the Hotspot Approach.  
4.3.1 The EU-Turkey Statement 
In 1  March 2016 in a common Statement, EU and Greece recognised Turkey as a “safe 
third country” and “a first country of asylum” even though Turkey has been criticised for 
the systematic violations of human rights and violence (Amnesty International, 2016b). 
This practically meant that, “all new border crossers entering from Turkey into the Greek 
islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey”, as well as “Migrants not 
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applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in 
accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey” (European Council & 
Council of Europe, 2016). For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek 
islands, the EU agreed that a Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU – up to a 
maximum of 72,000 persons (Gatti, 2016). In order to comply with the Statement, Turkey 
agreed to “readmit non-Turkish nationals to its territory, from June 2016; to apply a 
previously-agreed plan on the status of Syrian refugees in Turkey; and to prevent non-EU 
citizens from leaving” (Peers & Roman, 2016).  
The EU-Turkey Statement has systematically been criticised as a non-legal document or 
juridical international agreement, meaning that is only a deal, “an agreement for the mutual 
benefit of the two parties” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2018b), which 
however does not bind Greece to implement it (Amnesty International, 2016b; Chios Law 
Bar Association, 2016; Refugee Support Aegean, 2018). Moreover, Amnesty International 
stated that the EU-Turkey Statement is governed by “moral and legal flaws” and urged the 
Greek government to completely reject it (Amnesty International, 2016b). The EU-Turkey 
Statement has also been criticised as dehumanising, for it ignores the very people at the 
heart of the refugee crisis by “significantly eroding their rights” (Amnesty International, 
2016b). It has also being criticised as violating “European and international law, since it 
might lead to collective expulsions and may not give asylum-seekers an effective 
opportunity to apply for international protection in the EU” (Gatti, 2016, p. 1). 
Furthermore, due to the recognition of Turkey as a safe country almost all asylum claims 
potentially can be assessed as “unfounded” and “inadmissible” resulting in  massive 
expulsions, deportations or readmissions of border crossers back to Turkey (Amnesty 
International, 2016b; Gatti, 2016, p. 1). Additionally, the EU-Turkey Statement has been 
criticised for legitimising Turkey as a “safe” country although systematic violations of 
human rights, violence, a dysfunctional asylum system, inequalities in access to protection, 
degrading living conditions and coerced expulsions of border crossers from Turkey  have 
been reported (Amnesty International, 2016b; Gatti, 2016).  
However, one severe challenge to the idea of Turkey as a safe country is the social and 
political conditions implemented particularly in the aftermath of the post-military Coup 
era. After the unsuccessful military coup in Turkey massive arrests, abuses, violations of 
human rights and liberties of Turkish citizens and military men took place (Amnesty 
International, 2018b). The Head Director of Amnesty International, journalists and judges 
in Turkey are arbitrary arrested (Amnesty International, 2018b; Sputnik news, 2017a, 
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2017b). In the aftermath of the Turkish military coup an increased number of Turkish 
citizens have attempted to cross the Greek -Turkish borders and seek international 
protection from fear of persecution of Erdogan’s regime (Stockholm Centre for Freedom, 
2018). On Lesvos coasts, the dead bodies of Turkish citizens, including families, have been 
washed ashore, whilst activists have reported systematic push-backs of Turkish citizens in 
the Evros region (Greek Council For Refugees, 2018). Turkish citizens living in Germany 
have sought international protection there from fear of persecution in Turkey (China 
Economic Net, 2018; Global security, 2017). On 2017 eight Turkish military men entered 
Greece with a military helicopter to seek international protection and they were granted the 
refugee status on the grounds that Turkey is not a safe country for them (Associated Press, 
2016). Although Greece recognised Turkey as unsafe for Turkish citizens nevertheless, it 
recognised and legitimised Turkey as a safe country for border crossers. 
4.3.2 The Geographical Restriction Regime 
After the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement via a decision of the Asylum 
Service director (Efimerida tis Kyvernisis, 2017) the ambivalent “geographical restriction 
regime” was re-enforced in complying with the terms and conditions of the EU-Turkey 
Statement. Under the geographical restriction regime all new border crossers arriving at the 
Greek Islands after the 20th of March 2016 are stranded by the Greek authorities, until 
their bureaucratic and asylum procedures are completed (Greek Council for Refugees, 
2016d). According to Sophia one of my interviewees, a lawyer and activist supporting 
refugees in Lesvos, the Greek Government is determined to implement the EU-Turkey 
Statement and the Geographical Restriction Regime “no matter what”,  
Turkey does not accept refugees back if it is proved that returnees [border crossers] are 
returned from another part of Greece and not from the islands. The EU-Turkey 
Statement says; “From the Greek Islands only! Do not return refugees [to Turkey] from 
Korinthos [Greek mainland]. Those keep them’!   
Meanwhile, the legality and even the validity of the Geographical Restriction Regime per 
se is being challenged by activists and Non-Governmental Organisations as constituting a 
deprivation of liberty and against the Greek Constitution (Amnesty International, 2016b; 
Chios Law Bar Association, 2016, p. 11). Chios Law Bar Association (2016, p. 11), notes 
that this rule is only an outcome of interpretation and thus a political decision per se.  
The EU-Turkey Statement does not define that refugees are obliged to stay at the Greek 
Islands until their asylum application is being processed. Refugees and migrants’ obligatory 
staying is an outcome of an interpretation. However, the way this interpretation is 
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implemented until now is against both the Greek Constitution and the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Hence, refugees and migrants who enter Greece through the Greek 
Islands should have the right to move to the Greek mainland until their asylum application 
is examined (2016, p. 15). 
On April 2018 the Greek Council of State, the supreme administrative court of justice, 
issued a decision which was annulling the Asylum Service Director’s decision (Efimerida 
tis Kyvernisis, 2017) concerning the geographical restriction of border crossers on the 
Greek Islands. The Greek Council of State acknowledged that the geographical restriction 
forced border crossers to live in structurally violent conditions and highlighted that, 
the Decision of the Asylum Service Director does not set out legal grounds for the 
imposition of restrictions on border crossers’ freedom of movement, and deduced no 
serious reasons of public interest to justify the necessity of the restriction in accordance 
with Article 31(2) of the Refugee Convention (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 
2018a). 
 
However, the decision of the Greek Council of State, which would provide relief to 
thousands of border crossers on Lesvos, was not in practice put into effect due to the 
Asylum Service’s new Director, who after the court’s decision claimed public order and 
security reasons. The decision of the geographical restriction regime which was re-
enforced by the Asylum Service Director raises legal, political and moral issues and also 
evidences that the Greek authorities are determined to implement this rule “no matter 
what”. The decision also manifests the institutional and administrative violence border 
crossers are exposed to on Lesvos by the administration per se. How and why an 
administrative service, as the Asylum Service is, is legitimised and authorised not to abide 
with the rule of the Greek State Court?  To quote Vickie Cooper and David Whyte,  
 
Violence committed at the institutional level  …) is not delivered by ‘street gangs’ or by the 
individuals that are typically the focus of public anxieties and tabloid moral panics. The 
[institutional] violence is delivered by smartly dressed people sitting behind desks. And if 
we are looking for people to blame for [institutional] violence, we may not get very far. In 
front of the  …) politicians who designed this agenda  …) stand the armies of civil 
servants, government departments and Local Authorities (2017, p. 23).  
 
The geographical restriction regime and the enduring immobilisation of border crossers 
within Lesvos (and the other islands) created a prison context physically and symbolically, 
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an enormous territorial and geographical limbo. As if the long and dangerous journeys 
from one violent border to another, from harm to harm, and from limbo to limbo were not 
enough, border crossers additionally found themselves to be captives and prisoners of the 
Greek state and the EU. The geographical restriction regime indefinitely immobilised 
border crossers on Lesvos by creating a spatial confinement context, where the prison is 
not located only within Moria camp but everywhere on the Island. According to Katja 
Franko Aas, “one does not need prisons to be, or feel, incarcerated in the locality”  2007, 
p. 293). As Sariad, a Syrian border crosser, puts it by echoing most of my interviewees, 
“The Island is like a prison; the only difference now is that there are no fences; there is 
instead the sea.”  
4.3.3 The Hotspot Approach 
The hotspot system for the containment, regulation and control of the unwanted border 
crossers is not something new. It was put in effect on May 2015 within the European 
Agenda of Migration and under “the Hotspot Approach to Managing Exceptional 
Migratory Flows” policy (European Commission, 2017b). Under the Hotspot Approach 
scheme, EU via multiple EU agencies (EASO, Europol, Frontex, and Eurojust) 
demonstrated its “support” to Greece and Italy in order to cope with the massive influx of 
border crossers arriving. Through the lens of the hotspot approach Greek islands and 
particularly Lesvos were turned into a securitised and militarised space by inaugurating the 
semi settlement, symbiosis and operation of multiple national and EU bodies; The Greek 
police and Coastguard, the Greek army, the European Union’s law Enforcement Agency 
(Europol), the European Union Borders and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX), the 
European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO), the Greek Asylum service, the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) 
and various International and Non-Governmental Organisations. At the same time, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has also been deployed in order to patrol the 
Aegean Sea and “assist” in tackling the “criminal trafficking networks”, which were 
blamed for the deaths of hundreds of border crossers (BBC NEWS, 2016; NATO, 2016). 
NATO’s operations at the Aegean Sea inaugurated and established a whole new 
geopolitical epoch as far as the militarisation of the Aegean Sea is concerned (Garelli & 
Tazzioli, 2016).  
In 2015, Moria camp was transformed into a “hotspot centre” (Council of the European 
Union, 2015), where all the aforementioned EU agencies, International and Non- 
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Governmental Organisations managed the processes of asylum, debriefing, screening, 
identification, registration and other bureaucratic processes until now (European 
Commission, 2017b, pp. 15–16). According to the European Commission’s report a 
hotspot is described as “an area at the EU’s external border which faces disproportionate 
migratory pressure” (2017b, p. 14). Until the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement 
on March 2016 hotspots on the islands were, as Martina Tazzioli and Glenda Garelli argue, 
“dock-and-go” where border crossers were completing their registration and identification 
procedures relatively fast and then they were moving to the Greek mainland (Tazzioli & 
Garelli, 2018, p. 2). In the aftermath of the EU-Turkey Statement and the Geographical 
Restriction Regime, Moria camp was turned into a “closed” detention centre and Lesvos 
into a Prison island (Tazzioli, 2016). Due to the overcrowded facilities within Moria 
hotspot the practice of confinement of all border crossers was proved to be practically 
impossible and eventually was merely implemented for some border crossers; the 
unaccompanied minors through the lens of “protective custody”, and the deportable 
nationalities detained inside the Section B (see Chapter 5). From this angle, the hotspot 
approach combined with the EU-Turkey Statement and the geographical restriction regime 
produced different multilayered material and symbolic incarcerations of border crossers on 
Lesvos inside, outside and beyond the camp of Moria, what Tazzioli and Garelli name as 
“containment beyond detention” (2018, p. 2) (see also Chapter 6); that is to say, “forms of 
containment that take place outside of the fences of detention centres while being strictly 
connected with them” (2018, p. 4) . 
Conclusion 
When I first visited Lesvos for fieldwork on October 2016, only a few months after the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, there were approximately 6,000 border 
crossers immobilised indefinitely in a state of precariousness, destitution and limbo within 
the official, unofficial and makeshift camps of the island in degrading, humiliating and 
appalling living and reception conditions (see Chapter 5). The implementation of the EU-
Turkey Statement, combined with the other deterrence tools (Section 4.1 and Chapter 5) 
succeeded in decreasing the migration flows, just as policy makers had hoped for 
(International Organisation for Migration, 2017a). At the same time, it “succeeded” in 
increasing the death tolls, harms and human suffering of border crossers who since then 
have been following alternative and more risky routes mainly through Italy, Spain and 
Cyprus in order to reach safety (International Organisation for Migration, 2017a). 
Furthermore, harm and suffering is inflicted upon border crossers who are permanently 
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stranded in a state of limbo within border zones, formal and makeshift camps in Lesvos, 
Greece and elsewhere (Chapter 5). After the implemetation of the EU-Turkey statement 
self-harms and suicide attempts of border crossers on Lesvos took place as an expression 
of despair and fear of coerced deportations (Chapter 5) in harmful and lifethreatening 
conditions.  
As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the awkward ongoing “armed love” enforcement in 
the aftermath of the “refugee crisis” under the rubric of deterrence, externalisation and 
internalisation, is deeply engrained, and has brought more misery, suffering and death 
upon border-crossers’ lives. Not only border crossers face the multiple forms of militarised 
borders before they even reach Europe, due to the externalisation policies and bilateral 
agreements of the EU with non-EU countries, but they additionally found themselves 
against the violent (land and sea) borders and thresholds as well as border harms en route 
to Europe. But even when they reach Europe, as the Lesvos case shows, border crossers are 
confronted with a Kafkaesque militarised, securitised, bureaucratised complex, which 
regulates their everyday lives (see Chapter 5 and 6) and is enforced from the internalisation 
policies. The implementation of deterrent politics in order to prevent border crossers from 
entering or moving forward to European soils created a prison within the prison context in 
Lesvos and elsewhere. The metaphor of Lesvos as a Prison Island encapsulates the fact that 
there are multilayered and multiple forms of bigger and smaller, actual, symbolic and 
metaphorical detentions, prisons, confinements and imprisonment of border crossers 
beyond the actual, material prisons incarnated via barbered walls, cells, surveillance 
cameras, closed gates and gatekeepers. The metaphor of Lesvos as the Prison Island is one 
of these symbolic incarnations of imprisonment beyond the actual prison and a devastating 
aspect of the violence and the multiple forms of social harm border crossers are 
experiencing on Lesvos (see Chapter 6). Without being able to move either forward or 
back but restricted in a piece of earth surrounded by the deep blue sea, border crossers are 
held in multiple forms of limbo.   
In the next chapter I will discuss the consequences of the internalisation policies and their 
collateral casualties in human cost. I will focus on the bureaucratic deterrence and thus 
“the ‘ordinary’ and ‘mundane’ bureaucratised face of violence” (Cooper & Whyte, 2017, 
p. 23) and the multilayered forms of everyday violence border crossers experience on 
Lesvos. Finally, I will discuss the material and symbolic confinements beyond the camps 
and hotspots as they are manifested through the Prison Island and I will highlight the 
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multilayered and multiple forms of structural violence, harms and even death deliberately 
inflicted upon the poor and marginalised of this kind of human mobility. 
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CHAPTER 5  
“Make their Lives Unliveable”: The Harms and Violence of 
Reception, Asylum, Detention and Bureaucracy 
 
 
In the previous chapter I focused on the politics of deterrence, externalisation and 
internalisation which were proliferated in the aftermath of the refugee crisis and which 
made the border crossings even more violent and fatal. This Chapter is divided into two 
parts. In Part I, I will refer to the reception, registration, identification and asylum 
procedures implemented upon arrival. I will also refer to the overwhelming inconsistency, 
confusion and bureaucratisation of the procedures which have condemned border crossers 
to an enduring discomfort, uncertainty, waiting and bureaucratic limbo. I will focus on the 
structural violence and social harm, which the processes per se inflict upon border crossers, 
as they become trapped within them, and on the “structural violations of human rights” 
(Ho, 2007) which in turn exacerbate harm. I will refer to the blatant violation of the 
principal right of having access to international protection in terms of; (i) restricted 
“physical” access to the procedures and the responsible/relevant bodies in order to lodge in 
an application; (ii) restricted access to accurate, timely and effective information about 
international protection; (iii) restricted access to legal aid; (iv) safeguarding of the principal 
of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. As I found the violations of these 
principals inflicted severe harms including the coerced deportations and refoulement of 
border crossers in life threatening and violent conditions. I will then refer to what I call 
“bureaucratic deterrence”, meaning the intentional, well-designed policy of deterring by 
gradually, slowly and silently ‘killing’ those who have sought international protection in 
Europe. The “bureaucratic deterrence” is the apotheosis of the politics of discomfort 
(Darling, 2011, p. 268) and the unease (Bigo 2002). As I will explain, the “bureaucratic 
deterrence” includes an overwhelming bureaucratisation, procedural chaos, inconsistency 
and uncertainty, enduring waiting and queuing, maze-like and mentally exhausting 
procedures, which border crossers must adhere to while living in harmful, life threatening, 
humiliating and degrading reception and living conditions. In this way, border crossers are 
deterred and indirectly coerced by the authorities to withdraw their asylum claims, and 
either traverse alternative dangerous illicit migratory pathways to other European countries 
or “voluntarily” return to their countries of origin.  
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In Part II, I will consider the harmful, humiliating, degrading and appalling living 
conditions of border crossers within Moria hotspot, the structural violence and social harm 
border crossers experience. I refer to this form of violence as obscene, drawing on the 
work of scholars and activists (Beneduce, 2015, p. 559; Biehl, 2013; De Genova, 2013; 
Mbembe, 1992, p. 5; Migreurop, 2017), because it coerces people to destitution and 
precariousness by indirectly coercing them to do unspeakable and harmful things, which 
otherwise they would not, in order to survive. Unwanted pregnancies, survival sex, coerced 
marriages, smuggling are only few of the multiple forms of this obscene violence I found 
unfolding as both “manifest and latent” (Galtung, 1969, p. 172) on Lesvos. The apotheosis 
of obscenity is that this violence is avoidable but deeply built within the structures. Finally, 
it is emphasised how this obscene violence is intentional not random, an outcome of 
political decisions, of acts of omission and commission.  
Vignette: The Borders of Bureaucracy and Inconsistency 
In overcrowded cells, without having any access to the yard even for a few minutes, border 
crossers were standing behind the blue bars of their dirty and overcrowded cell in Pagani 
detention. Unable to reach me they used to nod at me in order to approach them. Small 
pieces of papers from boxes, toothpaste packages and information leaflets were circulated 
from hand to hand, from cell to cell, through the blue bars of the cell by ending up in the 
outside world; to me. Handwritten names, ages, nationalities, other personal data, 
questions, requests or complains were a usual form of communication in the absence of 
any interpreter or an English-speaking detainee who could serve as an informal interpreter 
and as an intermediate between border crossers and me. The lack of interpretation could 
directly lead to isolation since many non-English speaking border crossers were 
condemned to silence or in dependent relations with other detainees. “Why some people 
are leaving before us even though we have spent more days inside prison in comparison to 
them”? “Is this fair?” and “Are we forgotten here?” were in so to speak the frequently 
asked questions. Those small pieces of paper were given to me with a hope that the 
problem would soon be resolved.  
When I started working in Pagani detention centre the whole registration, identification, 
bureaucratic and asylum procedures were in the hands of the police. This fact generated a 
series of problems, delays, uncertainty and confusion to border crossers who were stuck 
within a system which did not make sense at all. As I wandered through the administrative 
maze of the registration and identification procedure, which was managed by the police, I 
came across a very awkward, chaotic and inefficient system which caused many problems, 
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not only to border crossers but to the police officers themselves. All the bureaucratic, 
administrative and identification procedures were taking place simultaneously in several 
different parts of the island, in several different police departments from different police 
officers. Depending on the time and the spot of arrival at the island the responsible for the 
region police department was authorised to do the arrest, the identification, registration and 
bureaucratic procedures before border crossers were transported to Pagani. When border 
crossers were transferred to Pagani upon arrival the police officer on shift would handwrite 
border crossers’ personal data in a notebook. Due to the lack of interpretation and the fact 
that many police officers did not speak English at all, the vast majority of border crossers’ 
personal data were either misspelled or incorrect. As a result, when the police officer from 
the Alien’s Bureau of Mytilene’s Police department would come to find an individual in 
order to take photos and continue with the bureaucratic procedures, he would sometimes 
spend hours or even days in order to find that person. As a result, many border crossers 
could spend weeks in Pagani but without the bureaucratic process having begun at all. For 
border crossers whose bureaucratic procedures had already taken place, frequent mistakes 
during registration could cause extreme delays by pushing the process back to the start. 
Frequent mistakes during registration could “metamorphose” Iranian border crossers to 
Afghans, Egyptians and Algerians to Syrians, and Africans to Somalians. As police 
officers cynically used to say, “They all look the same”. Similarly, unaccompanied minors 
were metamorphosed into adults and the adults into unaccompanied minors. The police 
were registering the age of all border crossers according to what each individual was 
claiming and also depending on the police officer’s rough estimation and guess; meaning 
whether the border crossers looked like as adults or minors according to their physical 
appearance. In a big notebook named as the “book of arriving and departing foreign 
nationals” located inside Police’s office in Pagani, detainees’ personal data  name, age, and 
nationality) the number of their cell and the dates of arrival and/or departure were 
recorded, similarly to hotel bookings where tourists’ dates of departures and arrivals are 
registered. By searching within this awkward notebook one could tell or at least 
theoretically find in which cell each detainee was living, the date of her/his arrival and 
departure, if s/he had a family detained somewhere in the building and also the personal 
information of the people who were travelling in the same boat. All the information which 
was stored inside this notebook was handwritten and managed by all the police officers 
who were working on shifts there. From 2008, when I started working until 2010, when 
Pagani closed, border crossers’ sensitive data were kept in one and only handwritten 
notebook. There was no computer, no database or any electronic source of recording, 
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saving and storing the data and as some of the police officers were arguing, that even if 
they had a database or software they would not know how to use it. The size and the length 
of the notebook, its colour, boring appearance, unpractical large size which made it look 
like a papyrus, was for me the exemplar of the image of bureaucracy and inconsistency of 
the Greek public services. The notebook was often torn apart because of its regular use and 
unpractical size. At the same time, this was in reality very difficult to be used as a source 
of data. I could spend hours every day in order to find a detainee’s personal data. There 
were many mistakes, misspellings and misinformation. Border crossers were dehumanised 
by being locked in a depersonalised environment, as all refugee camps and detention 
centres are, and by also losing their name, their past and identity. All these combined with 
the mistakes, misspellings and misunderstandings during the registration denoted the 
fragile balance between the (non)status of the unauthorised border crosser (a person who is 
“illegal”) and the status of the non-person (a person who does not exist). As an outcome 
many of the detainees were “stucked” into detention for an uncertain prolonged period, 
waiting for their day of freedom to come. Unaccompanied minors were unluckier since 
misspells or mistakes during the registration could result in spending more time into 
prison. The bureaucratic procedures surrounding the unaccompanied minors were lengthy 
and the unwillingness of the local authorities to process them even bigger. Police officers 
never admitted that they were doing mistakes and usually accused detainees for lying 
during registration from fear of being deported. After the registration procedures were 
completed all the data were sent to the central police station in the capital of Lesvos, in 
Mytilene. A similar approach was applied by the port police. The competitive relationship 
between the two forces was dominant and expressed mainly through the denial in taking 
the responsibility of newly arrived border crossers’ arrests and registrations. For instance, 
when the police wanted to avoid arresting border crossers, they used to ask “From where 
did border crossers come from? From the sea or land? Ah, from the sea! They are not our 
responsibility, call the port police”. 
PART I 
5.1 Reception and Identification Procedures 
On October 2015, the first hotspot was established and started operating on Lesvos (Danish 
Refugee Council, 2017, p. 11), serving initially as an open and “transit” site for registering 
border crossers arriving to Greece (Tazzioli, 2016). After the implementation of the EU-
Turkey Statement, Moria hotspot was turned into a “closed detention facility and all new 
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arrivals were effectively deprived of their liberty” (ECPT, 2017, p. 11; Tazzioli, 2016 see 
also Chapter 4). Within Moria hotspot an asylum and buraucratic regime has been enforced 
with the operation of multiple national and EU agencies and bodies (see Chapter 4). As the 
Danish Refugee Council notes, “the Greek hotspots play a crucial role in the operation of 
the [EU-Turkey] Statement”  2017, p.  ). The hotspot approach as a policy precedes the 
EU-Turkey Statement and is responsible for the border regime people in Lesvos and border 
crossers are experiencing until today. The EU-Turkey Statement is also genealogically 
interlinked with the hotspot approach and is also its continuum (Antonakaki et al., 2016, 
pp. 3–4). The hospot approach manifested the criticism and reluctance of EU policy 
makers to establish consistent, standarised and efficient registration, fingerprinting and 
identification system for border crossers arriving in countries like Greece and Italy 
(Antonakaki et al., 2016, p. 3; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015, p. 54). Currently, Moria hotspot is 
both a Reception and Identification Centre and a hotspot, which operates as an open camp 
for some and a closed (detention) site for others. As the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment noted after an 
inspection on Lesvos, “Most persons were no longer deprived of their liberty, as they were 
allowed to temporarily leave the premises of the RICs during the day however, their 
freedom of movement was restricted to the respective island” (2017, p. 18).  
Within the hotspots, the following procedures take place upon border crossers’ arrival: 
Registration, identification, screening and debriefing by Frontex, Europol and the Greek 
authorities, health checks and vulnerability assessments by NGO staff, age assessment of 
unaccompanied minors by NGO medical staff or medical practitioners that work as part of 
the Greek National Healthcare System, the asylum procedures by European Asylum 
Support Office (hereafter EASO) and the Greek Asylum Service, coerced deportations or 
re-admissions of border crossers by the Greek Police, Coastguard and Frontex, and coerced 
returns by the IOM. In the following section I discuss the process of registration and 
identification which border crossers endure immediately after they arrive on Lesvos, the 
European frontier. 
5.2 Identification and Screening 
The process of registration, identification, screening and debriefing, are the first stages of a 
long and enduring procedure all border crossers are confronted with immediately after they 
reach Lesvos and the other Greek islands (i.e. Chios, Samos). Registration and 
identification includes fingerprinting, photographs, and screening, which is the 
determination of border crossers’ nationality and verification of identity process, shorting 
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and storing of the data. As Efterpi, a Frontex police officer, several times repeated during 
her interview, “It’s really important to know where migrants are coming from”. All the 
aforementioned procedures are conducted by Frontex, in collaboration with the Greek 
Coast guard and the Police, who although they are surveillance, repressive bodies, instead 
of performing tasks relevant to criminal law enforcement, mainly perform tasks which 
have to do with regulation. Thus, they are in David Graeber’s words, “bureaucrats with 
weapons” (2012, p. 72). Frontex’s main missions and tasks are to assist member states by 
providing support within the hotspots in the aforementioned procedures, as well as to fight 
organised cross-border crime and terrorism at the external borders in cooperation with 
Europol and Eurojust (FRONTEX, n.d.). Frontex’s role within the procedures would be 
auxiliary to the Greek authorities by providing them with technical and operational 
support. However, Frontex’s role was much more than auxiliary. Frontex played a crucial 
and leading role in the assessment, verification, and decision-making on the determination 
of border crossers’ nationality, while Greek authorities’ role was subordinate. Furthermore, 
Frontex’s power over the Greek authorities was evident by the fact that Frontex’s decisions 
were difficult to be challenged. As the Greek Council for Refugees notes, 
 …) even though the Greek authorities may base their decision concerning the nationality of 
a newcomer exclusively on a Frontex assessment, documents issued by the latter are 
considered to be “non-paper” and thereby inaccessible to individuals. This renders the 
challenge of Frontex findings extremely difficult in practice (2017, p. 29). 
 
This is very important considering the fact that many of my interviewees pointed out 
serious delays and mistakes in the registration, identification and determination/verification 
of nationality by Frontex and the Greek authorities. Katerina Rozakou in her ethnographic 
research on bureaucratic procedures on Lesvos observed a series of errors and omissions 
on the formal documentation produced by the Greek authorities during registration. 
According to Rozakou, “[documentations] were full of errors and inconsistencies; names 
were misspelled, families were filed under different surnames, years of birth were 
inaccurate, and even nationalities were mixed up” (2017, p. 38).  
Although there is an accountability mechanism focusing on Frontex’s action, as the Danish 
Refugee Council notes this has not been put into effect. Specifically, 
The regulation includes an accountability mechanism introducing complaints mechanism 
for allegations of breach of fundamental rights by any person directly affected by the 
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actions of Frontex staff. At time of writing there are no reports of this complaints 
mechanism being used in the hotspots (2017, p. 23). 
 
As Efterpi noted border crossers “are rescued and welcomed” by the Greek coastguard or 
Frontex who transfer them to Moria hotspot in order for identification or screening 
procedures to take place. Both verbs “rescued” and “welcomed” note a self-representation 
of Frontex’s work as humanitarian and not repressive. According to Aas and Gundhus, this 
“shows a growing presence and prominence of human rights and humanitarian ideals in 
border policing practices” (2015, p. 1). However, this “humanitarian ideal” is oxymoronic 
due to the institutional violence manifested via border-related deaths directly linked with 
Frontex and Greek coastguard’s operations (Aas & Gundhus, 2015; Pallister-Wilkins, 
2015, pp. 57–58). Also, academic research in other hotspots like Lampedusa has shown 
that identification procedures often take place with the use of violence (Tazzioli & Garelli, 
2018). Forced fingerprinting is a systematic practice which is implemented by the Greek 
authorities and I have first-hand, lived experiences as an activist and former social worker 
at the detention centre of Pagani, wherein border crossers who were unwilling to be 
fingerprinted were physically abused or punished with prolonged detention for not 
“cooperating” with the Greek authorities (Iliadou, 2012). In this sense, the fact that border 
crossers are “rescued and welcomed”, which Efterpi emphasised, apart from cynicism is 
very much a matter of interpretation. 
Immediately after arrival on Lesvos, screening and identification procedures take place 
within a container inside Moria hotspot. The process of screening includes an interview, 
the duration of which depends on the “collaboration” of the border crossers with Frontex 
staff. Screening takes only a few minutes as Frontex told me, but in cases when border 
crossers do not cooperate, the process can be interrupted and thus last longer. According to 
Stefan, another Frontex police officer, 
We are trying to make assumptions of someone’s identity and nationality, since migrants do 
not obtain documents. In case they do, they do not always say who they are in order to help 
the Greek authorities to complete all the necessary procedures. 
Apart from the identification or screening for the determination of the country of origin, 
Frontex staff detects “reliable” informants within the border crossers for debriefing. 
“Migrants are a source of information”, as Stefan said. Debriefing is a more in-depth 
interview during which the debriefer is trying to collect data on illicit routes, smuggling 
and trafficking networks and terrorism. According to Stefan, 
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If we understand that the migrant could give us more information to share with our 
intelligence in Frontex I will inform the “debriefers”. That’s what debriefers are doing. 
They are trying to understand the trajectories migrants are traversing, the routes they are 
taking, and all the information about the smugglers. Everything. 
Moria hotspot is serving as a filtering mechanism at the moment of arrival with Frontex 
and the Greek authorities doing the sorting of border crossers into bureaucratic and legal 
“categories”, like “economic migrant”, “asylum seeker”, “deserving”, “non-deserving” and 
thus “deportable” and “non-deportable”, in the name of humanitarianism. As Polly 
Palister-Wilkins observes, humanitarianism has universal claims and is based on the idea 
of humanity as a whole (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015, p. 59). However, in the case of border 
practices and policing, the idea of humanity as a whole is challenged and as Didier Fassin 
argues, “oscillate[s] between sentiments of sympathy on the one hand and concern for 
order on the other, between a politics of pity and policies of control” (2005, pp. 365–366).  
After screening, identification and debriefing, border crossers are moving to the second 
stage of a long and enduring process, that is the asylum procedures. In the following 
section, I will refer to the asylum procedures and the coerced choices, through the lens of 
social harm approach, border crossers are engaging with. 
5.3 The Formal Options and Coerced Choices of International 
Protection 
Due to the geographical restriction regime (Chapter 4), most of the border crossers I 
interviewed were trapped on Lesvos in limbo by being given specific formal options by the 
Greek authorities. As Annie, an aid worker of a well-known International Organisation 
argued, 
We are trying to explain to people what their options are according to the EU legislation. 
Either they like it or not, these are the options they have. We cannot do something about it. 
It was their choice to leave and come here, so the options they are given are specific. What 
can we do? Not all deserve the refugee protection and the non-deserving must return to their 
countries.  
 
Annie’s quote is very indicative of the standpoint which many International Organisations 
operating on Lesvos have towards border crossers. This view was often framed during the 
interviews with arguments like, “it was their choice to come”, as if fleeing poverty, 
violence, conflict and persecution can indeed be considered a choice in the first place. 
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What has become for me a lived experience is that an option and a choice is something 
very relevant (see Chapter 4); what for some (authorities, NGOs) is an option, for some 
others (border crossers) is a coerced choice (see also Chapter 4 and section below). By 
coerced choices I mean all the choices made by border crossers through direct or indirect 
extortion, and/or under the constant threat of deportation or re-admission. Similarly, to 
Chapter 4/Section 4.2.4, coerced choices are related to autonomy harms. All formal options 
provided by the Greek authorities are exclusively linked with the international protection, 
and thus they become coerced since if one does not apply for international protection is 
automatically excluded from relocation and family reunification system and also faces the 
danger of deportation or readmission. Furthermore, after being extorted to engage with one 
of the formal options border crossers find themselves abandoned in an enduring 
bureaucratic limbo which is incomprehensible, inconsistent, and chaotic with dysfunctional 
and inefficient procedures in all stages. The diagram below illustrates the coerced choices 
border crossers have. These will be analysed in the sections below by explaining how and 
why they entail the element of coercion. Furthermore, the concept of coerced choices is 
deployed here through the lens of social harm. In this respect, coerced choices consist of 
autonomy harms which do not allow border crossers to formulate autonomous choices, 
decisions and diminish the control over their lives (Section 4.2.4). 
 
Figure 1:  Border Crossers’ Coerced Choices 
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5.3.1 International protection 
The first coerced choice border crossers must make when they arrive on Lesvos is to apply 
for international protection. Border crossers are indirectly coerced to seek international 
protection from Greece, a country which is only transit for them and not their choice of 
final destination (Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018, p. 8). They do so under the threat of prolonged 
detention in appalling living conditions (Section 5.5), followed by coerced deportations to 
the country of origin or readmission to Turkey based on: (i) the Safe Third Country or First 
Country of Asylum concepts (see Chapter 4) and; (ii) the Bilateral Readmission Protocol 
of 2002 between Turkey and Greece  Ministry of Citizen’s Protection, 201 ). Activists and 
NGOs like Amnesty International have criticised and raised serious concerns about the 
inadequate access to international protection, violations of the principle of non-refoulement 
and denial of dignified living conditions of border crossers in Turkey (Amnesty 
International, 2016c, p. 5). In Amnesty International’s words, “contrary to what is required 
under EU and international law, Turkey does not provide effective protection to the 
asylum-seekers and refugees on its territory” (2016c, p. 5). 
After being coerced to seek international protection, border crossers enter a maze-like 
procedural chaos surrounded by bureaucratic fences, symbolic borders, extreme delays, 
cancellations, inconsistency, inefficiency, and mainly frustration (see Sections below). The 
context surrounding the procedural maze-like chaos is better depicted through the Greek 
expression “without beginning, middle and end”. In this respect, international protection - 
apart from being a coerced choice -often proves to be futile. As I will further explain below 
the limitations lie at the heart of the inadequate physical access to the asylum procedures, 
the limited access to information about international protection and the limited access to 
legal aid. 
5.3.1.1 Restricted “Physical” Access to the Asylum Procedures 
The “lodging” of the asylum application must be done by the applicant in person to the 
Asylum Service’s office on Lesvos which is located inside Moria hotspot. The Asylum 
Service, EASO’s office as well as the whole administrative and bureaucratic apparatus is 
located inside Moria hotspot, surrounded by material and symbolic walls and fences, 
surveillance cameras, the police, Frontex, the G4S private security and sometimes the 
army. If border crossers need to seek for international protection, renew their papers, 
schedule and/or complete the asylum interview, or be assessed as “vulnerable” (Section 
5.3.6), they must walk in front of the armed riot police [MAT], who constantly guard the 
hotspot, go through the face-control and documentation checks by the police beneath the 
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gates, and then cross the threshold of the so-called Moria “camp”, which more resembles a 
prison than a refugee camp (Jauhiainen, 2017, p. 6). After one experiences the fear and 
intimidation of being repeatedly exposed to the various gazes of control then one must wait 
in long queues in order to lodge an application or even reach the asylum service and 
administration. The Asylum Service, as well as the whole administration section and even 
the NGOs’ offices, are located in a separate section surrounded by fences too. After 
observing from the inside and outside the carbuncle which is the Moria hotspot complex, I 
could not help but ask myself, how border crossers would dare to cross the threshold of the 
hotspot, in order to seek for international protection, without feeling terrified that they are 
going to be arrested, detained and mainly deported. By being inside prisons, the asylum 
service’s offices and administration operate as invisible symbolic, bureaucratic and 
material borders standing like obstacles on people’s way. This also connoted the chaos and 
the unbridgeable chasm between bureaucrats and border crossers; the former were feeling 
comfortable within these borders, whilst the latter were threatened and horrified by them.  
Although, border crossers in previous years would normally renew their documentation 
every 6 months at the police department, when the Asylum Service in Greece was 
established (in 2013 see Chapter 3) all documentation renewal procedures changed. 
Documentation renewals are now taking place differently according to nationality criteria. 
For example, renewals for specific nationals who are considered as deportable like 
Pakistani people, take place each month at the Asylum service in Moria hotspot. This 
means that border crossers throughout the long asylum procedure, which can last from a 
few months until years, are coerced to regularly traverse the threshold of Moria hotspot 
and experience the horror of the intimidating gazes of control as well as the horror bred by 
the thought that entering Moria hotspot does not necessary mean exiting too. As Imran, an 
interviewee from Pakistan noted,  
I want to renew my asylum card which expires in a few days, but I am just waiting outside 
Moria camp because I am afraid to go inside. Sometimes they put you in jail because they 
tell you that your procedure has failed. They arrest you, put you in jail and then they send 
you to Turkey. 
In cases where border crossers’ asylum application is rejected in the first instance, the 
caseworker of the asylum service can trace it within the Asylum Service’s computer 
database and simultaneously inform the police, who arrest border crossers and detain them 
in order to readmit them or coercively deport them to Turkey. As Simon, working in an 
administrative position in the Asylum Service noted, 
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The Greek authorities have designed the whole system and process in such a way, so no one 
can escape. Refugees cannot leave the island and they are forced to come by themselves 
inside Moria in practice in order to be arrested [in case their application is rejected]. 
Otherwise the police would have to look for them somewhere in the [Greek] mainland in 
order to arrest them and deport them. 
In this sense the Asylum Service, although consisting of case workers, administrative and 
not police staff, was serving as a punitive, persecution and repression apparatus by 
successfully playing the role of the cop. Furthermore, contra to the dominant image of an 
overall inconsistent, incomprehensible, maze-like and chaotic system, Simon’s account 
capitalised the fact that when the system desires to, then it can indeed be very effective, 
functional, fast, consistent and with order. The dominant image of a system and processes 
full of inconsistency and chaos is meretricious but only to re-enforce the “bureaucratic 
deterrence”, and to legitimise Greek authorities’ inaction and impunity for its arbitrariness, 
violations, institutional violence and infliction of harm.  
5.3.1.2 Restricted Access to Information 
Border crossers have restricted access to information about international protection. Access 
to information means access to legal aid and assistance during the appeal stage, non-
discrimination between border crossers on the basis of nationality, information about the 
procedures and the estimated time of waiting (Greek Council for Refugees, 2017, p. 114). 
However, restricted access to information is due to the inadequate interpretation services 
within the hotspots and police departments (ibid.). Additionally, due to the nationality-
based assessment which was introduced with the hotspot approach, there is a 
discriminatory and racialised treatment taking place where certain nationals from Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt are detained immediately after their arrival 
(Ministry of Interior, 2016). These nationalities are considered according to a Police 
Circular as “economic migrants” and thus are “deportable” (De Genova, 2013, p. 1181). 
Within the detention of Moria hotspot, the so-called “Section B”, some border crossers are 
detained in practice because they have the misfortune to have the “wrong” nationality. As 
Nicola De Genova argues, “Deportable non-citizens are pervasively subjected to myriad 
conditions of social degradation, globally” (2013, p. 1180). From this angle, deportable 
border crossers in Section B of Moria hotspot have due to isolation restricted access to 
international protection, receive limited legal aid and social care, and have restricted access 
to information about the international protection procedures. As I found, even for some 
NGOs, deportable border crossers are not a “target group” and, thus, are disregarded. As 
Simon noted, “There are discriminations taking place, where NGOs overlook for example 
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Pakistanis. They only pay attention to nationalities with a refugee profile. All the others are 
just ignored.” Furthermore, due to the overcrowded facilities in Moria hotspot many of the 
deportable nationalities are also detained within the various police departments on the 
island, where NGOs and lawyers’ presence and access is not easy. As Médecins Sans 
Frontières note, “Residents have no idea when or how they will get out of here. Tomorrow 
they can receive a paper saying, ‘You will be deported’. Or they can be put in detention 
without any explanation without even a translator to explain to them what is going on” 
 Médecins Sans Frontières, 201 ). 
During fieldwork I experienced the disregard of deportable detainees in one instance when 
a lawyer working for a UK-based NGO who had just arrived on the island was asking me 
where she can find border crossers to speak with. When I suggested her to specifically 
search on the issue of detention of the “deportable” nationalities within “Section B” and 
the police departments, she said, “We are not concerned with the issue of detention”. 
5.3.1.3 Restricted Access to Legal Aid 
The provision of legal aid was also restricted, and variable both from site to site and 
according to the geographical region (Greek Council for Refugees, 2017). Although, there 
are many NGOs operating on Lesvos, in August 2017 cuts in EU funding for NGOs in 
Greece resulted in the reduced provision of services like legal aid. The limited provision of 
legal aid was prevalent as many activists like Sarah noted, “There is urgent need for 
lawyers here because refugees staying on Lesvos are many and their problems are 
overwhelming. The few lawyers who assist them are overloaded with work and in some 
degree burn out”. The urgent need for lawyers was something that I noticed myself since 
the first question I have been repeatedly asked during the everyday encounters with border 
crossers was, “Are you a lawyer?” 
Furthermore, legal aid is mainly provided to border crossers who are in an appeal 
procedure. All the rest are obliged to navigate the system on their own, to consult a lawyer 
at their own cost and, as Greek Council for Refugee notes, to do so without sufficient 
information (2017, pp. 51–53, 114). Limited and inadequate access to legal aid was 
constantly the case in Greece and Lesvos. When I was working in Pagani from 2008 until 
2010, there was only one lawyer for approximately 1500 detainees (see also Georgoulas & 
Sarantidis, 2013; Iliadou, 2012; Sarantidis, 2018b). This systematic practice is 
unfortunately becoming the norm for many border crossers in other EU countries like 
Germany, France, Sweden, Italy and the UK (for a detailed account on the access to leagal 
aid in EU see ECRE/ELENA, 2017). 
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5.3.2 The Fast-track and (In)admisibility procedure 
A central feature which was introduced by the Law 4375/2016 and which was directly 
linked with the EU-Turkey Statement was the establishment of an exceptional regime 
applicable within the border and asylum procedures in cases of emergency. The special 
border procedure which was enforced under the Article 60(4) L 4375/2016 was framed as a 
fast-track border procedure. The fast-track border procedure is a nationality-based 
approach and was introduced as an “extraordinary” and “temporary” measure for all border 
crossers arriving after the 20
th
 of March 2016 (Greek Council for Refugees, 2016b). Contra 
to the already existing asylum procedures, the fast-track border procedure and the 
exceptional measures which entails, are activated in case of large numbers of border 
crossers arriving and lodging asylum applications at the borders. As an extraordinary and 
temporary measure, fast-track border procedure would initially be enforced for a maximum 
period of 6 months after the publication of the law (L 4375/2016) and would not take place 
after the 3
rd
 of January 2017 (Greek Council for Refugees, 2016b). However, due to 
reforms which have been applied in June 2016 and August 2017 the fast-track procedure 
remains in force up to now. Thus, in practice, the “temporary” and “exceptional” fast-track 
border procedures are still applicable by turning the emergency from “exception”, in 
Michel Agier words, into an “endless emergency” (Agier 2011, p. 2), meaning a 
permanent, routinised and normalised condition. The fast-track procedure never worked as 
it was intended. The main bodies responsible for completing the whole asylum procedures 
(Asylum Service and EASO) were obliged through the fast-track procedures to make 
decisions on asylum claims within 25 days. However, as I found in practice the procedures 
could last from a few months to years. The fast-track border procedure includes the 
registration of the asylum applications with the involvement of the police and the army, the 
notification of decisions and other procedural documents, as well as the receipt of appeals 
by the Greek Police and the army. The fast-track border procedure is applied only to 
people who are subject to the EU-Turkey Statement and takes place within one of the six 
Receptions and Identification Centres (RIC) where hotspots are established (Fylakio in 
North Greece, Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos). 
A central feature of the fast-track border procedure is the enforcement of (in)admisibility 
procedures and a differential nationality-based approach within the asylum procedure 
(Asylum Information Database, 2017, p. 60), according to which, as the Greek Council for 
Refugees argues,  
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The full registration and further examination of the [asylum] applications are prioritised on 
the basis of nationality where the authorities register and interview Syrian nationals first to 
assess whether their claims are admissible or whether they could be returned to Turkey, 
followed by applicants from countries with a relatively low recognition rate, such as 
Algeria or Pakistan to assess their claims on the merits (2016d, p. 33).  
The concept of “inadmissibility” is related to the “safe third country” and “country of first 
asylum” concepts of the EU-Turkey Statement and shapes the legal basis for returning 
border crossers back to Turkey. However, neither the “safe third country” nor the “country 
of first asylum” concepts are found in the 1951 Geneva Convention. Instead, these notions 
are by-products of the EU’s exceptional policies on the asylum system. The 
(in)admissibility procedure is defined under Article (54) L 4375/2016, according to which 
an asylum application is considered as inadmissible when:  
1. Another EU Member State has granted international protection status or has accepted 
responsibility under the Dublin Regulation; 
2. The applicant comes from a “safe third country” or a “first country of asylum”; 
3. The application is a subsequent application and no “new essential elements” have been 
presented; 
4. A family member has submitted a separate application to the family application without 
justification for lodging a separate claim (AIDA 2016, p. 54). 
Under the “inadmissibility” procedure border crossers who have applied for international 
protection are examined in order for an assessment to be made as to whether Turkey can be 
considered a “safe third country” or a “first country of asylum” (Greek Council for 
Refugees 2016, p. 77, 81). Those belonging to “vulnerable groups” and those falling under 
the Dublin III Regulation concerning family reunifications are exempted from these 
exceptional procedures (Greek Council for Refugees, 2017). However, even these 
procedures are complex and lengthy. As Giannis, a lawyer told me, “Without legal aid it is 
almost impossible for border crossers to complete the procedures by themselves”.  
Greece has recently come under pressure from the European Commission to revoke even 
these exemptions so as to allow for their return to Turkey as well (Amnesty International, 
2017a, p. 48; Sarantidis, 2018a). Between 2016 and 2018, approximately 1,657 border 
crossers have been re-admitted to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement (Amnesty 
International, 2017a, p. 17; Ministry of Citizen’s Protection, 201 ). During the first months 
of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, the so-called Greek Appeal 
Committees prevented the coerced returns of border crossers seeking international 
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protection from the Greek islands to Turkey (Amnesty International, 2017a, p. 48). 
According to Sarantidis, “They overturned the vast majority of the appealed first instance 
inadmissibility decisions of the Greek Asylum Service, by rejecting the notion that border 
crossers seeking for international protection can find effective international protection in 
Turkey” (Sarantidis, 2018, p. 4). However, the Greek Government, under pressure of the 
European Commission to speed up and increase returns on 16 June 2016 approved through 
the Greek Parliament an amendment of the aforementioned 4375 Law and changed the 
composition of the Appeals Committees (Amnesty International, 2017a, p. 14; Asylum 
Information Database, 2016; European Commission, 2016, p. 3,5). According to Sophia, a 
lawyer supporting border crossers, 
Because of the fact that the first Appeal Committees were not rejecting the appeals but on 
the contrary they were accepting them. There were only two cases which were rejected. The 
Ministry was not happy with that and thus decided to change the composition of the Appeal 
Committees and assign them to Judges.  
The new Committees started issuing decisions, all of which upheld the inadmissibility 
decisions of the Greek Asylum Service for applications falling under the EU-Turkey 
Statement. The  in)admissibility approach also noted the policy maker’s intention, in 
Myrto’s, a lawyer supporting border crossers, words, “to get rid of the nationalities that 
were falling within the readmission scheme”. From this perspective, Myrto argued that an 
asylum application was assessed as inadmissible even if a border crosser would have 
reported that s/he has been abused or pushed-back while being in Turkey. In Myrto’s 
words, 
State’s policy is to reject almost all cases on the ground of being unfounded or 
inadmissible. Very often when a refugee was claiming that she was abused in Turkey and 
that she was pushed-back from Turkey to Syria, it was assessed that there was no danger for 
her to be readmitted back to Turkey and that she will be safe there. Thus, her asylum 
application was rejected.  
 
Although, initially rejection on the grounds of inadmissibility was targeting Syrian border 
crossers as Sophia noted, all border crossers face the risk of being assesed as inadmissible 
irrespectively of their nationality,  
Our advice to refugees is that ‘all of you, independently of your nationality, you are in 
danger because inadmissibility is applied to all and not only to Syrian refugees. Thus, you 
are in a state in which you are in danger. If you do not have any vulnerability, any medical 
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problem, any special psychiatric condition you are in danger and you must be very careful 
of what you are going to say about your living conditions in Turkey’. 
Both the Asylum Service and the Appeals Committee are playing the role of the rejection 
and expulsion machine by indicating the wider politics of massive rejections, 
deportations, closed borders and deterrence which are enforced for the sake of Fortress 
Europe. As Sophia, and many more activist interviewees argued, “For me this 
demonstrates the political will for massive rejections. Basically, they wanted to establish 
an organisation in order to massively reject people.”  
5.3.3 Relocation Scheme 
Another coerced choice for border crossers is to apply for the Emergency Relocation 
Scheme (European Commission, 2017c). According to International Organisation of 
Migration, “Relocation is the transfer of border crossers who are in clear need of 
international protection from one EU Member State to another Member State where their 
asylum application will be examined once the relocation has taken place” (2017b). 
Although the European Commission had agreed to relocate 63,302 persons from Greece, 
the total number of people being relocated since 2015 is only 20,066 (European 
Commission, 2017c). Furthermore, there are certain eligibility criteria making access to 
Relocation impossible. According to the European Commission, eligible for relocation are 
“Nationalities with overall asylum recognition rate of 75% or higher in EU Member States. 
Currently: Eritrea, Syria, Yemen, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bhutan, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates” (European Commission, 2017c). However, this eligibility restriction excludes 
many more border crossers who need international protection (UNHCR, 2017b). Thus, it is 
discriminatory and exclusionary also for the reason that the assessment should be 
individualised. Currently, there are 2,000 people in Greece eligible but in a state of waiting 
to be relocated within the camps and over 2,000 in the process of being eligible (European 
Commission, 2017c). As Amnesty International notes EU has failed to implement the 
relocation scheme by depriving from people in need of international protection one of the 
few formal options to find sanctuary within EU (Amnesty International, 2017b; The 
Independent, 2017a). And although the European Commission claims that 20,066 have 
been already been relocated from Greece, the NGO Action Aid notes that the process of 
relocation is so slow that, “At this pace, it will take the EU almost 15 years to relocate 
them” (2016, p. 15).  
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5.3.4 Family Reunification Scheme 
Another coerced choice is the Family Reunification Scheme, which is also linked with the 
asylum procedures. Border crossers can apply for Family Reunification when they reach 
Lesvos. At the same time they must apply for international protection and wait until the 
Greek authorities complete the necessary procedures in order to be allowed to be reunited 
with their families in another EU country. It is a coerced choice because border crossers 
are coerced by the Greek authorities to engage with a stressful, lengthy, and slow but 
mainly impenetrable bureaucratic process, under the threat of deportation or re-admission. 
Although, Family Reunification as UNHCR notes, “is a fundamental aspect of bringing 
normality back to the lives of persons who have fled persecution or serious harm and have 
lost family during forced displacement” (2015a, p. 6), the process is very problematic and 
restrictive. It is based on a very narrow definition of “family” to such an extent that 
families are exposed to the “psychological and emotional harm” (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; 
Tombs, 2019) of separation and waiting. As Action Aid argues, 
 …) often parents cannot be reunited with their adult children. Siblings over 1  years of age 
are not provided with an opportunity to reunite, and family ties across generations are 
broken as asylum-seekers find themselves in different countries. This causes stress and grief 
amongst people who are already suffering the loss of their normal life as they have travelled 
across the world. It also breaks family ties and networks that are essential not only to the 
asylum-seekers themselves, but also to the societies in which they will eventually integrate 
(ActionAid, 2016). 
 
Another serious problem related to the family reunification scheme is the lack of an appeal 
and legal mechanism in case a reunification application is rejected. An applicant cannot 
appeal in person in case of a rejection, and an appeal process is at the discretion of the 
Greek authorities. In practice this means that when applicants have their application for 
reunification being rejected, they have no legal means to appeal directly against this 
decision. According to Action Aid, “A long administrative legal procedure could be started 
in the country where they are located, but with uncertain results. Family reunification then 
can be postponed for years, or never take place at all”  ibid., p.13). As a result, border 
crossers seeking to reunite with their family are trapped in an enduring bureaucratic limbo 
struggling with bureaucratic procedures which, as Cleo, a lawyer and activist who had 
supported many family reunification cases argues, “the procedures are so complicated and 
inconsistent that if refugees do not have a lawyer to do the bureaucratic procedures for 
them, then they will never be able to complete them by themselves.” When I was working 
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in Pagani detention centre I witnessed many cases of border crossers who were coerced to 
choose to travel irregularly again in order to be reunited with their families in another EU 
country since, as they were telling me, this way was faster and even easier than the family 
reunification scheme.  
5.3.5 Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration 
Another formal option - and at the same time a coerced choice - is the Assisted Voluntary 
Return scheme. The International Organisation of Migration, which is the responsible 
international body performing the voluntary returns, argues that within its 40 years of 
operation it has “assisted” more than 400,000 people to voluntary return to their countries 
of origin “with dignity and safety” (International Organisation for Migration, n.d.). 
Between June 2016 and 9 July 2018, approximately 11,525 people have been returned 
from Greece (International Organisation for Migration, 2017c). One key feature of 
voluntary returns is that people are fully aware and willing to be returned (ibid.). However, 
as scholars have noted often voluntary returns take place by the use of violence and thus, 
as Andrijasevic and Walters argue, “when migrants make the decision to return under 
duress or as an alternative to state-enforced expulsions, ‘voluntary’ seems to designate an 
absence of viable options rather than a deliberate option” (Andrijasevic & Walters, 2010, 
p. 993;see also Khosravi 2018, p. 5). Border crossers on Lesvos and Greece might not be 
exposed to direct violence in order to “voluntary return”, but upon their arrival they are 
exposed to a “stealthy” (Li, 2009, p. 67) form of violence through an overwhelming slow, 
confusing and inconsistent bureaucracy, delays, postpones, enduring waiting and 
“stuckedness” for months and years (see Chapter 6). After the exhausting waiting they run 
out of patience, withdraw their asylum claim and request to voluntary return home. This is 
not an “option” being made freely, it is a coerced choice caused by the bureaucratic 
deterrence enforced by the determined policy makers to make border crossers’ lives 
unlivable. That is, the more border crossers suffer while entering into the bureaucratic 
chaotic and inconsistent procedures the more they will be deterred, withdraw their asylum 
applications and will be coerced to leave back “home”.   
5.3.6 Vulnerability 
As I will explain in this section, vulnerability is also a coerced choice for border crossers 
linked with the bureaucratic procedures and international protection. Vulnerability also, 
inflicts autonomy harms to border crossers as I will show. Although, vulnerability is not a 
new concept within the asylum procedures, in the aftermath of the geographical restriction 
regime (Section 4.3.2) it has received an overwhelming attention and application within the 
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bureaucratic procedures by EASO experts and the Asylum Service staff. Vulnerability is 
an assessment approach which is implemented at the same time and in relation to the 
asylum procedures, in order for vulnerable border crossers to be detected, assessed, 
prioritised and allowed to move from Lesvos to the Greek mainland. According to Article 
14(8) L 4375/2016, which relates to reception and identification procedures, the following 
people are considered as vulnerable groups.  
Unaccompanied minors; persons who have a disability or suffering from an incurable or 
serious illness; the elderly; women in pregnancy or having recently given birth; single 
parents with minor children; victims of torture, rape or other serious forms of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence or exploitation; persons with a post-traumatic 
disorder, in particularly survivors and relatives of victims of ship-wrecks; victims of human 
trafficking (Greek Council for Refugees, 2017, p. 78). 
 
Vulnerability assessment must take place before border crossers apply for international 
protection. In order for border crossers to be assessed as vulnerable, they must go through 
a vulnerability screening. Screening, assessment and identification procedures were 
initially performed by medical and psychosocial staff of the NGOs Doctors of the World, 
PRAKSIS and Medin, but on mid-2017 onwards the responsibility was assigned to staff of 
the Ministry of Health and the Centre of Disease Control and Prevention (KEELPNO) 
(Greek Council for Refugees, 2017, p. 80). In practice, however, there were many 
problems related to the procedure as well as an overwhelming number of people waiting to 
be assessed as vulnerable. According to the Greek Council for Refugees,  
due to considerable delays and at times dysfunctional identification processes, (...) gaps 
in the provision of services coupled with shortage in human resources led to a significant 
reduction in capacity to conduct vulnerability screening in the reception and 
identification procedure, as well as to provide out-patient consultations, a considerable 
number of border crossers (2017, p. 80). 
As an outcome, not only vulnerability was inadequately assessed but additionally only 
persons with “evident” vulnerabilities were given the “option” of an assessment and, thus, 
care by the Greek authorities. The highly problematic nature of the administrative 
vulnerability assessment, however, was not only the lack of quality and the provisional 
gaps of the process, as the idea of the existence of a vulnerability assessment itself in the 
first place. Vulnerability is “universal and constant, inherent in the human condition” 
(Fineman, 2008; Peroni & Timmer, 2013). Also, all border crossers from the moment they 
are embedded into structurally violent procedures and living conditions (see Part II) 
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become vulnerable. As I witnessed, administrative vulnerability was not a tool of 
protection and inclusion, as the authorities were claiming, but was instead a tool of 
segregation, segmentation and exclusion. It was acknowledging that some people were 
more vulnerable than others, whose needs must be protected and safeguarded by a 
paternalistic state (Butler, Gambetti, & Sabsay, 2016). At the same time, the paternalistic 
state has the power to define who counts as vulnerable or not, to control the ways of 
protection and, at the same time, to victimise (Iliadou, 2017). In practice, however, due to 
the overwhelming numbers of people arriving and being stranded in Lesvos, vulnerability 
does not guarantee the protection of the vulnerable. Vulnerable people can be excluded 
from the administrative vulnerability scheme during the bureaucratic procedures, since 
among the vulnerable cases even “more” vulnerable cases are identified to whom a higher 
priority is given. A state of “vulnerability within vulnerability” is thus being enforced. 
According to Gilson, “ …) [vulnerability] characterises some and does not pertain to 
others, and this attribution is accompanied by a hierarchical ascription of value in terms of 
agency and other desirable capacities and traits” (2016, p. 74).  
 
As I witnessed the process itself, was firstly resulting in the under-identification of all 
vulnerabilities in general, and particularly those not evident and visible. Secondly, instead 
of including on the contrary, as all kinds of bureaucratic assessments eventually do, it 
resulted in a systematic exclusion of those in need by producing divisions, binaries and 
hierarchies such as who is or who is not, who deserves or not, and who worths to count as 
vulnerable. In this sense administrative vulnerability assessment is an obscene, in Liisa 
Malkki words, “bureaucratised humanitarian intervention” (1996, p. 378). According to 
Malkki,  
one important effect of the bureaucratised humanitarian interventions that are set in 
motion by large population displacements is to leach out the histories and the politics of 
specific refugees’ circumstances. Refugees stop being specific persons and become pure 
victims in general (...) (ibid.). 
Through this lens the administrative vulnerability assessment pushes border crossers into 
the position of the “pure victim”, a state of being neither specific persons nor genuine 
refugees, but “vulnerable”, “bare humans” and lives, powerless, weak, dependant and 
subordinate.  
Yusuf was a 60 years old border crosser from Syria who, the day we met, had an 
appointment for vulnerability screening inside Moria hotspot. As we were speaking he 
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opened his plastic bag and showed me his papers. He unfolded one of them and by 
pointing with his finger at a small box at the end of the document he told me with a 
strangled voice, “Do you see this? This is not good, not good at all. It says “NO”. This 
“NO” in this box is not good.” As I looked more carefully at his paper, I realised that he 
was pointing at a medical assessment. The box on the bottom of his document was 
referring to as vulnerability issue. Although Yusuf had heart problems according to the 
medical assessment, he was not vulnerable enough and thus he was assessed as non-
vulnerable. “This is not good, not good at all”, Yusuf kept on saying, as vulnerability 
would have helped him to be recognised as a refugee. Vulnerability would also be his 
passport, which would allow him to travel to the mainland, by breaking free from the 
Prison Island. Vulnerable people are exempted from the geographical restriction regime 
and are allowed to travel to the Greek mainland. As Katja emphasised, “This ‘‘no’ and 
‘yes” has ‘killed’ people. There are even people who are forging the vulnerability 
assessment by replacing the ‘no’ with a ‘yes’. I believe that case workers can directly 
check if one is vulnerable through the system [a database], but many refugees are forging 
“no” to “yes”.”  
The inadequate vulnerability screening in combination with the increased number of 
people who were waiting to be assessed, has been proved particularly problematic for 
survivors of torture, rape and trafficking. On the one hand, due to the aforementioned 
dysfunction and gaps and, on the other hand, due to the lack of supporting evidences, like 
the vulnerability assessment, which would validate one’s story, very serious vulnerabilities 
were under-identified and treated as undeserving of the protection of the international 
protection.  
Single men are excluded from the procedure of vulnerability as non-vulnerable. The 
hegemonic discourse “associates vulnerability with femininity, weakness and dependency” 
(Gilson, 2016, p. 71), and dictates that (single) men are stronger. As a result, men do not 
enjoy equal treatment within Moria hotspot. They must endure longer queues in order to 
use the lavatories or to receive food (see Section 5.5). They are obliged to sleep inside 
summer tents in Moria hotspot’s yard or at the nearby Moria olive fields, even during 
winter and heavy snow, as if single men do not feel cold, get ill or die. In January 2017 
three single men living in summer tents died within a week from hypothermia (Iliadou, 
2017, 2018). Their lives had not counted as vulnerable, while their deaths had counted as 
random accidents. As a result of the inadequate vulnerability assessment procedure, there 
were various cases of people seeking international protection who were coerced to do 
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anything possible in order to be assessed as vulnerable and thus have a “better” treatment -
for instance, to live in accommodation outside Moria hotspot or to have the opportunity to 
travel to the Greek mainland. Petros, a humanitarian worker for an NGO highlighted 
during his interview, 
A woman who is raped, for example, en route to Europe and is now in a state of unwanted 
pregnancy, apart from the fact that it is very unlikely to speak to someone [inside Moria] it 
is also very unlikely that she will have abortion, since pregnancy is a ‘bonus’, a ‘ticket’ for 
being assessed as vulnerable. 
As Serafeim an aid worker supporting survivors of torture sarcastically observed, 
“Vulnerability is the royal road which leads to the refugee status”, but which is paved, as I 
found, with massive misery, suffering and pain. What perverted minds would implement 
obscene policies and bureaucratic criteria like the administrative vulnerability by inflicting 
death to men and coercing women into unwanted pregnancies, even when these are an 
outcome of a rape?  
5.3.7 Coerced Deportations 
Coerced deportations are probably the only formal option that EU states so generously 
offer to border crossers. Deportations often take place with the excessive use of violence 
on behalf of state officials which in many instances can be proved fatal (Amnesty 
International, 2015b; Asylum Information Database, 2015; European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance, 2015; Fekete, 2003; Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 121). Resisting 
deportation is a very common reaction on behalf of border crossers who consider that their 
deportation back “home” or to another “safe” country equates to their death penalty (The 
Guardian, 2016). Resisting deportation fuels more violence by state officials and inflicts 
more harm and deaths (Fekete, 2003). Self inflicted harms are very common “despair 
harms” (see Section 5.5.4) on behalf of border crossers who prefer to die than to be 
deported to their countries of origin or to a third safe country (Deportation Monitoring 
Aegean, 2019). Deaths due to suicides and self harms count, as Weber and Pickering note, 
as border-related deaths (Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 143). In Lesvos deportations take 
place in a regular basis and border crossers are deported despite serious life threatening 
health conditions and/or disabilities (Detention Monitoring Aegean & Legal Centre 
Lesbos, 2018). The coerced deportation operations are not carried out in secrecy but are 
normalised by being executed in the public view and by producing a theatrical border 
spectacle (De Genova, 2013; Gillespie, 2018). Coerced deportation operations are the 
exemplar of what Nicola De Genova calls “waste removal”; that is to say, “a state’s 
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perfunctory and mundane act of ‘taking out the trash’”  in Khosravi 201 , p. 253). 
“Deportation”, as Khosravi argues, “by its nature involves force and coercion” (2018c, p. 
33). Who in the first place wants to be deported back to a country from which she has fled 
persecution, war, violence, conflicts and destitution? Furthermore, who wants to “be 
expelled from one country but only to find her/himself an outcast in another” (Khosravi, 
2018a, p. 2)? As academic research indicates border crossers after deportation often face 
situations of exclusion, precariousness, fear, anxiety and violence worse that the ones they 
were confronting prior to their initial departure (ibid., p. 12). The deportation regime is a 
manifest of the obscene and cruel neoliberal system which aims to keep the underclass in 
an enduring state of precariousness, disposability and deportability. In this way the 
neoliberal political system keeps people trapped within an exploitative economic system as 
a cheap and consumable labour (Khosravi, 2018b, pp. 39–40).   
5.3.8 Irregular travel 
After living and waiting in limbo until they complete the multiple bureaucratic procedures, 
border crossers are eventually deterred and withdraw their asylum applications and they 
are indirectly coerced to continue their journey by following other irregular border 
crossroads from Lesvos and Greece to other European countries. Border crossers are 
coerced to address to the “local” smuggling and trafficking networks or to rely on, as 
Gillespie et al. have documented on their research report, “alternative, often unverified and 
unreliable sources of news and information circulated on social media, particularly by 
smugglers and handlers. This is endangering them and exacerbating an already dire 
situation” (Gillespie et al., 2016, p. 5). The smuggling and trafficking networks on Lesvos 
have rapidly proliferated; from individuals and ordinary citizens who “offer” a place within 
their vehicle, to state officials who turn a blind eye, and local shopkeepers who forge travel 
documentations (Alfavita, 2018; Ekathimerini, 2018; Greek Reporter, 2015; The 
Economist, 2016). The vicious circle of exploitation, violence and commodification 
(Chapter 4) of border crosser continues from Lesvos to the Greek mainland (Reuters, 2018; 
The Independent, 2017b), along the Balkan route (Brunovskis & Surtees, 2017), the 
Bosnian-Croatian border (Medium, 2018), Calais in France and the UK (FreedomUnited, 
2017; The Independent, 2017c, 2018), in Ventimiglia at the French-Italian borders 
(OXFAM, 2018; The Guardian, 2018c) .  
5.4 Bureaucratic Deterrence and Social Harm 
In this section I will mainly focus on the “obscene and grotesque” (Mbembe, 1992, p. 3) 
nature of bureaucratic asylum procedures. As I found, it was “the banal rituals” (Bourgois, 
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2009, p. 20; Gupta, 2012, p. 6; Kleinman, Das, & Lock, 1997, p. x) of bureaucratic 
procedures in all (in-between) stages and levels which were intensifying, if not producing 
in the first place, border crossers’ suffering and pain. The violence and harms the 
procedures (bureaucracy) inflict upon border crossers are quiet and silent, but this is how 
structural violence is. According to Johan Galtung, “structural violence is a process with 
ups and downs” (Galtung, 1990, p. 294). The harms of the administrative and bureaucratic 
procedures border crossers experience are routinised and mundane (Cooper & Whyte, 
2017, pp. 3, 23), silent and quiet, slow forms of violence that, in Gupta’s words, 
“disappears from view and cannot be thematised as violence at all” (Gupta, 2012, p. 5). 
Below I will focus on the bureaucratic procedures, surrounding asylum and on their 
ultimate aim, which is to inflict harm and deter by making border crossers’ lives 
unliveable. I will explain how the asylum “system”, “procedures” and “structure” are 
violent by inflicting and perpetuating harm upon border crossers through chaos, 
uncertainty and inconsistency, disbelief and enduring waiting.  
5.4.1 Uncertainty, Inconsistency , Desbelief and Enduring Waiting 
The access to the asylum procedures formally includes the stages of registration and 
lodging of the application to the Asylum Service, as well as the interview process which is 
held by various low rank actors of  EASO and the Greek Asylum Service. However, as 
simple as this may sounds it is in reality a complex and Kafkaqeusian process which 
includes, in Sophia’s words, an “enduring waiting, discomfort and ‘sweat’ [pain]”, in order 
for a full registration to be accomplished, an asylum interview to be completed and a 
 final) decision on one’s life to be made. The bureaucratic process can last months and 
years, with  extended waiting between each stage of this procedure (Biehl, 2015, p. 58). 
Thus, the main problem surrounding the bureaucratic and asylum procedures is ironicaly 
the “procedures” per se and thus their very “structure”  Galtung, 1969, p. 175). The 
existence of complex administrative procedures at and within the borders echoes the state’s 
anxiety over the governance and control of migration (Rozakou, 2017; Torpey, 2000). The 
governance of unwanted human mobility through bureaucracy has become a vital aspect of 
the European border regime (Rozakou, 2017, p. 39), where identification, documentation 
and registration practises are, in Rozakou’s words, “considered regulatory and 
classificatory technologies. Numbers, documents, fingerprints, and photographs, among 
other modes, are essential technologies of state power” (ibid.). The bureaucratic asylum 
procedures on Lesvos in the aftermath of the hotspot approach are characterised by the 
operation of an asylum regime, meaning a complex hierarchical “structure”, with different 
level of duties, responsibilities and multiple actors managing them, and a procedural 
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formality (Rozakou, 2017, p. 37). The Greek Asylum Service is the main body ruling with 
EASO’s international staff experts assisting with the admissibility interviews (European 
Ombudsman, 2018). 
The claims of a procedural formality was contradicted by the everyday reality and practice. 
According to Rozakou, “The ways a bureaucracy operates are embedded within broader 
cultural patterns of conduct and sociality” (2017, p. 39). More specifically, the bureaucratic 
procedures - in all their steps and in-between stages - were chaotic, inconsistent, confusing, 
multiple, and in many instances, fragmented, generating  many more parallel procedures, 
sub-procedures within the procedures. In this regard, there were different asylum 
procedures implemented on the Greek mainland, different procedures in Evros region at 
the North Greek-Turkish borders and different procedures on the Eastern Aegean Islands, 
like Lesvos. There were different procedures for border crossers who arrived on Lesvos 
before the implemetation of the EU-Turkey Statement (the “regular asylum procedures”), 
and different procedures for those arriving after. The latter are truncated and framed as 
“fast-track” border procedures. There are different procedures which are implemented at 
border zones, like the airports and ports, and different procedures in detention centres and 
police departments. Furthermore, there is a different procedure - the so called old one - 
applicable for border crossers who have lodged an asylum application before the 7
th
 of 
June 2013, and a paralell new procedure applicable for those who have lodged an asylum 
application after the 7
th
 of June 2013 (Greek Council for Refugees, 2017, p. 6). The 
existence of different and parallel procedures and sub-procedures also meant a multitude of 
rules and regulations, obligations and prohibitions in an “if this, then that” logic 
(Antonakaki et al., 2016, p. 11). Within the procedural chaos, one must also add frequent 
amendments, which made caseworkers’ mistakes unavoidable and the completion of 
bureaucratic procedures dependant on border crossers’ luck. As Hassan, an Afghan border 
crosser argues, “asylum depends on refugee’s chance”. The element of chance mixed with 
the element of confusion and inconsistency are common ways of understanding and 
experiencing the overwhelming bureaucratisation in which border crossers were embedded 
(Griffiths, 2012, p. 8; Whyte, 2011, p. 19). And although, in theory bureaucracy in West 
states’ is applied through a Weberian lens of rationality, efficiency, regulation and order 
(Herzfeld, 1992, p. 17), the bureaucratic procedures which border crossers must endure in 
practice are chaotic, incoherent, inefficient and inconsistent. This ritualistic, repeated, 
routinised, systematic, patterned (Herzfeld, 1992, p. 18) domination of the chaotic, maze-
like and inconsistent bureaucratic procedures and sub-procedures shaped a context of 
“mundane surrealism” (Scheper-Hughes, 2004, p. 182) for border crossers. In her research 
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on border crossers in the UK, Melanie Griffith notes that the immigration system is 
incoherent and generates mistrust and confusion to border crossers, due to the frequent 
bureaucratic mistakes which can undermine border crossers rights and mainly harm them. 
In Griffith’s words, “from their use of multiple names or dates of birth for one person 
within a single letter, to extremes such as confusing which individual has been deported or 
incorrectly bestowing refugee status” (Griffiths, 2012, p. 10).  
As I witnessed on Lesvos, border crossers felt uncertain, confused and intimidated of being 
constantly exposed to the gaze of the Greek authorities both in a “panopticon” and a 
“myopticon” way (Whyte, 2011). The “myopticon” is a technology of power, controlling 
and knowing, which disciplines people not only through constant surveillance and 
visibility but through vagueness and distortion, through uncertainty and fear. Myopticon’s 
main intention is to distort. The asylum and bureaucratic regime’s procedures due to their 
inconsistency and chaotic nature confuse border crossers and distort their identities, 
reliability, personal histories of persecution and violence and expose them to further harm. 
Through inconsistency, uncertainty and vagueness –“the myopia” of the central gaze of 
control- border crossers’ narratives are distorted, questioned and thus easily rejected as 
counterfeit. Efterpi, for instance, a Frontex’s police officer responsible for the 
identification of border crossers, during her interview was repeatedly referring to them as 
“liars” (Biehl, 2015). Efterpi specifically argued, 
Some migrants insist in their lie [during identification screening]. I had many cases of 
migrants claiming that they were Syrians, but the interpreter and I were sure [emphasis], 
that they were Algerians. “Are you sure you are Syrian?” I was repeatedly asking him and 
until the last minute he was replying, “yeah, yeah, I am Syrian”. I finally registered him as 
Algerian, because he was Algerian for sure [she emphasises and slightly hits her hand on 
the table]! 
Efterpi and the interpreter’s opinion were valid, but border crossers’ narratives were not. 
When the authorities observe border crossers through the various bureaucratic procedures 
they see “liars” and people lacking “credibility” (Biehl, 2015, p. 63). The disbelief of their 
credibility and honesty is a common feature border crossers experience when entering into 
the multiple and different bureaucratic procedures. Both identification and predominantly 
the asylum interviews demand consistency, both of the story and the grounds one claims 
when one seeks for international protection. Mistakes or inconsistencies in border crossers’ 
stories, produced by anxiety, fear or by inadequate access to information about 
international protection, will negatively affect their credibility and thus their application 
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(Biehl, 2015). The increasing demand on assessments and evaluations by expertise during 
the various bureaucratic procedures and the production of supporting documentation 
proving the credibility and truth  Fassin & D’Halluin, 2005; Whyte, 2011) are illustrative 
examples of the institutional disbelief, misrecognition and devaluation of border crossers’ 
experiences and voices. For instance, on Lesvos I witnessed the emergence of the 
“vulnerability screening assessment” (see Section 5.3.6). Border crossers who have not 
been assessed and certified through the “vulnerability screening” do not count as 
vulnerable and are excluded from protection. Another controversial example is the age 
assessment of unaccompanied minors. Border crossers must be assessed under specific 
medical and psychosocial procedures in order to be verified as “minors” otherwise they do 
not count as such. These assessments have been challenged as being unsuitable, lacking 
credibility and validity to verify and guarantee one’s age (Feltz, 2015) and “vulnerability” 
(Greek Council for Refugees, 2017). The cruel irony is that border crossers can at any time 
be rejected as invalid, unreliable and non-credible due to procedures and assessments, 
which lack themselves reliability, validity and credibility. This is a central feature of the 
obscenity of policy makers who enforce non-reliable assessments in order to justify the 
politics of mass rejection, which are systematically being enforced at the expense of border 
crossers’ lives. These intentional policies surrounding the asylum procedures are a form of 
bureaucratic violence, perpetuate and inflict more harm, since rejection often means 
deportation or readmission to harmful and life threatening conditions (Section 5.3.7). As 
Samantha, a lawyer and activist noted,  
The violence of bureaucracy is one of the most dominant problems which we are facing 
here. I do not understand how and why the system operates like this. If the system was just 
corrupted or dysfunctional, I would find ways of supporting refugees by manoeuvring 
within the system.  However, the problem is that the system is so inconsistent that I cannot 
manoeuvre within it. I constantly confront with multiple symbolic fences. 
As I found on Lesvos, the bureaucratic procedures are intentionally maze-like, inconsistent 
and confusing so as, on the one hand, border crossers can enter them, but without being 
easily able to exit them. On the other hand, due to this inconsistency, uncertainty, 
confusion and chaos border crossers’ advocates will not have enough time and room to 
(re)act. The procedural chaos and the bureaucratisation of the asylum procedures on 
Lesvos made navigation inside the system almost impossible. As a result of the 
inconsistent, multiple and parallel procedures border crossers become even more confused 
and dependant on lawyers and NGOs, since otherwise their navigation within the asylum 
procedures ends up being  “a mission impossible”. Inconsistency and chaos leave many 
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windows open for the authorities to manoeuvre and be arbitrary. However, the 
inconsistency and uncertainty being produced within the bureaucratic procedures, as 
Zachary Whyte argues, “is not so much an unfortunate by-product of determination 
procedures, as fundamental to the system’s functioning as a technology of power” (Whyte, 
2011, p. 21 see also Griffiths 2012, p. 12). As such it is also part and parcel of the 
bureaucratic deterrence, which aims to make people suffer by making their lives unliveable 
to live and indirectly coerce them to withdraw their asylum application and return back 
from where they came from.  
As Johan Galtung argues, “a violent structure leaves marks not only to the human body but 
also on the mind” (1969, p. 294). One of the most dominant forms of social harm which 
border crossers experience due to the bureaucratic procedures are psychological and 
emotional harms (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007). Due to the inconsistency and multitude of the 
bureaucratic procedures border crossers constantly feel uncertainty and fear. The long and 
slow procedures within all bureaucratic stages become exhausting and lead to the 
psychological and emotional extermination of people who must endure appalling and life 
threatening living conditions in/outside camps, and of course the threat of coerced 
deportation to their countries from where they were persecuted in the first place. As 
Sophia, a lawyer noted, “For me an investigation must be done at some point of how the 
psychology and the mental condition of people who live in camps has changed, in 
particular in the islands”.  
The asylum and bureaucratic processes border crossers are embedded into upon the arrival 
on Lesvos are violent and harmful. Border crossers are exposed to psychological and 
mental, physical harms. As demonstrated earlier, the bureaucratic procedures surrounding 
the identification, registration, screening and asylum are lengthy, slow, inconsistent and 
dysfunctional. As a result, from the moment they are embedded into the system border 
crossers get stuck, and wait inside a bureaucratic and legal limbo (Cabot, 2012) – often for 
years. To the slow procedures one must add the systematic postponements and 
cancellations of appointments and asylum interviews without any prior notice, which push 
procedures back to the beginning. Almost all of the border crossers I have interviewed had 
experienced cancellations and postponements of their asylum interview not just once but 
multiple times, like Mahdi, an Iranian border crosser. Mahdi had to cross the threshold of 
Moria and the intimidating gazes of control seven times because his asylum interview was 
postponed, cancelled and rescheduled – and therefore had to experience fear, stress, hope, 
cancellation and hopelessness seven times. As Mahdi argues, “Seven times they have 
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changed the date of my interview. I should have completed my interview many months ago 
but they change, change, change. Seven times they changed the date. Seven times [he 
repeats].” In this sense navigation within the system and the bureaucratic procedures do not 
only picture Kafkaqeusian but Sisyphean too. Although, the range of emotional and 
psychological harm, which is inflicted upon border crossers while they navigate within the 
bureaucratic maze, is overwhelming and mundane, it is not perceived or thematised by 
them as violence. Furthermore, this form of violence is not only invisible, routinised and 
taken for granted but it is also tolerated (Gupta, 2012, p. 5; Scheper-Hughes, 2004, p. 177). 
“Something is better than nothing”, one of my interviewees commented on the chaos and 
inconsistency of the bureaucratic procedures. The bureaucratic responses which were 
enforced, in the aftermath of the refugee crisis, were aiming to establish order, fast, 
standardised and harmonised procedures in Greece with the other EU member states 
(Mountz, 2011b, pp. 384–385). However, as I found it was the bureaucratic responses 
which intensified the suffering of border crossers (Gupta, 2012, p. 6; Kleinman et al., 1997, 
p. x) mainly because, despite the overall inconsistency and chaos, the various actors and 
agents enforcing the bureaucracy remained “loyal to the image of an ideal-type 
bureaucracy” (Rozakou, 2017, p. 40).   
PART II 
5.5 Obscene Violence: Living Conditions, Social Harm and 
Structural Violence 
Border crossers not only must endure the harms and violence of the bureaucratic and 
asylum procedures upon their arrival on Lesvos, but in order to adhere to these procedures 
are coerced to wait and live under harmful, humiliating, degrading and life-threatening 
conditions. This is a common practice exercised by the Greek authorities as part of the 
politics of deterrence. At the time of writing (August 2018), there are 9,694 border crossers 
who are trapped on Lesvos (Aegean Boat Report, 2018). Among them, approximately 
7,500 people live in Moria hotspot, which operates as an open camp for some and a 
detention for some others; of these, approximately 100 people are detained within the 
hotspot’s detention centre (the so-called “Section B”) and 1.468 people are living in tents 
located in the allotments outside of the Moria hotspot (Pazianou, 2018). Approximately 
1,200 people live inside Kara Tepe camp, which is coordinated by Lesvos Municipality, 
100 people in PIKPA camp which is coordinated by volunteers and 750 people in various 
apartments and houses coordinated by UNHCR and various NGOs (Pazianou, 2018). 
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Although, I have collected an important set of data concerning the living conditions, 
enduring waiting, violence and multiple forms of harm in all the aforementioned sites, I 
will mainly focus on social harm and structural violence in Moria hotspot, since the vast 
majority of border crossers live there. I distinguish the harms inflicted upon border 
crossers, due to the structurally violent reception and living conditions, to the following 
multilayered types  see sections below). However, as Tombs notes, “these are analytical 
categories which, in the real world, overlap, are messy, and which can, therefore, be 
subject to intellectual contest” (Tombs, 2019). 
5.5.1 Physical, Psychological and Emotional Harms 
Border crossers on Lesvos are living in reception and living conditions which are 
humiliating, degrading, inhuman and life-threatening (Leete, 2017; Legal Centre Lesbos, 
2017c, 2018). According to activists of Legal Centre Lesbos, 
The current reception conditions in Lesvos are in abject violation of the provisions of the 
Recast Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU, Recital 11 which demands 
“Standards for the reception of applicants that will suffice to ensure them a dignified 
standard of living”, and Article 17(2) which mandates: ‘Member States shall ensure that 
material reception conditions provide an adequate standard of living for applicants, 
which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental health. 
Member States shall ensure that that standard of living is met in the specific situation of 
vulnerable persons, in accordance with Article 21, as well as in relation to the situation 
of persons who are in detention’ (2017c). 
The conditions within and around Moria camp have also been negatively criticised by 
various (I)NGOs. These reports refer to the degrading and humiliating conditions, poor 
infrastructures, lack of access to health care and medical services, under which border 
crossers are coerced to live for indefinite periods of time (Amnesty International, 2015a; 
European Court for Human Rights, 2014; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2014, 2017a). In May 
2017 I interviewed Kevin, a border crosser from Ghana. He had been in Lesvos for more 
than six months with a pending asylum claim. Meanwhile, he was living inside Moria 
hotspot with the ability to move outside in the city and return back to sleep there. “The 
situation in Moria is beyond any imagination” Kevin was saying over and over again. 
We live in an open camp but we see it as a prison, because we are always being controlled 
in everything we do by the police, the NGOs, and the people who work in Moria. And 
Moria is not a place for human beings to live. There is no good, proper accommodation, no 
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good health care, and no education for children, no good food, and no good sanitation. We 
are just living in between the bushes and the forest [Moria camp is in an isolated area]. 
The situation within Moria hotspot is so difficult by making everyday living an everyday 
suffering. In addition to the overcrowded facilities, border crossers interviewees noted the 
inadequate access to the lavatories and bathrooms. As most of them said, there were only a 
few lavatories and bathrooms for more than 9,000 people. They were filthy and thus 
unhygienic in such extend that border crossers preferred to go instead to the woods, like 
Amir from Iran. “I never use Moria’s lavatories or bathrooms. There is no water and it is 
very filthy. During summer I go to the ‘jungle’ [the woods] for toilet or bathing even if the 
water is cold”. Meanwhile, queuing for hours in order to use the facilities is an everyday 
reality. Border crossers are exposed to exhausting and enduring queuing not only for the 
identification, registration and asylum procedures but for almost everything in a daily 
basis. Long and lengthy queues was the norm; lengthy and long queues for the lavatories, 
the showers, the food and even long, enduring queues for receiving clothes. Mustafa, an 
Afghan border crosser, highlighted during interview that “there is a queue even for the 
food. The minimum you must wait is one hour to receive food. Everything here has to do 
with queuing.” This seemingly picture of order, which queuing connoted, proved to be an 
everyday lived experience of disorder and distress. As Megan Comfort (2008) and Javier 
Auyero (2011) observe one should pay attention to the general conditions and context in 
which the waiting and queuing takes place (Auyero, 2011, p. 11; Comfort, 2008). Moria 
hotspot is not the typical administration or welfare office. There is no any waiting room 
there. There are not even offices in general, just containers transformed into offices. There 
are no walls to lean, no chairs to sit, and all border crossers must endure the lengthy and 
long queuing and waiting standing outside in the cold weather and rain during winter or 
heat during summer. Enduring queuing under these conditions inflicts harm in the form of 
irritation, anger and discomfort to such an extent that border crossers queuing, run out of 
patience and fight with each other over the priority in the queue. And then the police 
intervene by exercising excessive violence. As Mustafa notes, 
In the food queue how can old people stand so long? For one hour? They try to go in front 
in the line and the police catch them and beat them. Why you do this? He is an old man! 
How can he stand in the queue for an hour? And the police officer says, ‘This is not my 
problem, this is your problem. You must wait for one hour’. 
Queuing is common and systematic practice states’ implement to the underclass and 
the more marginalised members of humanity. In this regard, waiting in queues is class 
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structured (Auyero, 2011; Khosravi, 2014). I saw that waiting and queuing under these 
degrading and humiliating conditions are dehumanising and consist of a dominant form 
of violence and harm. Photos from the inside of Moria hotspot are very indicative of 
the structurally violent living conditions under which border crossers are coerced to 
live and endure. Some of the most notorious pictures are those from the bathrooms and 
lavatories. They are filthy full of plastic bottles or buckets, because of the lack of the 
running water. According to Kevin, 
Sometimes we have buckets in order to reserve water so if water does not flow from the 
pipe we use it. Sometimes the pipe will not flow water for a whole day. And the water for 
bathing is very very cold. Ever since we arrived in Moria there was snow and the water was 
very cold. So, most people were waiting for approximately one month without taking bath.  
During winter in one of my visits to Moria hotspot I witnessed male border crossers 
bathing outside in the cold. Furthermore, the smell of urine and excrement was almost 
everywhere. Border crossers living in Moria hotspot are coerced to endure inappropriate 
housing, hygienic conditions, clothing, medical treatment and even food. “For how long 
one can bare to eat only rice or potatoes in a daily basis and within this filthy place?” 
Khalid, a border crosser from Syria, asked me.  
Winter within Moria camp is an additional problem, which makes the lives of border 
crossers even harder (OPENTHEISLANDS, 2017). As Amnesty International, after a visit 
in Moria hotspot, noted, “As someone visiting the camps, it is difficult to get your head 
around the fact that actual human beings will spend even one night living like this, let 
alone weeks, months – even years” (Amnesty International, 2018a). Winter is cold and 
unbearable for border crossers who use and invent metaphors in order to illustrate the 
misery they are coerced to live within. “This is not an Island. It is the land of ice, an 
iceland. That is why I think it is very cold”, Salif remarked and by playing with words 
“iceland-island” indirectly commented the problem of winterization. As Morteza notes, 
Each refugee is provided with two blankets and I think two blankets with this weather are 
not enough, especially when refugees sleep in summer tents. Even inside the house you 
cannot sleep with two blankets, how are we supposed to sleep in this cold inside the 
summer tents? In Moria it is colder than in Mytilene. We sleep in tents and there is not a 
heater [he mutters]. So, you are lying but you are not sleeping, because you are shivering 
24h/day since there is no heater. If you want a heater you must buy it yourself, which is 
very expensive and we do not have money to buy it. 
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Inadequate protection against winter has been also proved fatal. Within only one week on 
January 2017 three border crossers men who were living in summer tents inside Moria 
hotspot died from hypothermia  Médecins Sans Frontières, 2017d). According to the Legal 
Centre Lesbos,   
When questioned about plans for ‘winterization’ of the camp for the approaching winter, a 
UNHCR representative responded that one solution would be increased returns to Turkey. 
Return to Turkey of border crossers violates the basic tenets of rights guaranteed to 
refugees and is clearly not a solution to the inhumane treatment that border crossers 
currently face in Lesvos (Legal Centre Lesbos, 2017c). 
Border crossers not only must endure long queues for almost everything but they must 
also queue to see the doctor. And although there are various NGOs which provide medical 
treatment, access to medical treatment and health care is, as Médecins Sans Frontières 
argue restricted since border crossers might wait for up to six months to see a doctor 
within the hotspot  Médecins Sans Frontières, 2017a). Doctors mainly distribute the same 
pill for all problems and pains, the “magic” pill as I name it; that is paracetamol. As 
Mustafa said, 
If you want to go to the doctor you can go and there is also a queue there and they give you 
a paper. You might wait ten, fifteen minutes. If you have a serious health problem the 
doctor will give you the same medicine. If you have headache the doctor will you give a 
tablet. If you have stomach problem they will give you the same tablet. All they have is one 
tablet. For all the problems they give one tablet.  
This systematic practice exercised by the medical staff within the camp is not something 
new. While I was working in Pagani detention centre, I had witnessed multiple cases of 
people waiting for hours in a queue just in order to be distributed paracetamol and even 
placebo pills which in reality were caramels. Furthermore, in cases of skin diseases the 
doctor did not distribute any treatment to relieve the symptoms but used to shout to 
people, “Hamam [Take a bath] my friend, hamam!” Practices like these were degrading 
and racist which undermined border crossers’ intelligence by belittling them as ignorant, 
dirty and uncivilised, incapable to tell the difference between placebo-caramels, 
paracetamol and other medicines.  
In many instances border crossers must buy their medicines with their own money. If they 
do not have money they receive inadequate medical care. As Sams an Afghan border 
crosser argued, “Doctors do not have medicines for all people. For example I have a 
stomach problem and the doctor gave me only one tablet. This is not enough. The doctors 
 [146] 
 
say ‘I do not have medicines to give you, you have a paper from me and so go to the 
pharmacy.”The medical treatment of border crossers with mental health issues, alcohol 
and drug addiction within Moria hotspot and even outside is also appalling. According to 
Médecins Sans Frontières, “Between June and September, an average of six to seven new 
patients per week arrived at MSF’s clinic on Lesvos in acute need of mental health 
consultations following suicide attempts, incidents of self-harm, or psychotic episodes” 
 Médecins Sans Frontières, 2017c). Due to the financial crisis and the off cuts within all 
sectors, as well as the overwhelming number of border crossers in Lesvos, the hospital 
and medical staff working there are not able to provide adequate medical and mental 
health consultation, treatment and follow-up to border crossers.  
The mental health condition of border crossers with new or pre-existing mental health 
issues deteriorates to such an extent that Médecins Sans Frontières published a plea to the 
EU and Greek policy makers “to stop inflicting additional suffering on people who are 
already traumatised”  Médecins Sans Frontières, 2017c). Border crossers have experienced 
multiple forms of violence and harms before they even reach Greece, in their countries of 
origin and en route to Europe (Canning, 2017) (see Chapter 4). Many have survived wars, 
bombings, death and massacres; they have witnessed deaths and killings of other people 
including their loved ones; many are survivors of torture, sexual violence, physical and 
psychological abuse. Children from war countries like Syria are confronted with brutal and 
outspoken violence to such an extent that, “A generation of Syrian children face 
psychological ruin and ever increasing danger, with child deaths soaring by 50% last year 
and the number of young soldiers tripling since 2015” (The Guardian, 2018a). UNICEF 
found that 2017 was the deadliest year of the war for Syrian children (UNICEF, 2018). 
Children on the move are at risk for additional multilayered forms of harm and violence 
(InfoMigrants, 2019; OXFAM, 2018) even in reception countries like Greece. The 
confinement and/or the coercion of being accommodated within facilities like Moria 
hotspot re-traumatises border crossers, exacerbating  post-traumatic stress disorders or 
traumatising  by exposing them to new harms including death. According to Serafeim, an 
aid worker supporting survivors of torture, “the range of harm and trauma one is 
experiencing within refugee camps and detention centres is enormous and worse in 
comparison to the violence one is experiencing outside camps like Moria.” 
Reliving traumatic experiences by witnessing violence, abuse, deaths, and riots within the 
Moria hotspot inflicts more pain and delivers more psychological harms which are 
manifested via suicide attempts, self-harm, or psychotic episodes  Médecins Sans 
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Frontières, 2017b, 2017a). As Maria, a support worker of an International Organisation 
said, 
Refugees who have been exposed to tortures when they hear people shouting [during riots 
or fighting] get upset and cannot calm down due to post-traumatic syndrome. The living 
conditions here [Moria hotspot] are not suitable for abused people or tortured, who have 
such a violent background and experience. Another problem is that refugees are already 
victims of violence from their home countries, whilst they are also exposed to violence 
while they wait in Turkey. Mainly women and LGBTQ people who are waiting and 
working in Turkey in order to gather money to pay the trafficker to travel to Greece are 
brutally abused. 
These systematic structurally violent practices inflict and exacerbate the feeling of 
helplessness, precariousness and frustration to people with and even without having 
experiencing trauma. Whilst, they have also been proved fatal (Jersey Evening Post, 2017; 
Leete, 2017; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2017d). 
Structural violence, according to Johan Galtung, “is present when human beings are being 
influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realisations are below their potential 
realisations” (Galtung, 1969, p. 168) and “takes place when certain people are left to suffer 
in agonising circumstances that are normalised through the law” (Gilbert & Ponder, 2014, 
p. 1270). The structurally violent conditions and abandonment, which border crossers 
experience in Moria hotspot, cannot be justified. In the aftermath of the refugee crisis, EU 
has invested a great amount of funds for the humanitarian management of migration flow. 
As already discussed in Chapter 1, the humanitarian intervention in Lesvos is one of the 
most expensive humanitarian responses after the World War II. EU funds were invested in 
order for appropriate, dignified infrastructures and facilities for border crossers to be built 
within Moria hotspot. Despite this fact, as I witnessed, border crossers were left to suffer 
and even die in harmful and degrading reception and living conditions. The infliction of 
suffering and social harm upon border crossers is absolutely avoidable, and by echoing 
Galtung, when a condition which generates harm and pain “is objectively avoidable then 
violence is committed” (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). Such violence is considered to be structural 
because as Gupta notes, “it is impossible to identify a single actor who commits the 
violence. Instead the violence is impersonal, built into the structure of power” (Gupta, 
2012, p. 20; see also Galtung, 1969, p. 171). Border crossers in Lesvos are left to suffer, as 
Davies et al. argue, “the brutal indignity of harmful spatial environments” (2017, p. 1270) 
such as these inside Moria hotspot. In this respect, structural violence is more quiet, silent 
and stealthy, where the everyday life within Moria hotspot is experienced as a war. As Paul 
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Farmer argues, “You get up in the morning and it is the fight for food and wood and water” 
(1996, p. 262). 
5.5.2 Physical Harms, Degradation and Police Violence 
Police very often exercise more subtle and brutal forms of violence. When they see border 
crossers fighting with each other in a queue they do not react, on the contrary they laugh. 
They amuse themselves at borders crossers’ expense. As Mustafa argues, “The police…I 
have seen them many times...they see refugees fighting and they just stay around for the 
amusement. Some others just stare at how we fight.” This is an everyday practice one 
encounters within camps on behalf of the police and gatekeepers and is not something 
new. I have experienced and witnessed these dehumanising practices, what Pierre 
Bourdieu would frame as “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu, 1977, 1999), on behalf of the 
police, gatekeepers and even non-police staff since 2008, when I was working in Pagani 
detention centre (see also Georgoulas & Sarantidis, 2013). In Pagani, police officers not 
only amused themselves at the expense of border crossers, they were even betting who 
would win during a fight. Due to the nature of the camp per se, which depersonalises and 
dehumanises people from persons to a faceless mass (Bauman, 2004, pp. 76–77), every 
time border crossers were fighting I could hear the police and even other employees 
belittling them by saying “These are not people. These are animals”. I will never forget a 
gatekeeper in Pagani who, on the very rare occasions when border crossers were allowed 
to walk for a few minutes in the yard, when he wanted to ask them to get into their cells 
he would not speak but would make the belittling sound “tsaprou”  τσαπρού), which 
shepherds usually do to the sheep. The ultimate mockery, dehumanisation and 
animalisation of border crossers, which takes place through the anthropocentric 
hierarchical distinctions between human and animal species, is a condition one encounters 
within the borders (Haslam, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2015a, 2015b). Such 
dehumanisation and animalisation which takes place in practice, however, stands in 
radical contrast with the humanitarian enforcement logic, which places border crossers in 
the epicentre of its intervention (Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 84). Dehumanisation and 
animalisation raise the important issue of who counts as a human and person in the 
context of the unauthorised border crossing. According to Zygmunt Bauman, 
Inside the fences of the camp, they [refugees] are pulped into a faceless mass, having been 
denied access to the elementary amenities from which identities are drawn and the usual 
yarns of which identities are woven. Becoming a ‘refugee’ means to lose ‘the media on 
which social existence rests, that is a set of ordinary of things and persons that carry 
meanings-land, house, village, city, parents, possessions, jobs and other daily landmarks. 
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These creatures in drift and waiting have nothing but their ‘naked life’, whose continuation 
depends on humanitarian assistance’  Agier 2002)” (2004, pp. 76–77). 
Humiliation and verbal abuse by the police is an everyday form of violence and harm 
which takes place both inside the hotspot and outside of it. Erfan, a Pakistani border 
crosser, told me that, “the police all the time say “malakas” [asshole]. “Malakas” is a very 
famous word in Moria. All the time they say “malakas”. I do not know why.” Whilst, 
Farhad an Iraqi Kurdish interviewee, was constantly saying, “Police is bad, police is very 
bad.” According to Thaleia an activist supporting border crossers, 
We have many testimonies for police violence, but from people who do not wish to proceed 
to an allegation. For example, there were incidents where some of the refugees in Moria 
camp were throwing stones. Some of them were arrested by the police. The police also 
arrested some others who were near the incident. Refugees said that when they were at the 
police station they were beaten a lot by the police, they were not allowed to sit down and 
were coerced to stand for hours. They were interrogated for many hours and police were 
slapping them. 
Excessive abuse and police violence inside Moria hotspot has also been recorded by 
border crossers and activists (No Border Kitchen Lesvos, 2017). A very famous case of 
police violence is the case of Moria 35 (Joinda & Hansel, 2018; Legal Centre Lesbos, 
2017b).  
5.5.3 Sexual Harms 
The atrocity of sexual abuse and violence in the form of assault and rape is not an unusual 
phenomenon nor new, but rather a part of “a continuum of violence” (Scheper-Hughes & 
Bourgois, 2004, p. 1) in time and space. Women, men, unaccompanied minors are often 
being raped multiple times, in the country of origin from border to border and from transit 
zone to transit zone (see Chapter 4), as well as within the so-called “safe havens”, en route 
to Europe and in Greece. In a recent study released by UNHCR for Syrian border crossers 
it is indicated that,  
Sexual violence and torture of men and boys in Syria by multiple parties to the conflict may 
be far more widespread than previously thought. Those interviewed for the study provided 
shocking accounts of what they, or others known to them, had experienced. Reported forms 
of sexual violence included rape and mutilation of or shooting of genitals at point-blank 
range. Much of this was reported as occurring in detention or makeshift prisons. UNHCR 
researchers heard accounts of violence against boys as young as 10, and against men 
including those in their 80s (UNHCR, 2017a). 
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On October 2016, an unaccompanied minor boy detained under the “protective custody” of 
the state within Moria hotspot was raped by other minors within the section where minors 
were detained  Médecins du Monde, 2016). Although, there were gatekeepers on shift 
inside the section at the time that the incident took place, as well as carers from an NGO 
operating there, none of them heard or saw anything according to one of my interviewees. 
This incident, which is not an isolated one (UNHCR, 2015c, 2018c), also brings to the 
surface the issue of the harms associated with the systematic practice of prolonged 
detention of unaccompanied minors  Médecins du Monde, 2016). According to UNHCR, 
Refugee and migrant children moving in Europe are at heightened risk of violence and 
abuse, including sexual violence, especially in overcrowded reception sites, or in many 
locations where refugees and migrants gather, such as parks, train stations, bus stations and 
roadsides. From testimony and reports we have received there have been instances of 
children engaging in survival sex to pay smugglers to continue their journey, either because 
they have run out of money, or because they have been robbed. Unaccompanied children 
can be particularly vulnerable as they lack the protection and care of an adult. They may 
also be placed in detention in some countries, including with adults, posing great risks to 
them (2018c, p. 1).  
Rapes, sexual assault or the fear of sexual violence are very common within Moria hotspot. 
Women are afraid to use the lavatories during the night due to fear that they are going to be 
raped. According to Human Rights Watch report, 
The women and girls interviewed described pervasive sexual harassment and a persistent 
sense of insecurity in Moria, and said authorities are unresponsive to their complaints and 
do not take adequate action to ensure their safety. One woman said she had been 
approached by a fellow asylum seeker asking for sex in exchange for money. Many said 
they do not feel safe moving around Moria alone and leave their shelters only in groups or 
accompanied by male relatives. A 17-year-old girl from Syria said: “Out of fear, I stay in 
the tent. I don’t go out (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
The fear and insecurity of a sexual assault is so enormous within Moria hotspot that even 
during the day women are afraid to use the bathrooms if they are unaccompanied from 
fear of being raped (UNHCR, 2018c). According to Salif, 
if my [lady]friends want to go to the toilet I must go with them. I wait for them to finish and 
then we go back together. There are no lights. When lights are broken they are not 
immediately substituted. Thus, women have problem. These things can happen because 
there are so many people in the camps and you must expect to see unexpected situations 
taking place which normally would not. 
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Rapes do not take place only inside Moria hotspot but also within the Kara Tepe, a formal 
camp coordinated by the Municipality, which mainly hosts families and children. 
According to Voula, a volunteer in a local charity,  
Rapes are also taking place in Kara Tepe. There was a case of a minor boy who was 
repeatedly raped by an adult refugee man living there, with the tolerance of the parents and 
the coordinator. The parents were afraid. The boy had to commit a suicide attempt in order 
for the coordinator to decide to do something about it. 
Survival sex is another form of sexual violence which takes place within and outside 
Moria hotspot. Men, women and minors are coerced into prostitution in order to make 
money for living, to rent a room in a hotel, or to buy clothes and food. As a UNHCR 
spokesperson told me during her interview, 
Sexual violence is a serious issue. Apart from the fact that there are many stories of women 
who were forced into sex in order to secure their journey here. You have cases where they 
are forced into survival sex, generally and after they have reached here [Greece], in order to 
improve their living standards, their life. Unaccompanied minors in Athens for instance do 
this [survival sex] in order to be able to spend some nights inside a house, take a proper 
bath, to sleep in a proper bed. All these are things that should have been secured, so as no 
one would be forced to do things like that. 
Sexual harms within structurally violent and harmful spatial environments, like those 
of Moria hotspot or transit border zones along the way, and in refugee camps in 
Greece, Italy, Croatia, Hungary, Germany and the UK are endemic (Amnesty 
International, 2016a; Canning, 2017). The obscenity here is that these harms are 
absolutely avoidable.  
5.5.4 Despair Harms 
As contradictory as it may seem, “despair harms” are the ultimate form of resistance. 
Despair harms include harms like hunger strikes and starvation, self-harms and suicide 
attempts, in which people engage as a form of resistance, pressure, reaction and protest. I 
name these harms as despair harms because they might be non-violent acts against others, 
but they can cause harm and even death directly to the persons who perform them. Also, 
they might derive from despair but they also show resistance and agency (Section 4.1.5). 
Furthermore, despair harms also include violent actions like riots, damages and setting 
fires inside camps. These actions are; i) reactions of border crossers who are deprived of 
hope and dignity in Moria hotspot, by experiencing ultimate dehumanisation, degradation, 
animalisation and devaluation (Chapters 4 and 5); ii) reactions against the state violence 
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they have repeatedly been exposed to, the violent inaction and abandonment for months 
and years in inhuman, degrading and appalling living conditions. Violence in the forms of 
despair harms, as described above, is the last resort for border crossers in order for their 
voices to be heard. In one of my interviewee’s words, “violence as a reaction to violence... 
violence against violence”. Despair harms are an ultimate form of resistance.  
Several sections of Moria hotspot, including the asylum service, which is “the most hateful 
office” as Thaleia a caseworker said, have been burnt several times by border crossers 
living there, causing even more delays and waiting to the already slow and lengthy 
procedures. “We have nothing else to lose anymore” Salif said, echoing many other border 
crossers living in Moria hotspot. The vast majority of border crossers I spoke with had lost 
everything, including their dignity. But foremost they had lost their hope. They were in an 
unbearable state of realising that, in Franz Kafka’s words, “there is hope but not for us” 
(Kafka, 2007). Border crossers are excluded from hope and since there is no hope left for 
them, the gap hope’s absence leaves is replaced with (outbursts of) anger. At the same 
time, hunger strikes are a frequent phenomenon which take place not only within Moria 
hotspot, but even in the public places and squares in Mytilene (Legal Centre Lesbos, 
2017b), as acts of resistance and as the ultimate mean on behalf of border crossers to make 
themselves visible. Outbursts of anger and despair “fade away” with even more police 
violence and abuse (Legal Centre Lesbos, 2017a). As Sophia argued,  
One aspect of the problem surrounding the asylum service is the state of waiting and 
precariousness. People wait for many hours outside [Moria] without knowing when and if 
they will manage to get registered. Many times some people did things, some actions which 
I would say they were manipulating actions. I would also call these actions, as actions of 
despair through self-harms. Also people who performed these actions the next days were 
arrested as delinquents, they were detained in the police station and they were transferred in 
other camps in Greece. 
In January 2017, a border crosser from Egypt known as “Mohamed A.”, whose application 
for international protection was rejected in first instance, was arbitrarily detained in order 
to be re-admitted to Turkey. As a demonstration of resistance and despair he started a 
hunger strike which lasted for more than 40 days. Activists in Lesvos and the Greek 
mainland took actions in order to express their solidarity and support to his struggle. 
Mohamad A.’s case is only one indicative example of the various aspects of the violence 
and harm which the politics of massive rejection, inadmissibility and deterrence inflict 
upon border crossers. According to Weber and Pickering,  
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If the act of suicide is regarded as being at the end point of a continuum of self-harm, then 
hunger strikes can be seen as a form of self-inflicted harm used for a range of purposes- 
most notably in these contexts as a way to achieve expedited resolution of their claims for 
asylum, to be released from detention or as reprieve from deportation (2011, p. 157). 
5.5.5 Administrative Detention Harms 
According to Article 46 1) L 4375/2016 “an asylum seeker shall not be detained on the 
sole reason of seeking international protection or having entered and/or stayed in the 
country irregularly”. Moreover,  the use of detention of border crossers, according to 
Article 46(2) L 4375/2016, must be the last resort when alternative measures cannot be 
applied (Lymperopoulou & Rizakos, 2016). Furthermore, the national legislation (Article 
22(3) L 3907/2011), entails a list of alternatives to detention including; “Regular reporting 
to the authorities and an obligation to reside at a specific area”, as well as “financial 
guarantee as an alternative to detention”. However, as the NGO Greek Council for 
Refugees notes, “alternatives to detention are not systematically applied in practice” 
(Greek Council For Refugees, 2016). The detention of border crossers seeking 
international protection in Lesvos varies. According to Greek Council for Refugees, 
Applicants detained for (a) verification of identity or nationality; (b) establishment of 
elements of the claim, where there is a risk of absconding; or (c) for applying for asylum 
merely to frustrate or delay return proceedings, are initially kept in detention for a 
maximum period of 45 days. This can be extended by another 45 days if the Asylum 
Service recommendation on detention is not withdrawn; Applicants detained for (d) public 
order reasons or (e) pending a Dublin transfer can remain in detention for a maximum 
period of 3 months; Unaccompanied asylum seeking children can be detained “for the safe 
referral to appropriate accommodation facilities” for a period not exceeding 25 days. 
According to the provision in case of “to exceptional circumstances, such as the significant 
increase in arrivals of unaccompanied minors, and despite the reasonable efforts by 
competent authorities, it is not possible to provide for their safe referral to appropriate 
accommodation facilities”, detention may be prolonged for a further 20 days (Greek 
Council for Refugees, 2016a). 
 
Border crossers seeking international protection in Lesvos can spend many days within 
Moria hotspot in order to go through the identification, registration procedures and seek 
for international protection in order to be provided with a police note which allows them 
to move outside Moria and within Lesvos but nowhere else (Chapter 6). The time within 
Moria is spent living in inhuman, humiliating, degrading and appalling conditions (see 
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previous section). The politics of systematic detention of border crossers, unaccompanied 
minors and other “vulnerable groups” in the aforementioned conditions is part and parcel 
of the politics of deterrence and is obscene violence. The politics of administrative 
detention - which includes various, layered, material and symbolic detentions and 
imprisonments - has become part of the everyday life of people. As Christina, an activist 
supporting border crossers noted, “camps have become normalised.” In the aftermath of 
the refugee crisis of 2015, the politics of administrative detention has been intensified by 
preserving the characteristics of the past (see Chapter 3). The whole Greek mainland has 
turned into a containment where multiple formal and makeshift camps have appeared and 
proliferated through the passage of time (Geohoros- National Technical Univeristy of 
Athens, 2017). New names have been invented for these sites (i.e. Hot Spots, Pre-removal 
Centres) but in fact this means more and multiple forms of “confinements”, 
“imprisonments” and “detentions”, both material and symbolic ones. Detention centres 
and pre-removal centres have multiplied and been fortified, whilst border crossers are 
detained within the mainland but mainly within the islands. Islands per se have become 
prisons, “Prison Islands” in which border crossers are trapped in symbolic prisons apart 
from the real ones in a state of precariousness and “limbos-ness”. Prison within prison and 
detention within detention shows the various forms of material and symbolic 
imprisonments which border crossers encounter (Chapter 7). 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter I referred to the reception, registration, identification and asylum 
procedures implemented upon arrival. I also referred to the overwhelming inconsistent, 
confusing, chaotic and maze-like bureaucratic procedures, which condemn border crossers 
in an enduring discomfort, uncertainty, waiting and bureaucratic limbo. I also focused on 
the structural violence and social harm, which the “processes” per se inflict upon border 
crossers, as they become trapped within them. Due to the range of harm and violence 
border crossers experience I called this violence as obscene, since it leads to the ultimate 
dehumanisation, degradation and depersonalisation of border crossers, assault of their 
dignity, and the negation of what it is to be “human”. Within the hotspot, the so-called safe 
zone and “safe haven”, the conditions described above also constitute deprivation and 
violations of the minimum standards one of the basic principals defined within the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights. The misery and harm analysed in this chapter, as Paul 
Farmer argues “need not involve bullets, knives or implements of torture, this misery has 
often eluded those seeking to identify violence and its victims” (Farmer, 2005, p. 8). The 
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infliction of harm, violence and human rights abuses due to the bureaucratic procedures 
and the harmful reception and living conditions inside “camps” are not random or 
accidents, contrariwise they are an outcome of political decisions. 
In Chapter 6, I will focus on the range of harm and the concept of confinement beyond the 
camp and its institutional walls. I will focus on how spatial and temporal confinements 
beyond detention take place through the everyday practices of control, policing, law 
enforcement, discipline and violence by the Greek authorities -the police, the municipality, 
the local authorities- and even the local community. I will also refer to the border of time 
and the spatial and temporal confinements beyond the camp, within the island which in the 
aftermath of the EU-Turkey Statement and the geographical restriction regime has turned 
into a “prison island”. I will argue that the protracted waiting which border crossers 
experience within the prison island is a deterrent strategy which aims to make people 
suffer. Thus, time and protracted waiting will be seen as a form of state violence. 
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CHAPTER 6  
Spatial and Temporal Confinements Beyond the Camp: 
Stuckedness, Waiting and State Violence 
 
 
In the previous chapter I focused on bureaucratic violence inflicted upon border crossers 
from the identification, registration and asylum procedures, by arguing that the 
inconsistent, chaotic and lengthy procedures are a slow violence which silently, quietly and 
softly kills border crossers. I also focused on the enduring waiting and confinement within 
the walls of Moria hotspot and the multiple forms of social harm and structural violence, 
inflicted upon border crossers while they wait there. I called this violence as “obscene” due 
to the range of humiliation, dehumanisation, degradation and deliberate harm which 
inflicts upon border crossers.  
This chapter focuses on the interplay of two central and interlinked processes and 
deterrence enforcements; the “confinement beyond detention” (Mountz, 2012; Tazzioli, 
2017; Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018) and “the violence of stuckedness and waiting” (Iliadou 
2018). The first process focuses on the everyday strategies and technologies of regulation, 
confinement, social control, discipline, and harm outside of the Moria hotspot inside 
Lesvos Island, which since 2016 (see Chapters 4 and 5) has been transformed into a Prison 
Island; a spatial, temporal and existential confinement, where instead of walls and iron bars 
there is the deep blue sea. The second process is related to the lived and embodied 
experience of time, enduring waiting, and “stuckedness” (Hage, 2009a) within the spatial 
confinement, in Lesvos. Here I will focus on the spatial and temporal confinements -the 
“borders of time” or “temporal borders” (Agier, 2013, p. 29) - which confine border 
crossers’ lives beyond the camp and detention, in Lesvos, by exposing them to multiple 
forms of harm and violence. As I witnessed border crossers are being locked up within the 
“borders of time” (Agier, 2013, p. 29), which are characterised from enduring waiting, 
stuckedness, “existential immobility” (Hage, 2009a, 2009b) and existential inertia which is 
torturous and mentally exhausting. This is a deliberate harm infliction and is a form of state 
violence. Stuckedness, time and waiting, is a “border technique” (Mezzadra & Neilson, 
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2013) and part of the temporal border controls (Andersson, 2014b; Tazzioli, 2018) which 
are enforced in order to govern, discipline, regulate the undesirables by making their lives 
unliveable and by making them wait, suffer and endure until they are mentally and 
physically exhausted and deterred of staying or moving further to Europe (Iliadou 2017, 
2018). I call this stealthy and obscene form of state violence related to stuckedness, time 
and waiting as the violence of stuckedness and waiting (ibid.).  
Vignette: The Border of Time 
On May 2008 I traversed for the first time the threshold of Pagani detention. The site was 
surrounded by abandoned allotments and in a sense was concealed behind a big industrial 
building. If one was not aware about the existence and the exact location of this site, it 
would be very difficult for one either to see it or to find it. The “reception” centre was 
located in a former abandoned warehouse in an isolated industrial zone, 4 km away from 
the city centre. In reality it was out of sight and out of mind or, as I experienced it, in 
nowhere (Iliadou 2012). Iron fences were surrounding Pagani’s perimeter, whilst the two 
main gates were sealed with a simple lock, manifesting the irony of the presence but in 
practice absence of a strict surveillance and security of the camp. Detainees’ rooms were 
cells which resembled to cages. The disorder and messiness were prevailing all over the 
place within Pagani. The yard was full of litters and an awful smell was emanated from the 
overloaded litter bins. Homeless cats and dogs used to find sanctuary either inside the 
cages-cells or outside in the yard with the hope to grab food from the litter bins. A few 
steps away, there were two neighboring containers, the police and medical staff’s office, 
which were separated the one from the other from a tall iron fence. On this tall fence, 
which as a border was enveloping police’s office, a handwritten note was disposed warning 
the pariahs  NGO workers and border crossers) that “the entry is prohibited to all non-
police staff”. Apart from the detainees, who felt deep into their hearts both the borders and 
confinement, by being encircled from so many visible and symbolic borders, iron fences 
and bars, locks, surveillance cameras, restrictions, prohibitions and police officers I was 
feeling as if I was under suspicion, confined and constantly watched too (Iliadou, 2012). 
The scenes described above was for me an enduring lived experience of the symbolic 
borders which were breathing within the spatial ones, what I have called as “borders within 
the borders” (Iliadou, 2012). My embodied experience of the visible and symbolic borders, 
mainly expressed through confusion, fear and stress, is so intense which still invokes every 
time I face a fence even when this fence happens to surround a chicken coop.   
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Detention centres on islands for those who arrive without having documents, passports and 
visas are odd places. They have the attribute of “abnormality” as far as the space and time 
they occupy; they are always at the margins of time and space. As Michel Agier notes, “the 
border is spatial, the boundary has a form that partitions space and materialises an inside 
and outside”  Agier 2013, p. 19). The space border crossers occupy after their arrival is at 
the margins of the state and it is an interval and liminal border space, which role is to keep 
them for as long as it is necessary inside but at the same outside, locked-out of the state 
(Agier, 2013; Mountz, 2011a, p. 121). However, on that May of 2008, not only did I 
traverse the spatial border -that of Pagani “reception” centre- but I also entered an odd 
space affected by time and which, at the same time, looked forgotten and abandoned from 
time. It was that moment that the temporal border suddenly emerged in front of my very 
eyes as being closely tied into the spatial one, a state which is aptly reflected through the 
concept “border time” (Agier, 2013, p. 29). Contra to the normal industrial time, border 
time, was different, odd, abnormal, and heavy and mainly interval, which similarly to the 
spatial borders (see Chapter 4), it was producing thresholds of liminality (Mountz, 2011b) 
by coercing border crossers to exist as liminal existences (Agier 2013, p. 35). Thus, an 
intense first- hand lived experience related to confinement was for me from the very first 
moment its temporal aspect (Iliadou, 2012).  
Border time within Pagani detention was often framed by border crossers as the “prison 
time”. In this way they were noting with the more emphatic way the bond between spatial 
and temporal borders, and thus the existence of the temporal confinement. Border and 
prison time was full of uncertainty and enduring waiting. No one really knew why and 
what for one was (a)waiting for. As Agier argues, 
The social and non-natural character of the border ends up creating a particular situation: 
the uncertainty of its drawing is expressed in time- of waiting, reflection, conflict- and in 
space- vague, as if the border was the place where uncertainty had found its most exact 
recognition. (2017, p. 23) 
Dealing with time and waiting and the “formidable beast of monotony” (Griffiths, Rogers, 
& Anderson, 2013) was tough. Boredom, physical and social isolation were the main 
issues that border crossers were coping with while they were waiting, by also experiencing 
the sense of losing the sense of time due to isolation of living in the interval time of the 
border. “What day is today? Which month? Which year? What time is it?” These were the 
most frequently asked questions inside there since there were no calendars, no clocks, no 
mobile phones so as border crossers could be oriented in respect to time. Border and prison 
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time was partitioned into peculiar time zones related to certain repeated, controlled, 
institutional organised and ritualistic activities; for instance, the daily distribution of 
breakfast, lunch and dinner. In this way, as Sarah Turnbull also observes, border crossers 
were trying “to impose a sense of order” (Turnbull, 2016, p. 68) to the general disorder the 
border time was producing. Border crossers in Pagani were not allowed to exit their cells 
and walk in the yard although they had the right to do so. In this way they were not able to 
have any physical and social activity outside of the overcrowded cells. In one of the three 
levels of Pagani’s yard I remember that there was just one football net which nobody ever 
used, since no one could have access to it. Apart from the lack of any physical and social 
activity border crossers were not allowed to have their mobile phones for as long their 
confinement would last. During their arrest by the police, mobile phones were removed 
and as a result, border crossers who were isolated and deprived from any kind of 
communication with the “outside” world. Everyday news and news from home could not 
reach them, since there were no mobile phones and also not any access to Wi-Fi. The 
Greek authorities were not allowing me to bring them newspapers because as they said 
border crossers would read sad news from home which might upset them. Border crossers 
without having their phones could not contact their families back home to let them know 
that they reached Europe alive. Very often their mobiles were lost or stolen due to the 
inconsistent and dysfunctional system police was applying when detaining border crossers 
in Pagani. They literally used to throw all mobiles within a plastic bag and stored them 
somewhere in their office. Lost mobile devices meant lost contact details of family 
members, friends, middle persons and smugglers back home, in Greece and also in the next 
transit countries (Gillespie et al., 2016). Losing their mobiles or not having access to them 
was a shocking experience for most of the border crossers who were literally left locked 
out of the rest of the world. The only phones in Pagani were four telephone booths which, 
however, were located outside of the cells and border crossers could not have access to 
them since they were not allowed to exit their cells. When border crossers were given the 
opportunity to get out of the cell and make a phone call, they would realise that all phones 
were broken. If one was lucky enough and the phones were operating, one could make the 
phone call by using a telephone card which could only buy with her/his own pocket money 
(if s/he had) from the market. It was really a double shock for border crossers when they 
would also realise that there was not any single market to buy the telephone card, neither 
inside Pagani but nor outside, within 4km distance range. 
For the aforementioned reasons, after traversing the threshold of Pagani border crossers 
were at the same time traversing and getting “stuck” within an interval border time, a 
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temporal limbo, with a main symptom the feeling of boredom and inertia. That is why 
many border crossers were inventing ways and games to escape even for a while from this 
odd time. One of the games they were playing inside the cells was volley ball, but in lack 
of a real volley ball border crossers were making their own by filling old pillows with 
clothes and socks or by filling damaged balls with clothes, old bed sheets or towels. Others 
due to boredom used to open holes to the neighboring cells and were permeating from cell 
to cell without being noticed by the police. Furthermore, border crossers used to draw, 
write poems, make graffiti out from toothpaste on the walls, while they used to throw used 
tea sachets which got stuck on the ceiling and were disposed there by formulating an odd 
décor. These were their way to manage boredom and inertial time. This odd time caused 
psychological and emotional harms to border crossers in the form of nervousness, anxiety 
and anger. Border time itself was also experienced as a cruel punishment and torture. It 
was like somebody had put their lives on an endless hold. Many border crossers due to 
enduring waiting, anxiety and despair were harming themselves by hitting their heads 
against the iron bars and the walls until they bleed, or they were cutting themselves. Some 
others were fighting with each other. Fighting was another way to “kill” their time there 
and manage boredom, as border crossers used to say. Border and prison time was a slow 
and inertial time (Griffiths, 2014; Turnbull, 2016, p. 68), for which border crossers used to 
say that its slow pace made their hair grey and themselves to ultimately grow old only 
within 24hours (see also Khosravi, 2017, p. 82). The experience of time within border 
zones it is one of embodiment. Border or prison time was an embodied experience 
expressed for instance through the illusion of the abnormal ageing process. Border crossers 
found themselves, trapped inside the time of the border by being coerced to live the same 
day over and over again. As many of the border crossers confined there used to say “here 
we see all the time the same things. The same people passing by, talking to us, the same 
flag waving, the same church…everyday is exactly the same” (Iliadou, 2012).  
6.1 Spatial Confinements, Racist Violence and Panoptical 
Surveillance: The Prison Island 
Beyond the hotspots, detentions and camps, the police department cells, the barbed wires, 
the iron bars and images of people with handcuffs, the confinement and immobilisation of 
border crossers expands and diffuses within borders and borderlands, transit stations and 
buffer zones, stripes of lands and islands. The spatial and temporal borders do not only 
exist within the closed settings of detention centres, hotspot and camps but they are 
expanded and diffused beyond the institutional walls and fences by inflicting additional 
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harms upon border crossers; more subtle, stealthy and obscene ones. This section is about 
the various forms of policing, social control and enforcement “in the intimate and mundane 
spaces of the daily life” (Mountz, 2012, p. 83). 
In Greece, islands have a long history in functioning as spatial confinements, as some of 
them have been used in the past as quarantine zones and isolation, displacement and 
confinement of the undesirables; the lepers (Spinalonga Island), the mentally ill (Leros 
island), and the exiled leftists from the dictatorship of colonel Ioannis Metaxas (1936-
1941) (Gavdos, Anafi, Karpathos, Leros and Lesvos) (Avramopoulou, 2018; 
Christopoulos, 2018; Wolfe, 2017). Some of these islands continued to operate as prisons 
during the dictatorship, between 1967 and 1974. The islands of then were used for the 
isolation and containment of those who were considered dangerous for polluting or 
intoxicating the population with their illness or political beliefs (ibid.). Islands have 
systematically been used as spaces of control, isolation, dispersal, containment, deportation 
and management of the undesirable border crossers sometimes under ambiguous 
jurisdiction in the USA (Ellis island (1891-1924), Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Guam and 
Tinian), in Canada and Australia (Nauru and Christmas Island) (Mountz, 2011b, 2012), in 
Malta, Italy (Lampedusa), and Greece (Leros, Lesvos, Samos, Chios Islands). Denmark 
also announced plans for confining “rejected asylum seekers and migrants” away from its 
territory (Lindholm Island) (Selsoe Sorensen, 2018). The politics of deterrence, as Alison 
Mountz observes, often involves detention, isolation and containment on islands, so as 
border crossers would be deterred from reaching a sovereign territory and seek 
international protection (Mountz, 2011b). In the sites or islands-in-between, border 
crossers often experience a spatial confinement, protracted stuckedness, isolation and 
uncertainty. They often struggle without knowing which state’s captives they are. When I 
was working in Pagani detention centre I was frequently asked by border crossers, “Is this 
Italy?” Islands, as Mountz observes, are “difficult for activists and refugee lawyers to 
locate, detainees to escape and researchers to study” (Mountz, 2011b, p. 382), they are in-
between places and consist of thresholds of liminality. Lesvos Island is undoubtedly a 
Greek island. However, the overwhelming border, the bureaucratic and deportation regime, 
which has been proliferated and enforced in the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis, 
with multiple international and EU bodies and actors (Chapters 1, 4 and 5) leading and 
adjudicating the various processes with the Greek authorities holding a subordinate role, 
produces in practice a juridical and sovereign territorial ambiguity by turning Lesvos into a 
liminal threshold (see also Section 4.2). In this respect, Lesvos as a threshold plays a 
crucial role in the enforcement of the politics of deterrence since there border crossers’ 
 [162] 
 
rights are suspended or violated, the autonomy of their movement is restricted, they 
experience multiple states of limbo, and multiple forms of harm and violence even from 
the local population (see below). Apart from their physical confinement, border crossers 
also experience the confinement of their desire and dream to settle in another place 
(Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018, p. 3). Prison Islands like Lesvos, for unauthorised border 
crossers, manifest the enforcement of spaces and regimes –an “architecture or archipelago 
of exclusion”- where people are denied, excluded or minimally given access to rights, care 
and international protection (Mountz, 2011b, p. 383). According to Mountz, “the 
architecture of exclusionary enforcement captures bodies in trajectories between states: 
holding people in an open detention facility on an island, where they are suspended in time 
and space, neither returned home nor allowed to reach their destination” (ibid.).  
Contra to the systematic deterrence practices of keeping border crossers locked out (Agier, 
2013; Tazzioli, 2018), at the margins of the nation state, in the post-refugee crisis era 
border crossers are also locked up on islands between states and even within EU but in the 
periphery. The metaphor of Lesvos as the “Prison Island” which border crossers use, is the 
ultimate manifestation of the spatial and temporal confinement and limbo beyond detention 
(Iliadou, 2017). Despite the political visibility and media attention, which the Moria 
hotspot has attracted through the passage of time as a detention centre for 10.192 border 
crossers (Aegean Boat Report, 2018), in reality it is an open site for some, a residency for 
overnight for some others and a closed detention for only a few (Chapter 5). According to 
the statistical data of the Ministry of Interior among the 10,192 border crossers, who are 
currently on Lesvos, 7, 995 stay in Moria hotspot and 137 out of them are detained inside 
the closed detention facilities (the so-called Section B), the 620 border crossers live in 
apartments which are coordinated by the UNHCR, 164 in apartments which are 
coordinated by the state, and 83 in apartments which are coordinated by NGO’s (Ministry 
of Interior, 2018). Apart from the 137 detainees including the unaccompanied minors, who 
are not allowed to move outside the premises of Moria hotspot, all the rest are authorised 
to move within Lesvos and outside Moria hotspot by possessing an official document 
produced by the Greek authorities. The official document is commonly called, by border 
crossers, volunteers and practitioners within their everyday transactions and practices, as 
the “Mytilene paper”. The “Mytilene paper” is parallel to other official legal documents 
and, as Yael Navaro-Yashin argues, “appear[s] peculiar to anyone not acculturated to this 
state practice and seems normal or familiar to those who are its subjects and live under its 
sphere of influence” (Navaro-Yashin, 2007, p. 85). The “Mytilene paper” technically plays 
the role of the identity card and passport. In reality, it does not authorise people to cross the 
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border controls, the borders and travel from Lesvos to the mainland and elsewhere, since it 
is not recognised and legitimised as an official document outside of the island. This paper, 
as Navaro-Yashin argues, is “both real and unreal, present and absent,  …) [it] exist[s] and 
there is an administrative practice in place that requires [it] but still [it is] not recognised” 
(Navaro-Yashin, 2007, p. 80). It is also a residency restriction which defines, whether or 
not border crossers are obliged to overnight in Moria hotspot, Kara Tepe camp or to 
another formal site and accommodation. As Sophia told me, 
The paper is named as “the Mytilene paper”, which you can use in order to go to Mytilene 
and go out from Moria camp. But the paper contains a residency restriction; if you are a 
family you must stay in Moria or Kara Tepe and if you are a single man you must stay in 
Moria. Hence, you are restricted in sleeping inside Moria.   
Although, outside of the detention and the walls of Moria hotspot the vast majority of 
border crossers, who regularly move back and forward from the various sites to the city 
centre, are adrift to the intimidating gazes of control through stop and search practices and 
sweep operations. Although, almost all of border crossers obtain the “Mytilene paper” and 
have the right to freely move within the prison island, however they are repeatedly 
stopped, controlled, arrested and intimidated during these operations. Border crossers’ 
spatial and temporal confinement beyond the camp on the island takes place through an 
“enforcement archipelagos” (Mountz, 2011a) of everyday practices and technologies of 
governance, enforcement, panoptical surveillance, discipline, illegalisation, violence and 
abandonment. On May 2017, during my last field trip to Lesvos Sams, an Afghan border 
crosser who has lived in Lesvos over the past six years and in Greece for more than a 
decade was stopped, searched and arrested by the Port Police while he was taking a night 
walk around the port. Although, he demonstrated his refugee card to the authorities, the 
Port Police officers arrested him, detained him in a container for many hours and then 
released him, without any further explanations.  
I was just walking around the Port and I was arrested! They detained me for several hours 
in a container within the port. At some point a port police officer came to see me and said, 
“You should be aware that we are looking for them [border crossers]”. They are doing 
street patrols with cars and every time they spot refugees, because refugees are visible, they 
look like refugees, they arrest them, detain them and after some hours they let them go on 
foot. They are doing it frequently you know. They just stop refuges in the streets and they 
arrest them [he repeats]. 
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“Since when walking during night is illegal?” he kept on saying, frustrated by the fact that 
either with or without “papers” all border crossers and their “papers” are treated by the 
authorities with disbelief, suspiciously, as non-genuine, and illegal (Haas 2017; Fassin and 
d’Halluin 2007). The humiliation, intimidation and institutional violence beyond the camp 
through stop and search practices and sweep operations in the everyday life on behalf of 
the Greek authorities is not something new and it is not an isolated incident (Amnesty 
International, 2012b; Papanicolaou & Papageorgiou, 2016b; Racist Violence Recording 
Network, 2016; Vasilaki, 2016). On 2014, Safar a border crosser from Afghanistan in 
Mytilene harbor, similarly to Sams, was confronted with the suspicious border. Safar’s 
story begins in 2006 when he arrived to Greece as an unaccompanied minor and sought for 
international protection. He was waiting in limbo for up to 6 years and, without being able 
to wait more, he left irregularly from Lesvos to Germany to seek for international 
protection there. After some months he was granted the refugee status. During 2014 he 
decided to travel to Lesvos, as a tourist this time, to visit his friends. Disappointingly, 
when the ship from Athens reached the port of Mytilene, he was arrested by the Port 
Police, because of the fact that he “looked like” a migrant. Although, he possessed 
“genuine papers”  a passport and the refugee card) the authorities did not believe him and 
detained him for hours in a container located at the Port police station. Safar was 
interrogated by the Port police officers; he was forced to give the names and addresses of 
the people he was visiting, whilst the bona fide of his passport was disbelieved.  
Port police did not want to believe that my passport was a genuine one. They were 
looking at it and checking it over and over again, whilst they were constantly repeating: 
‘How can this be possible? There is no way this document to be genuine. Greek 
authorities did not want to believe that there are also migrants who can travel legally. For 
them we all are and will always be illegal.  
As the port police officers were searching Safar’s bag they discovered political brochures, 
issued by an activist network which was advocating border crossers and in which he was 
an active member. “You arsehole! Are you involved in these things?”, one of the officers’ 
yield at him. “Since when is illegal to distribute information leaflets”, Safar asked in order 
to receive port police officer’s abusive answer, “Shut up you fucking arsehole!” For the 
police officer not only Safar was an activist but also smart. The everyday disbelief of the 
genuineness of border crossers “papers” during the “transactions” with the authorities 
intimidate border crossers, and further evoke and inflict traumas, horror, anxiety, 
psychological and misrecognition harms (Hillyard & Tombs, 2007; Pemberton, 2015; 
Tombs, 2019). Moreover, this also turns the official documents -and thus the refugee status 
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per se- into “make-believe” and “ephemeral” (Navaro-Yashin, 2007) by turning border 
crossers’ lives per se into make-believe. 
The aforementioned examples are only but a few of the everyday enforcements, that I 
found occurring in Lesvos, which were shaping what Mountz describes as “the ways that 
states have entered into the intimacies of the daily lives of [border crossers] on a security 
continuum” (2012a, p. 82). Detention of border crossers within hotspots, detention centres 
and “camps” at the borders have been seen so far as part of a continuum of the broader 
politics of deterrence, externalisation and internalisation (Chapter 4). Those enforcements 
on behalf of the EU and the Greek state, have expanded the field of security by linking the 
external and internal border security measures, in such a way, that the two of them have 
become one (Bigo, 2000). However, as the aforementioned examples indicate the security 
and policing nexus is also expanding “in the intimate and mundane spaces of daily life” 
(Mountz, 2012). Stop and search practices, which include checks over border crossers’ 
documentations, arrests, detention, abuse and often arbitrary deportations in Greece are 
notorious as sweep operations or as Operation Xenios Zeus (Chapter 3). Both names are 
used formally by the Greek authorities and policy makers and are very oxymoronic and 
sarcastic, if one considers the fact that the former dehumanises and degrades border 
crossers as “human waste”, which are going to be removed, so as the nation-state will be 
“cleaned” and protected. The latter manifests the sarcasm and cynicism of the powerful at 
the expense of border crossers, since Xenios Zeus in the Greek mythology is the god who 
protects all “foreigners” and thus is the symbol of hospitality, a feature well bind within the 
Greek culture too (Chapter 3). Operation Xenios Zeus is the ultimate manifestation of what 
Derrida had called as “hostipitality” (Derrida, 2000). Lesvos island and, particularly, the 
city centre has become a space of constant control and surveillance for border crossers with 
the Greek authorities proceeding to an overwhelming  wo)manhunt based, in Mountz’s 
words, on a “racial profiling, routinely approaching people of colour and people with 
accents” (Mountz, 2012, p. 83). In this respect, as Sophia, an activist supporting border 
crossers highlighted, 
Literally everything which is black, and moves is arrested. Sweep operations are an 
everyday practice here even during night. This is extremely violent. Refugees are in a 
constant fear. Therefore, as you have noticed they do not walk a lot in the streets even 
during night. They prefer to walk at the sideways in order to be as much invisible as 
possible. Sometimes the police officers in order to intimidate them, they set up blocks and 
they just sit there with the alarm on, only to horrify people. If this is not violence then what 
is!  
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Activists I interviewed during my research expressed their concerns on the overwhelming 
numbers of border crossers being brutally abused and tortured by the Greek authorities 
during these “sweep operations” in Lesvos.  As the No Border Kitchen Lesvos activist 
group states, 
Police violence is omnipresent in Lesvos. It happens in the day, in the night, in the street, in 
the police station, in Moria prison and to people with and without papers. Every day on this 
island people are controlled, harassed, humiliated, insulted and beaten (No Border Kitchen 
Lesvos, 2017). 
For this reason, the vast majority of border crossers were coerced to adopt survival 
strategies in order to cope with this everyday intimidation and institutional violence. For 
example, they were adjusting their everyday routine in order not to be arrested and 
harassed by the police (Iliadou 2017, see also Coutin 2005). “If the police during the stop 
and search practices see that a rejection is being decided upon one’s asylum application 
they immediately arrest her/him”, Sophia highlighted. Invisibility as I found is a common 
survival strategy border crossers engage with in order to cope with (Andersson, 2014a ; 
Iliadou 2017; Coutin, 2005) state violence and the “control type of visibility” (Tazzioli & 
Walters, 2016, p. 446). No one in the island can really escape from the routinised and 
every day violent practices of control, the “panoptical surveillance” (Tazzioli & Walters, 
2016, p. 446) being enforced beyond the “camp”. EU citizens, activists and even 
researchers on Lesvos cannot escape from the panoptical surveillance. Activists are likely 
to be arrested just because they might look “dark”, not “white enough”, or they might look 
as “foreigners” as many activists and volunteers currently are on Lesvos. Researchers 
conducting fieldwork on Lesvos are likely to be stopped and searched too. As one 
researcher told me, both himself and his team were stopped, searched and asked for 
identification by the police while conducting fieldwork on Lesvos. These non-isolated 
incidents are the so-called “collateral arrests” (in Mountz, 2012, p. 83) where non-Greek 
activists, volunteers, and researchers, are targeted by the police and are stopped, searched 
and questioned only because it happens they are around or present on Lesvos where this 
enforcement takes place (Mountz, 2012). The aforementioned harmful processes, as 
Tazzioli notes, “are processes through which people are governed, contained and stranded 
beyond a bordered zone of processing or containment as, for instance, a refugee camp” 
(Tazzioli, 2017). Furthermore, these processes are taking place quietly and silently without 
being visible to the world, since media attention focuses mainly on lives within the 
“camp”, by overlooking of what happens to people outside the “camps” and inside the 
(prison) islands.  
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Lesvos Island not only has become a space of control where the Greek authorities alone 
have entered in the daily lives of border crossers by policing, controlling and disciplining. 
The panoptical surveillance at border crossers’ expense is taking place with the 
involvement of both the local authorities and part of the local population. Both the local 
authorities and the local community of Lesvos initially stood in the frontline of the so-
called refugee crisis by carrying the burden of managing the overwhelming influx of 
border crossers in terms of reception and hospitality. The Mayor of Lesvos has even been 
awarded for the solidarity and aid that has provided to people (see Chapter 1). At the same 
time, local people have been proposed for the Nobel Prize for their solidarity towards 
border crossers (ibid.). As the crisis from a state of “emergency” and “exception” 
(Agamben, 2005) has turned into a permanent, routinised condition, and as border crossers 
are trapped on Lesvos in an enduring limbo (see Chapter 4), local authorities’ and 
community’s position towards them dramatically changed. A pivotal role for this shift, 
played the frustration and xenophobic violence manifested from a great number of local 
people. An intense and dispersed everyday xenophobic violence takes place which has 
turned Lesvos Island from the island of solidarity and hospitality (Chapter 1) to an island 
of daily hostility, racialised violence and impunity (InfoMigrants, 2018b). On June 2018, 
the organised beach Tsamakia in Mytilene city centre, which is managed by Municipality, 
allowed the access to the beach and the facilities to all non-Schengen nationals only after 
the demonstration of a passport. This decision was announced and translated into English, 
French and Arabic by immediately targeting border crossers (Lesvosnews, 2018). On 
November 2017, the vice-Mayor himself took the law in his hands by verbally and 
physically attacking border crossers who were on a hunger strike at Sappho’s Square and 
were peacefully demonstrating against their immobilisation on Lesvos and the living 
conditions in Moria hotspot (Avraam, 2017). These two examples are only but a few from 
the various incidents which take place regularly on behalf of the local authorities with the 
impunity.  
The local community has been called to carry a disproportionate burden of being the 
“notorious” prison island containing on hold more than 10,000 lives in multiple forms of 
limbo. This disproportion is intensified from the ongoing financial crisis, unemployment 
and the severe austerity measures. Since 2015, the local community has showed solidarity 
and hospitality and has even been proposed for the Nobel Prize award (see Chapter 1). 
However, after the shutting down of the borders, the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement and the geographical restriction regime in a city of 30,000 people more than 
10,000 of border crossers are living in a state of uncertainty, enduring waiting and 
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precariousness. In the village of Moria, which is a village with a population of 
approximately 1,000 people, the largest identification, registration and reception centre on 
the island is located, which hosts approximately 10,000 border crossers (Chapter 4). In the 
areas around Moria hotspot as well as in the city centre incidents of stealing, drugs, alcohol 
and prostitution (Spiegel, 2017) have been increased and local people have systematically 
complained but their voices have not been heard. This is a form of institutional violence 
inflicted both to border crossers and the local people whose frustration has systematically 
being manipulated by Golden Dawn the neo-Nazi political party. Despite the relative 
invisibility of border crossers, waiting in limbo on Lesvos, on behalf of citizens and policy 
makers in Greece and the rest of Europe, border crossers have become hyper visible to 
local populations. As Mountz argues, “Thousands of asylum-seekers find themselves 
between states, paradoxically contained and dispersed, simultaneously hyper visible to 
local populations and hidden from mainland publics at national and global scales. There, 
they wait, their displacement prolonged” (2011b, p. 385).  
Golden Dawn presence on the island dates since 2012. Although, in 2016 Golden Dawn 
announced the shutting down of its offices on Lesvos, the “patriotic” and Neo-Nazi group 
Krypteia has made its presence visible with physical assaults against border crossers, 
volunteers and local journalists. Recently a nine years old girl from Lesvos was assaulted 
by a member of the patriotic racist group, who mistook her for Muslim (ekathimerini, 
2018a). Local journalists have been systematically been assaulted because they have 
concealed and publicised racist violence of the so-called “patriots”, while local women 
journalists are additionally exposed to sexist violence because of the fact they are women 
(emprosnet, 2018). On April 2018, a racist group of approximately 200 people attacked 
border crossers who were peacefully demonstrating at Sappho’s Square for the deaths 
inside Moria hotspot and for the living conditions. This attack was the most violent in the 
history of the island with the s- called patriots throwing stones, fireworks and flares against 
border crossers by shouting “burn them alive” (Are You Syrious, 2018). On September 
2018, racist groups vandalised a memorial dedicated to shipwreck’s victims just a few 
kilometers away from the city centre (ekathimerini, 2018b). This memorial have been 
vandalised twice within one year and it is the ultimate manifestation of cultural harm, 
violence and moral shaming (Copson, 2018; Galtung, 1990). Fake news has played its own 
crucial role in cultivating the overwhelming racist violence which escalates until now on 
Lesvos. The hypothetical desecration of national or religious symbols by Muslim border 
crossers has fueled outrage, and even more violent assaults on behalf of the local 
community.  
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On October 2016 when I started my fieldwork due to some fake news which were accusing 
border crossers for preventing a regional and national custom taking place in Sappho’s 
Square, which includes the lowering of the flag by the Greek army, there was an outburst 
of racist violence by the patriots. The patriots physically attacked border crossers and 
activists. Currently, there were incidents where individuals have attacked border crossers 
by accusing them of being thieves or that they are culpable for the financial decline of their 
businesses. In a most recent violent attack a 16 years old Syrian boy was seriously shot by 
a local man, in the village of Moria, who unfairly accused the boy of attempting to break 
into his house (InfoMigrants, 2018a).  
The aforementioned examples should not be seen only as racist and xenophobic violence. 
They should be seen as a paradoxical way of enforcement, social control, panoptical 
surveillance and policing of border crossers exercised by the local population and local 
authorities, which have literally taken the law into their hands. Thus, border crossers are 
governed, disciplined and exposed to state violence even in cases where the state might 
appear absent (Mountz, 2011a, p. 119). In the case of the xenophobic violence, state 
violence is present through its absence, inaction and abandonment of border crossers to the 
brutality (and impunity) of the exclusion and structural racist practices of the local 
authorities and the racialised violence of the Neo-Nazis and other individuals. The 
aforementioned forms of violence and harms would not be inflicted upon border crossers if 
the politics of closed borders and deterrence had not transformed Lesvos into a spatial 
confinement by holding border crossers in an enduring waiting and limbo.  
As if all the aforementioned forms of violence within the Prison Island were not enough 
border crossers must endure additional stealthy forms of harms; those inflicted by 
stuckedness, time and enduring waiting (see below). 
6.2 Temporal Confinements, Stolen Time and State Violence 
After traversing the threshold of Lesvos, border crossers find themselves locked up in a 
temporal confinement and stuck within the border of time. This is a form of bordering 
technique and migration governance through time and over time (Andersson, 2014b; 
Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013; Tazzioli, 2018). As Tazzioli argues, “migrations are governed, 
selected and contained even through the establishment of temporal borders and through 
mechanisms of control that affect and disrupt the temporality of migrants’ journeys” (2018, 
p. 15). Time and waiting –temporality- is implicated with multilayered ways in the 
governance of migration and is a fundamental feature of the border regime. As Ruben 
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Andersson argues, “Temporality  …) has become a multifaceted tool and vehicle – even a 
weapon of sorts – in the ‘fight against illegal migration’” (2014b, p. 2). As the border 
regime and border controls are proliferating in space, particularly in the light of the so-
called refugee crisis, temporal borders and controls also proliferate twofold. Firstly, 
temporal borders and controls unfold in the form of, what William Walters calls, “live 
governance” (Walters, 2016, p. 797); that is, technological surveillance, governing, 
intelligence reporting (i.e. EUROSUR), risk assessments, so as policy makers from 
distance can follow and monitor movement in real time (Andersson, 2014b, p. 7; Walters, 
2016, p. 797; see also Chapter 4). Such “live governance”, also, allows speedy and instant 
interventions and prevention before unauthorised border crossers arrive to Europe. In this 
sense, physical (sea and land) borders “are colonized in a temporal sense” (Andersson, 
2014b, p. 8). Secondly, temporal borders and controls are enforced through, both 
exceptional- accelerated and, at the same time, slow-paced, asynchronous rhythms of 
confinement and bureaucratic procedures (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013). Those involve a 
multiplicity states of stasis, “stuckedness” (Hage, 2009b), and waiting in order one to be 
allowed or denied access to rights and international protection (Section 5.3.1). According 
to Tazzioli, “the temporality of control and temporal borders are functional to slow down 
and disrupt migrants’ autonomous temporalities and geographies of movement, and to 
hasten at the same time the channels of deportation” (2018, p. 15). The temporality of 
migration controls and temporal borders have found their ultimate materialisation through 
the hotspot system (Chapter 4). Inside and even outside hotspots, as the Lesvos case 
(Prison Island) shows, border crossers are kept in a state of uncertainty, waiting and, most 
of them, are stuck in a protracted juridical limbo. The islands, similar to camps and 
hotspots, are machines of spatial and temporal surveillance, albeit as Andersson notes, they 
are “creaking, imperfect one[s]” (2014a, p. 230). There, border crossers are legally 
bounded to comply with fast-paced, fast-track, decisive and irreversible temporal deadlines 
and time schedules, so as to be considered eligible for international protection, relocation 
and family reunification procedures. However, while border crossers are expected to 
comply with fast-paced temporal deadlines, state’s responses instead are slow-paced, 
characterised by time lags, postpones and cancellations (Tazzioli, 2018, p. 14). For 
instance, as I showed in Chapter 5, after the implementation of the fast-track border 
procedures, all asylum applications should be completed and processed within 25 days. As 
I found in practice, border crossers, who have applied for international protection, wait 
instead for months and years to receive a reply (Section 5.3.1). The same pattern is 
repeated for the family reunification, as well as relocation. Specifically, for relocation 
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border crossers can wait for years but only to witness the whole relocation scheme 
eventually collapse (Section 5.3.3). The temporal borders and controls are border 
techniques for the governance, regulation and discipline of the unauthorised human 
mobility, through shifting dates and temporal deadlines (Andersson, 2014b, p. 3; Tazzioli, 
2018, p. 16), for which border crossers are obliged to be aware of and adapt to. They are 
part of the wider and powerful geography and “architecture of exclusion” (Mountz 2011, p. 
383), enforced on islands like Lesvos and as such aim, as Mountz argues, to “capture 
bodies in trajectories between states”  ibid.), as well as to exclude, reject, deport, mentally 
exhaust and deter. The temporal borders and controls work synergistically with the spatial 
and bureaucratic controls (see Chapter 4 and 5) by generating further restrictions, denial of 
rights and entitlements, disruptions of the autonomy of movement (Andersson, 2014b, p. 3) 
by suspending border crossers in time and space (Mountz 2011, p. 383). As Tazzioli 
argues,  
When strategies of spatial containment are not sufficient in limiting mobility and narrowing 
access to protection, states introduce temporal borders that vertically cut across the sites 
where migrants are identified and registered, producing a further hierarchization of 
“legitimate” mobilities” (Tazzioli, 2018, p. 20).  
The temporal aspect of migration governance is not a new phenomenon, rather it is the 
outcome of a continuum, a routine of pre-existing migration control practices and 
techniques of governing (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016, pp. 317–318) (see also 
Chapters 3 and 4). Julien Jeandesboz and Polly Pallister-Wilkins, highlight the crucial 
interplay between the crisis and the routines of control. As they note the spectacle of crises 
(like the so-called refugee crisis spectacle) and the routines of (temporal/spatial) controls 
are relational notions (ibid.). Through this lens, the spectacle of the refugee crisis, misery 
and deaths (Chapter 1), have routinised and normalised the EU strategies of spatial and 
temporal confinements, suspension and management of border crossers within border 
zones and islands, like Lesvos.  
As I found on Lesvos, the Greek and the EU authorities maintain border crossers in a state 
of “permanent temporariness” (in Mountz, Wright, Miyares, & Bailey, 2002, p. 343), and 
thus liminality, which similarly to Andersson’s findings, make Lesvos to look like “a 
pause, a holding of breath before [border crossers] push across the final hurdle into 
Europe” (Andersson, 2014a, p. 217). The “collateral casualties” in human cost of the 
temporal borders and controls enforcements are intense and harmful. These can be 
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articulated as follows; (i) The enforcement of a violent state of stuckedness and waiting, a 
temporal and spatial suspension between states of an increasing number of populations 
beyond the hotspots, inside islands and border zones. As Khosravi argues, “border crossers 
are trapped in the spatial and temporal cracks between nation states” (2011, p. 65). This 
state of being has also been normalised and routinised in the name of “exception” and 
emergency (crisis); (ii) An increased number of border crossers who live in conditions of 
permanent temporariness, stuckedness and waiting, experience the theft of their time 
especially when a rejection or deportation emerges, after many years wasted in transit 
zones and host countries (Khosravi, 2018b, p. 40); (iii) Being kept in a state of stuckedness 
and waiting inflicts necroharms (Chapter 7) upon border crossers, a cruel abandonment by 
the Greek authorities to the violence of time, waiting and social death. 
6.2.1 Stolen Time, Stolen Lives 
According to Bridget Haas “existential limbo” is the “subjective and temporal state of 
being in which the asylum system, in the present moment, is understood as the locus of 
suffering and in which life and meaning making are defined by a sense of immobility” 
(Haas, 2017, p. 75). “Existential limbo” is a form of stuckedness (Hage, 2009a). For more 
than a decade I have been witnessing and experiencing the violence of  stuckedness  and 
waiting, suffering and discomfort of border crossers I came across in my life’s trajectories 
unfolding as a continuum in time and space (Iliadou, 2012 see also Vignette). The harmful 
consequences of stuckedness were dominant in various backlog cases which were in the 
state of stuckedness and waiting for a response for their asylum case for more than a 
decade. Most of them have occupied multiple and shifting positionalities within my life; 
beneficiaries, colleagues, friends and research participants. Since the early 2000, when I 
started supporting border crossers in Greece and particularly on Lesvos, many border 
crossers who were former detainees and worked for more than a decade for NGOs as 
interpreters, cultural intermediates or volunteers, experienced the loss of their asylum 
cases’ files within the bureaucratic hole, and apart from experiencing stuckedness in the 
form of protracted legal and bureaucratic limbo for years, they had to start the asylum and 
bureaucratic procedures from the beginning. This time and waiting period was experienced 
by them as stolen (Khosravi, 2014, 2018b) or wasted under which all their life 
achievements and the time they had invested, were misrecognised and devaluated (Haas, 
2017). This was generating them the feeling of a life which was eventually pointlessly 
wasted or not fulfilled. From a social harm perspective this is an infliction of relational and 
misrecognition harms (Canning, 2017; Pemberton, 2015; Tombs, 2019) (see Chapter 
1/Section 1.2).  
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Juma, is a border crosser from Afghanistan, who entered Greece through Lesvos in 2008. 
When I first met him he was detained in Pagani detention centre, in the cell of the 
unaccompanied minors. Juma spent more than a decade waiting for a final decision for his 
asylum case. While he was waiting he went to school, learned Greek, worked for various 
NGOs, and made friends. In 2017 his asylum claim was rejected in a second instance 
degree and, thus, the only option that was left for him was to appeal to the Higher Court. 
Throughout the research period I witnessed Juma’s agonising struggle of searching, 
requesting and collecting certifications, verification and references from all the 
organisations, networks and employees he had worked for in the last decade in order to 
present them as evidences to the Higher Court of his achievements while living in Greece. 
“This is outrageous, in other EU countries I would have been granted citizenship for all 
these things I have accomplished here”, Juma told me. I never learnt whether he found the 
courage and money to present himself before the Higher Court, in order to ask for the 
obvious; the ten years that he spent in Greece -the time and years of his life being wasted 
due to Greek state’s time lag- to be acknowledged and at least to be returned to him in the 
form of a refugee status or humanitarian protection. I am not sure if his appeal was rejected 
or he just stopped pointlessly trying and waiting for something, which would never occur. 
This protracted waiting and awaiting, systematic rejections, precariousness and liminality –
in other words stuckedness- exhausted him physically, psychologically and emotionally. 
One day I just saw a short post with his photo on Facebook. He was holding an IOM’s 
plastic bag and was standing in front of a plane. He was smiling but his eyes looked sad. 
The post was accompanied by a short farewell comment to all of his Facebook friends, 
“This is it. Goodbye Europe, I am going back home.” Voluntary returns back home, like 
deportations, are another form of “waste removal”; a spatial expulsion but also a temporal 
one (De Genova, p. 253, Khosravi 2018, p. 39). 
Most of the border crossers I interviewed, between 2016 and 2017, experienced similar 
states of stuckedness for months and years, and devaluation of their life-time due to a 
rejection or deportation. This waiting time between recognition and expulsion was 
experienced as an empty, uneventful time which was producing existential immobility and 
stuckedness; a state under which one cannot move on with one’s life (Hage, 2009a). 
Border crossers of now are experiencing similar real and existential waitings with border 
crossers of then (see Vignette, see also the cases of Sams’, Danny’s and Juma’s in this 
section). Both border crossers of then and now, were experiencing stuckedness “by 
inhabiting a liminal position between recognition and expulsion while (a)waiting for a 
decision for their asylum application” (Iliadou, 2012, p. 333). Both border crossers of then 
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and now, were experiencing uncertainty, cancellation and misrecognition. In any active 
choice they were formulating, there was always a “what if?” in their minds. Would they be 
accepted, rejected or deported? Thus, they had no idea on how to spend their lives and how 
much of their time or effort to invest in various activities. Should they attend a Greek 
school and/or the university? Should they fall in love? Should they marry, make family and 
children? But what if they will be rejected and be deported? What will happen to them and 
their beloved ones? How can they replace the best years of their life, their youth, the time 
they invested and spent to learn Greek, to gain skills, make friends, settle down and be 
embedded (Khosravi, 2014, 2018c)? How can they replace the time which was lost, 
“wasted” (Griffiths, Rogers, & Anderson, 2013, p. 21; Haas, 2017, p. 86), “robbed”, 
“stolen” (Khosravi, 2018c, 2018a, 2018b) from them or “usurped” (Andersson, 2014b, p. 
3), particularly after a rejection and/or deportation? In Lesvos border crossers have been 
investing, but mainly wasting, as a form of capital similar to money, not just time, but “the 
time of their life”  Iliadou 2017). “I have not lived my life as I dreamed and as I wanted 
to”, Sams an Afghan interviewee, who lives in Greece for more than a decade, kept saying 
in a serene sadness, echoing most of my interviewees. Danny a border crosser from 
Afghanistan reached Lesvos in 2008 as an unaccompanied minor. Although, he was living 
for almost a decade in Lesvos his legal status was not yet regularised, since the final 
answer to his claim for international protection was still pending. Danny was captured in a 
liminal position between the old and a new asylum system, a state which is legally framed 
with the cold bureaucratic term “backlog” (Chapter 5). He is one of the some thousands 
border crossers in Greece whose asylum claim is still pending. Danny is in the stage of an 
appeal and during the last decade in a state of enduring stuckedness and waiting. Although, 
he was working as an interpreter for an NGO which provides legal aid to border crossers, 
the NGO has done little to help him with his asylum claim. When I met Danny in 2016 
outside of the camp he was working, he told me: “I will eventually receive an answer on 
my asylum case when I die”. Temporal stuckedness, in Danny’s case, unfolds in the form 
of cancellation, hopelessness and abandonment “where hopes for a  better) future seem 
impossible and where death appears as an ever-present potentiality” (Jefferson et al., 2018, 
p. 7). Danny is only 23 years old and he is single. One of his friends, who was passing by 
was teasing him and told him, “I will find you a nice girl to marry”, but Danny 
disappointed replied, “Who is going to marry me without papers?” These everyday 
existential, real and painful anxieties and realities are disregarded and misrecognised by 
policy makers and the International Organisations’ staff, who speak about “options”, but 
they only provide coerced choices to border crossers. These coerced choices are usually 
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framed under cold bureaucratic terms like “asylum”, “relocation”, “readmission”, 
“deportation”, “voluntary repatriation”, “reunification”, “rejection”  see Chapter 5). In the 
eyes of the EU policy makers and Greek authorities neither border crossers’ lives nor their 
time and achievements count. Ghassan Hage (2009a, p. 2) and Ayuero (2011) remind us 
that “who waits for who” and how one waits - the conditions under which someone waits - 
is class structured. It is mainly the underclass which endures many protracted waitings a 
fact that raises the issue of the asymmetrical and hierarchical power relations of, in Hage’s 
words, “who has the power to make their [border crossers’] time appear more valuable 
than somebody else’s time”  ibid). As Jefferson et al. emphasise, “Stuckness  …) is not a 
choice. Stuckness is a given and for many a curse. But a curse with which they (or many of 
them at least) deal or actively anticipate” (Jefferson et al., 2018, pp. 10–11). Stuckedness 
in reality is a deliberate enforcement and a well-designed deterrence policy which aims to 
make border crossers’ lives unlivable by killing them mentally, quietly, and slowly, like 
Sams and Danny, and/or by coercing them to “voluntary” return “home”, like Juma. 
As Khosravi notes, “time is a form of capital similar to money that can be invested, saved 
or wasted” (Khosravi, 2018c, p. 33, 2018b, p. 40). The theft and usurpation of border 
crossers’ time and thus life –“the time of their life” - generates, as Khosravi argues, “a 
sense of uncertainty, shame, depression and anxiety. This can lead to sleep disorders and 
psychosomatic pain. Dread, angst or guilt are all components of the experience of waiting” 
(2014, p. 1). Sams, was struggling from a chronic depression and anxiety which has been 
deteriorated through the passage of time due to his protracted stuckedness. Furthermore, he 
was dealing with feelings of guilt and shame generated by his family back in Afghanistan, 
since he is often told that after so many years in Europe he has accomplished nothing and 
that he has failed. The last three years Sams is harming himself. Bridget Haas in her 
research found that apart from anxiety and precariousness border crossers experience the 
feeling of powerlessness (Haas, 2017, p. 83). As Sams, Juma and Danny’s cases indicate 
contra to the time prisoners spend inside jails, border crossers who are confined in a state 
of stuckedness, “do not have the luxury of a sentence” (Griffiths et al., 2013, p. 20). 
Temporality, as Jefferson et al. argue, “animates stuckness as an important dimension of 
confinement” (2018, p. 2). After all, to be stuck in a place, equally means to be stuck in 
time (ibid., p. 3).  
Stuckedness, however, is a complicated and oxymoronic experience which is not 
experienced the same by all border crossers. It can involve patience and impatience, 
persistence and abandonment, hope and cancellation, agency and passivity. According to 
 [176] 
 
Lesvos Solidarity activist network, border crossers can easily “become depressed or lose 
hope while waiting. Sometimes people feel like they are wasting their lives and their 
talents” (Solidarity Lesvos, 2018). Jusi Jauhiainen in his research on Lesvos found that 
some border crossers experienced stuckedness as a process during which they learned to 
patiently endure waiting (Jauhiainen, 2017, p. 25; Khosravi, 2017, p. 79). What I found as 
a dominant feature on Lesvos in the post-refugee crisis era was that border crossers were 
experiencing a state of spatial, temporal and “existential stuckedness” (Hage, 2009) and 
waiting mainly outside the detention and the hotspot. Like Danny, border crossers who 
reached Lesvos in the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis, although not being detained 
in Moria hotspot, they were not allowed to travel outside Lesvos due to the geographical 
restriction regime (Section 4.3.2). They were experiencing stuckedness in the form of 
“protracted displacement” (Norum, Mostafanezhad, & Sebro, 2016, p. 61) while waiting 
on the island of Lesvos wherein their lives were suspended in time and space. Thalis a 
border crosser from Ghana, who arrived in Lesvos in the aftermath of the refugee crisis 
argued,  
I have spent a lot of money to reach here and I have borrowed a lot of money in order to 
pay my daily expenses and the hotel, but I will not be able to pay anymore, and I will thus 
be forced to return to Moria camp. It is very dirty there. Too many people are living there. 
The toilets and bathrooms are very dirty and even during winter they bathe with cold water. 
I do not know what is going to happen. I am wasting time of my life without doing 
anything. I do not have friends, I do not have money. I have nothing to do. I am sitting all 
day and thinking the same things all over again. I awake up very late in the morning and I 
sleep very early in the night. I have nothing to do here all day. I might not be in prison but 
the island for me is a prison. 
Many border crossers are coerced to prostitution in order to financially survive. One of the 
central parks in Mytilene has become a hub where young border crossers are coerced to 
“sell” their bodies to local men. This is also a form of state violence which is exercised 
through the lens of deterrence and preemption. Stuckedness and waiting within the 
temporal confinement and the border of time is also obscene because it penetrates to the 
intimate and mundane spaces of the daily life with a stealthy, quiet and silent way, to such 
an extent that it becomes unnoticed, normalised and, thus, is not perceived as violence at 
all. Furthermore, the protracted stuckedness and waiting within the border of time pushes 
border crossers in becoming themselves the border (Khosravi, 2011, p. 99; Weber & 
Pickering, 2011, p. 12). As Khosravi argues by reflecting on Etienne Balibar’s work, 
“borders have become invisible borders, situated everywhere and nowhere. Hence, 
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undesirable people are not expelled by the border, they are forced to be the border” 
(Khosravi, 2011, p. 99).  
6.2.2 The Violence of Stuckedness and Waiting 
What has become a first-hand lived experience through the passage of time as an activist, 
local, professional and researcher is that keeping people in stuckedness, enduring waiting, 
uncertainty and precariousness is a well-designed deterrent strategy. Temporality, waiting 
and stuckedness technique aims to make border crossers’ lives unlivable in the host 
countries or border zones, in order to be eventually discouraged and coerced to return back 
from where they came from in the first place. Keeping border crossers in a state of 
stuckedness and waiting, either in humiliating, degrading, appalling reception and living 
conditions inside camps and hotspots like Moria, or in temporal and spatial confinements 
in Prison Islands like Lesvos, where additionally border crossers experience the 
xenophobic violence, exploitation and police intimidation, is a manifestation of state 
violence. Stuckedness is inextricable with state violence. Additionally, stuckedness and 
waiting is one of the cruelest ironies being enforced through the politics of deterrence. As 
Haas emphasises, “border crossers who are defined by their mobility  as forced migrants) 
become spatially and temporally stuck in a protracted state of waiting” once in Europe 
(Haas, 2017, p. 87). The violence of stuckedness and waiting that border crossers endure 
within the Prison Island is an enforced, contemporary and sophisticated tool of torture, that 
EU and Greece use, in order to mentally, emotionally and physically exhaust, and deter 
border crossers, who want to come or are already in Europe, from coming, staying or 
continuing their journey forward. From this angle, time during stuckedness is a time which 
border crossers are spending, killing or doing (Andersson, 2014, p. 223; Hasselberg, 2016; 
Matthews, 1999). However, time is wasted, spent and killed but also “spends” and 
“wastes” border crossers’ lives and dreams  Iliadou 2017). Time kills. Waiting and 
(a)waiting kills too. Time and (a)waiting kills and exterminates quietly, silently and 
slowly, mentally, emotionally, and then physically, capitalising what Serapheim, who 
supports survivors of torture observed, “The powerful do not have to touch people with 
their hands in order to torture and exterminate them”  ibid.), since the violence of time, 
stuckedness, waiting, uncertainty of not knowing (when and if they are ever going to 
leave) (Hasselberg, 2016; Turnbull 2015) do the dirty work for them. No wonder why self-
harms and suicide attempts in the Prison Island have become a routine.  
Border crossers do not only experience their time being stolen or multiple forms of 
violence due to the enduring waiting and stuckedness. They experience a violent 
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abandonment in the violence of time, stuckedness and waiting. During their temporal and 
spatial stuckedness border crossers experience the action and inaction, and indifference of 
policy makers and the border regime, by being given a minimal humanitarian care, 
assistant and access to rights and international protection. This minimal care balances 
between pity, compassion and repression (Fassin, 2005; Ticktin, 2006). As Ticktin argues, 
“humanitarianism is inevitably accompanied by practices of policing; compassion comes 
with repression (Ticktin, 2016, p. 258). Through this compassion-repression lens border 
crossers are “kept alive but in a state of injury”  Mbembe 2003:21). In this respect, after 
arriving in Lesvos and stuck for months or years, border crossers are not allowed to go 
back home on their own, even if they want to, unless they are deported or escorted (see 
Juma’s case), they are not allowed to move forward to Europe, but at the same time they 
are not allowed to be free. They are not directly killed but they are not allowed to live. As 
some police officers working in Pagani detention used to tell me “do not be so sweet with 
them [border crossers] because they will spread the message to the others that we are 
treating them nicely here and they will want to come”. Meanwhile, other high and law 
rank police officers used to say,  
Pagani is a five-star hotel for the illegal migrants! This is what we have, and this is what 
they will get. If they do not like it, they should get the hell out from Greece and go back to 
their countries. We do not keep them here to entertain them, but to spread the message to 
the others waiting at the borders that the conditions here are not good and they should not 
come here.  
Border crossers through the lens of deterrence are left to suffer and slowly die. Their lives 
are maintained through a minimal humanitarian care, but only to exist as liminal minimal 
existences. According to, Thom Davies, Arshad Isakjee and Surindar Dhesi,  
The permanent wounding of individuals, rather than their direct and active killing, can be 
used as a means of control. Suffering therefore can be become a political technology, where 
certain groups are exposed to conditions in which they are “kept alive but in a state of 
injury”  Mbembe 2003:21). Within this necropolitical system of domination, conditions that 
are “obscene, vulgar and grotesque” (Mbembe 1992:1) become sanctioned for political ends 
(2017, p. 1268). 
Stuckedness is a state enforcement which has been implemented in the name of 
humanitarianism and the state of exception due to the refugee crisis  “end the human 
suffering and restore the public order”). As a result, border crossers experience the 
enforcement of a temporal and spatial stuckedness and confinement which has brought the 
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exact opposite results. Instead of ending the human suffering, it proliferated it by creating 
border zones and islands of abandonment and necropolitical violence. Through this lens 
border crossers experience degradation, devaluation and dehumanization by being exposed 
to social death. In this respect, stuckedness and waiting is state violence, which inflicts 
“necroharms” upon border crossers. As I will also explain in the next chapter, state 
violence in respect to temporality, stuckedness and waiting is also necropolitical violence 
which generates “necroharms” (Chapter 7) upon border crossers; a spatial and temporal 
stuckedness in a social death mode of neither dead nor alive. The violence of stuckedness 
and waiting is part of the state’s practices. It is a ritual and routine of spatial and temporal 
borders and controls. Therefore, stuckedness is integral of the temporal border controls 
which aim to discipline, manage, regulate and exclude the undesirables by “narrowing 
down the space of protection as much as possible and to temporally anticipate the threshold 
of deportability” (Tazzioli, 2018, p. 18). 
Conclusion 
As scholars have denoted a pivotal aspect of waiting has to do with the conditions under 
which one is waiting (Auyero, 2011). What I have been experiencing the last two decades 
is a violent abandonment of border crossers to degrading, humiliating, life threatening 
conditions and social death. My research findings on Lesvos indicate that border crossers, 
while they are waiting in the “Prison Island”, as they commonly call Lesvos, in order to 
complete the registration, identification and asylum procedures, they are exposed to 
multiple and multilayered forms of everyday violence and harm. Border crossers are 
intimidated, harassed and abused by the state officials through stop and search practices 
everywhere and constantly inside the Prison Island. The range of violence is so widespread 
that border crossers are coerced to adjust their routine in order to become as much invisible 
as possible (Coutin, 2005). The everyday life turns to be for them a living hell. Border 
crossers also endure protracted waiting due to the slow and long bureaucratic procedures 
surrounding the registration and the asylum. They also have to endure dehumanisation and 
segregation into bureaucratic and penal “categories” and “sub-categories”  vulnerable/non-
vulnerable, delinquents/non-delinquents). They must endure waiting for months and even 
for years in order to regulate their legal status or to be deported. While they are waiting 
they are forced to experience the humiliation of living in appalling, humiliating and 
degrading conditions like those in Moria hotspot, where queuing in order to use the 
lavatories, to receive food, to see the doctors, to speak with the staff, to seek asylum is an 
everyday systematic practice. At the same time, exploitation, violence, rapes, trafficking 
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and torture within the hotspot and the Prison Island is also an everyday reality. All these 
are added to their already existing suffering from their country of origin and their journey 
to Europe. In addition to the everyday violence, time and waiting expose border crossers to 
a slow and enduring “death” with enormous psychological and emotional consequences. 
Stuckedness, time and waiting are part of the deterrent strategies the EU and the Greek 
policy makers deploy in order to preemptively deter, prevent and halt border crossers from 
arriving to Europe. As a result, the violence of time, stuckedness and waiting becomes a 
direct, obscene and brute form of state violence.  
In the next chapter I will focus on the thanatopolitical border regime and the governing of 
unwanted human mobility through violence and death and the infliction of two new types 
of harms which are linked with the physical and social death. I have called these 
“thanatoharms” and “necroharms”. 
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CHAPTER 7  
Necroharms and Thanatoharms: The Politics of Death and 
Violence 
 
 
In the previous chapter I focused on the spatial and temporal confinements which confine 
border crossers’ lives beyond the institutional walls of the camp inside Lesvos. I focused 
on two central and interlinked processes and deterrence enforcements; the process of 
confinement beyond detention (Mountz, 2012; Tazzioli, 2017; Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018) 
and the process of “the violence of stuckedness and waiting” (Iliadou 2018). I argued that 
the former has produced and diffused the lived experience of confinement beyond the 
Moria hotspot “in the intimate and mundane spaces of the daily life”  Mountz, 2011) in the 
form of a “carceral continuum” (Foucault, 1975, p. 303) and stuckedness, by inflicting 
harm and exposing border crossers to everyday violence (Das, 2013; Scheper-Hughes, 
2004; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004). The latter, has produced the lived experience of 
the temporal confinement and stuckedness within the border of time by trapping border 
crossers in an indefinite, protracted displacement and existential inertia by inflicting more 
harm. I argued that both processes and enforcements are designed to make border crossers’ 
lives unliveable through abandonment and social death. This is a form of state violence 
which I named as “the violence of stuckedness and waiting”.  
The aim of this chapter is to analyse two violent interlinked processes which are the 
product of the deterrence enforcements being implemented in a continuum in time and 
space. I will focus on thanatopolitics as a mode of border management, regulation and 
governance of the unwanted human mobility through the intentional infliction of physical 
harms, death and violence.  I will show that the EU policy makers, in order to prevent and 
deter border crossers from reaching Europe, enforce the politics of death and violence 
through left-to-die practices, abandonment, inaction and indifference  De Le n, 2015; 
Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b). The governing of unwanted human mobility 
through violence and death is the Janus-face of deterrence. I name as “thanatoharms” the 
harms which are generated as a result of the thanatopolitical borders and deterring-killing 
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enforcements and processes. I will then move on to show that thanatoharms produce and 
inflict multilayer and overlapped, more stealthy and obscene cultural, psychological and 
emotional harms by exposing both the dead, the living and even whole communities in 
enduring necropolitical stuckedness, protracted displacement and social death. I name 
these harms as “necroharms”. 
Vignette: The Borders of Death 
One cold December of 2012 on Lesvos I woke up from the sudden ring of the phone. It 
was early in the morning. The sad voice of one of the members of the local activist 
network I was involved with on the other end of the line was urging me to wake up and go 
to help. “The sea has washed ashore dead bodies!” the voice said and burst into tears. A 
shipwreck took place during the night with many casualties. Border crossers’ dead bodies 
were found by local people, frozen on the pebbles of the coasts near the city centre. Dead 
bodies and various objects were scattered here and there reminding of a battlefield in a 
time of peace. These were the discarded bodies and belongings of those who were not 
allowed to belong (Davies & Isakjee, 2015, p. 93). A member of the rescue crew told me 
that the position of the dead bodies on the shore was revealing that some of the border 
crossers reached Lesvos alive but eventually froze to death. The frozen death found them 
“on the doorstep of Europe” (Cabot, 2014). 
The mass media and particularly the local news reproduced over and over again the 
macabre details and photos of the tragic end of the people fleeing wars, conflicts and 
persecution. Some of the relatives of the dead, who knew that their people were travelling 
within this fatal dinghy, started reaching Lesvos in order to identify the dead bodies of 
their beloved ones and repatriate them. Meanwhile, other relatives were reaching Lesvos 
with the hope to find the ones who were missing. The tragic deaths and events enabled a 
macabre industry of opportunists who were keen to “assist” the relatives with the 
bureaucratic and identification procedures but by making profit at the expense of border 
crossers’ relatives. In the next few days more dead bodies were detected in the sea. The 
number of fatalities of the shipwreck was finalised; 28 dead among which the 7 were 
unidentified and only 1 survivor. The one and only survivor, an unaccompanied minor, was 
photographed and interviewed multiple times by the ruthless journalists who only wanted 
to produce and be paid for the article of the day. Pain always sells after all. The survivor 
was also interrogated multiple times by the police and was eventually left alone.  
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The 2  dead bodies were “stored” for several days within the hospital’s fridges, since there 
was no space available within the morgue (Kovras & Robins, 2017), and waited there for 
their burial and all the bureaucratic procedures to be completed. The burial was delaying to 
be carried out and, as a result, the macabre smell of the human flesh in the state of sepsis 
and decomposition overwhelmed the hospital. Although, Lesvos Island was an entry point 
for border crossers, since the early 2000’s, there were neither adequate facilities within the 
morgue to store the bodies nor social services and staff managing the depressing issues of 
border related deaths. There was not even enough space within the town’s cemetery, a 
Muslim cemetery or an Imam to perform the burials and rituals of the funerals (Kovras & 
Robins, 2017; Mediterranean Missing Project, 2016; Stefatos, Papadopoulos, & Howe 
Haralambous, 2015; Stierl, 2016, p. 180). All the bureaucratic procedures were performed 
by activists like me, whilst the death rituals by border crossers who were living for many 
years in Lesvos and had become experts by experience in performing them. The local 
authorities were not keen to assist or take any actions in dealing with the management of 
the deaths, and they only wanted to get rid of the dead bodies with their “annoying” 
relatives by relocating the burden of responsibility to the local activist networks supporting 
border crossers. 
I remember that the funeral of the 28, eventually, took place after an agonizing struggle, 
discomfort and pain generated by the inconsistency, the chaotic, slow and long 
bureaucratic and identification procedures, and mainly due to the inaction and indifference 
of the local authorities. I will never forget a representative of the local authorities, who 
unwilling to deal and assist with the burial of the dead border crossers, suggested to me, 
“We should bury the dead in the dump so as local Christians will not be offended.” When 
the burial eventually took place, it was inappropriately performed. The workers of the 
Municipality, without knowing the religious and cultural rituals and customs, buried the 
dead bodies in the wrong position by violating the religious and cultural doctrine (Stefatos 
et al., 2015, p. 14), and by inflicting cultural sock and harm upon border crossers’ relatives 
and community. As a result, the workers had to exhume the dead bodies and bury them 
again. The process of repatriation of the dead bodies of the shipwreck of 2012, to the 
countries of origin or to other EU countries, was also characterised by long, slow, chaotic, 
inconsistent, exhausting procedures and indifference. I remember the agonising and 
enduring process under which, the relatives of one of the dead border crossers, who 
travelled from Sweden in order to identify and repatriate the dead, went through. They 
were ignored by the local authorities, misinformed, they faced the inaccessible 
bureaucratic fences and after weeks they faced the indifference and brutality of the 
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prosecutor who literally threw the documentation needed for the repatriation back in their 
faces by shouting at them, “Well, here you are! Take your bloody corpses.”  
That cold December of 2012 I witnessed the first shipwreck with so many casualties in 
human lives -until then- within the recent history of Lesvos. It is not that shipwrecks and 
border-related deaths did not occur before, but the particular event was until then the most 
fatal one, which caused a collateral shock to the people of Lesvos. Suddenly, the 
unauthorised border crossings -a phenomenon which has been unfolding and escalating on 
Lesvos over the last two decades- came out from its invisibility via the recovered dead 
corpses, shocked and sensitised even for a while the indifferent public opinion. This fatal 
event was also the hallmark of what would gradually unfold as the “refugee crisis” since it 
inaugurated the mass arrivals of Syrian (but not exclusively) border crossers and the 
increasing phenomenon of the intentional representation of border-related deaths as 
unforeseen and random accidents by policy makers. Although, I had buried the traumatic 
experience of the dreadful event of December 2012, in the bottom of my subconscious -a 
process which in psychology is framed as “repression of traumatic memory” (National 
Health System, 2007) - the macabre spectre of death haunting Lesvos, which I confronted 
later throughout the research process, evoked the trauma. The spectre of death was 
creeping all over Lesvos. This fact was vividly portrayed from the numerous disposed life 
jackets, plastic or wooden boats -the “refugee waste” (Gillespie, 2018, p. 150)- which was 
scattered all around the coasts. The irony was that the “refugee waste” had a formal place 
to be buried –in a municipal dumb known as “life jackets’ graveyard” (Gillespie, 2018, p. 
149)- but “refugees” per se did not. Due to the lack of facilities and space, border crossers 
were buried in an allotment illegally operating as a graveyard. In a sense this illegal site 
capitalised the cynic epilogue for the “illegal” lives, who even in death were not allowed to 
“belong” (Davies & Isakjee, 2015, p. 93) even though their waste somehow was.  
7.1 Thanatopolical Border Regime: The Politics of Death and 
Violence 
 
When crimes begin to pile up they become invisible.  
When sufferings become unendurable the cries are no longer heard.  
(Bertold Brecht in P. Davies et al., 2014, p. vii) 
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Since 2014, the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) has recorded the 
disappearance and death of over 22,500 migrants (Laczko, Singleton, & Black, 2017, p. 
iii). Whilst, over the course of the last two decades “more than 60,000 migrants have 
embarked on fatal journeys around the world, never to return to their loved ones” (Brian & 
Laczko, 2016, p. iii; see also Laczko et al., 2017; Singleton, Laczko, & Black, 2017). 
These numbers, however, are just estimation since there are not accurate data for the 
numbers of deaths of border crossers. As Brian and Laczko argues, “The real number is 
unknown, as many deaths are never registered, especially in more remote regions of the 
world” (Brian & Laczko, 2016, p. iii), and thus the existing data should be better 
understood as “a minimum estimate of the true number of global migrant fatalities” 
(Singleton et al., 2017, p. 4). In other words, “for every dead body washed up on the shores 
of the developed world experts estimate there are at least two others that are never 
recovered” (Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 1). The United Nations Higher Commissioner for 
Refugees have recorded 54 dead and missing people in Greece during 2017, 441 in 2016, 
and 799 in 2015 (UNHCR, 2018b). Death made its presence dominant through border 
crossers’ corpses which were washed ashore -in whole or in parts, identifiable or 
decomposed. The Aegean and Mediterranean Sea, as well as other land and sea border 
pathways which border crossers traverse in order to reach Europe, have become tools of 
“boundary enforcement and a strategic slayer of border crossers” (De Le n, 2015, p. 67; 
see also Kovras & Robins, 2017, p. 159). They have also become enormous graveyards 
(Albahari, 2015a, 2016; Doty, 2011, p. 600; Tazzioli, 2015). According to Stefatos et al,  
“Lesvos, the border, the region, is not only assigned the management of a refugee crisis, 
but also the management of death, a death that is constantly being normalised” (Stefatos et 
al., 2015, p. 13). Local people of Lesvos -similarly to Maurizio Albahari’s findings 
(Albahari, 2016, p. 275)- might not eat fishes due to the feeling of disgust being generated 
by the idea that fishes might have fed on human flesh from bodies never recovered from 
the sea. Ali, a Syrian border crosser I interviewed during my research could not stop asking 
me in a state of shock and awe, “Do you know how many of our own people have been fed 
by the fishes?” Fishermen in Lesvos are horrified every time they fish in Lesvos, as one of 
them told me, since very often parts of human remains are caught within their nets, “We 
are even afraid to call the Coastguard anymore when we fish human remains. The 
procedure of the investigation is very long and until it is completed we are not allowed to 
fish. We are just throwing them back to the sea.” Anna, one of the long-term residents and 
activists interviewee told me,  
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I have a very intense feeling, and I think many of us has it too, that as we are swimming we 
will come across a dead body. Most of us have this macabre feeling because we have first-
hand experiences. In most of the beaches that we used to go for swimming dead bodies 
were found. In Thermi, Aghios Fokas, Eressos, Tavari, Podara, Polichnitos, Plomari, Varia 
[popular and touristic beaches], at the airport, everywhere. 
As I was listening to Anna’s narration, I thought that death is not just the ugliest aspect of 
this particular border crossing, although it brings to the surface multiple political and 
ethical issues. The way that people die, are recovered (in whole, in parts or in 
decomposition) or are dispersed (within the sea and within the fishes’ bellies) makes this 
ugly aspect a macabre tale and even worse. It makes it an unbearable tale of everyday 
horror. 
The governing of the unwanted human mobility in the name of “humanitarian security” 
(Chapter 4) and “prevention through deterrence” (Doty, 2011, p. 599) has been a common 
feature of contemporary border politics (Fassin, 2012; Squire, 2017, p. 514). The more 
border crossers die and suffer en route to Europe -by being exposed to death, violence and 
the violence of abandonment (Davies & Isakjee, 2015, p. 93; Squire, 2017, p. 514)- the 
more others will be deterred to come to Europe. “Governing migration through death and 
biophysical violence”  Squire 2017, p. 517) has become the Janus-face of deterrence. 
Traces of deaths through remains of corpses (in whole or in parts)  De Le n, 2015, p. 25) 
washed ashore or being found, through the anonymous graves and massive tombs 
 Albahari, 2016; De Le n, 2015) along the multiple land and sea border pathways, are 
preemptive and deterrent “messages”, being left for the ones who have not reached Europe 
yet. As Rita Segato (2014) observes, “corpses are being used as messages where the body 
is actually transmitting something the perpetrators want to say, show or enact”  in Délano, 
Domínguez Galbraith, & Nienass, 2016). Prevention and deterrence policies have resulted 
into the increased deaths at, within and beyond the borders. As Jason De Le n observes 
policy makers instead of calling their policies “killing”, they call them instead “deterring” 
 De Le n, 2015, p. 67). Border-related deaths are systematically presented by policy 
makers as unforeseen, “natural” events, random and unpreventable “accidents”. However, 
as Vicky Squire argues border-related deaths should be seen, as “an operation of power 
that involves a particular way of killing those lives that are not deemed worthy of being 
sacrificed” (Squire, 2017, p. 514; see also Vaughan-Williams, 2015a, p. 47). Border 
crossers’ lives which have been degraded and devaluated as “unworthy” and “bare lives” 
(Agamben, 1998) become individuals whose deaths “are deemed of little consequence” 
(Doty, 2011, p. 600). In this sense, nature and the geographic space plays a pivotal role in 
 [187] 
 
the implementation of the violent deterrent policies by providing, as Dotty argues, “moral 
alibi that enables the policy makers to deny responsibility for the deaths” (Doty, 2011, p. 
599 see also Chapter 4/Section 4.1.3 ).   
The “deterring-killing” policies  De Le n, 2015, p. 67) surrounding the border regime 
which systematically and routinely expose border crossers’ lives to physical harms and 
death highlight “the lethal or thanatopolitical dimension of biopolitical governance” 
(Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 47). Those physical harms are not random and 
unpredictable events but an outcome of a continuum of multiple, systematic and intentional 
prevention through “deterring-killing” policies (see also Chapter 4). The biopolitical and 
thanatopolitical approaches, which draw on Michele Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, are 
very important in the understanding of the cotemporary practices of border management 
which allow or create the conditions, spaces and “juridical voids” of abandonment and 
death (Doty, 2011, p. 600; Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 47). Such 
approaches are also important in order, as Squire argues, “to understand how deaths that 
might be presented as ‘tragic accidents’ are better understood as an integral operation of 
power” (2017a, p. 517). Finally, such approaches contribute in the understanding of, in 
Vaughan-Williams words, “Why do European humanitarian border security practices often 
expose the very ‘irregular’ migrants they are supposed to protect to dehumanisation and 
death” (2015b, pp. 2–3). Foucault described as biopolitics the technology of power under 
which populations and life itself becomes the object of calculation, regulation, control and 
knowledge (Foucault, 2003, pp. 246–247). Biopolitics is a non-disciplinary power which 
seeks to intervene and take control of (biological) life itself through a set of processes and 
mechanisms in order to ensure regularization (ibid., p. 247). In respect to the EU border 
regime and the regulation of the unauthorised border crossings, the biopolitical paradigm is 
enforced in practice through the militarisation and surveillance of borders and the 
deployment of militaristic surveillance technology, policing, prevention and preemption 
and migration governance through spatial and temporal border controls and humanitarian 
intervention (Section 4.1.2, see also Chapter 6). Humanitarian intervention, at and beyond 
the borders, is a form of biopolitical intervention. As Didier Fassin argues,  
it uses techniques of the management of populations in setting up refugee camps, 
establishing aid corridors, making use of communication around public testimony to abuses 
perpetrated, and conducting epidemiological studies of infectious diseases, malnutrition, 
trauma, and even violations of the laws of war (2012, p. 226). 
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Furthermore, the biopolitical paradigm is enforced at the borders through the degradation 
of border crossers’ lives either into “security risky lives” and, thus, a threat or “lives to be 
saved” (Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 39). At the same time, their bodies, vulnerabilities 
and basic needs are targeted, intensively managed and regulated (ibid.). These processes 
ultimately produce segregations and hierarchies between lives which are “worthy” and 
“unworthy” to be protected, rescued and live. As Fassin argues, biopolitics “presupposes 
not only risking others but also selecting those who have priority for being saved” (Fassin, 
2012, p. 226; see also Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 41). The enforcement of death and 
violence as a mode of deterring and governing the unauthorised human mobility is based 
on the existence of such “hierarchies of humanity” (Fassin, 2012, p. 239;see also Vaughan-
Williams, 2015b, p. 42; Squire, 201, p. 515). In order deaths, violence, inaction and 
abandonment of border crossers to be legitimised in the name of humanitarianism and 
security (Chapter 4) border crossers must be reduced as hierarchical “inferior” humans, 
risky, and threatening. According to Doty, “After the apparatus of security fabricate and 
organize a milieu- i.e., after physical barriers, increased numbers of border patrol agents, 
and high-tech surveillance are put in place- agents of security can just let things take their 
‘natural course’” (2011, p. 606). Such escalating deterring-killing policies demarcate the 
shift from the biopolitical borders to the thanatopolitical ones (Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, 
p. 48). The concept of thanatopolitical border is a term developed by Giorgio Agamben. It 
marks the practices of the exposure and abandonment to death “as integral to sovereign-
biopolitics” (Squire, 2017). As already discussed in Chapter 4, Agamben has deployed the 
concept of “homo sacer” in order to define a life which “has been stripped of membership 
in society and thereby of his or her rights” (Khosravi, 2011, p. 3). When a life is reduced to 
bare life, it is easy to be exposed to death, be erased and effaced. This is how the 
thanatopolitical border regime operates. According to Mountz, 
People on the move across borders with a desire to work and/or make a refugee claim in 
another state find themselves caught in between jurisdictions. Liminal spaces of 
enforcement include ambiguous locales such as stateless rooms in airports, dynamic zones 
of interdiction in the ‘hot spots’ where smugglers operate and remote sites of detention 
within and beyond sovereign territory. In these thresholds between sovereign and non-
sovereign territory, asylum-seekers face legal ambiguities. A person might be en route from 
one country to another to make an asylum claim, but find herself detained in a third country 
in between that is not a signatory to the Convention, a site where she cannot make a claim 
(2011b, p. 385). 
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The thanatopolitical paradigm generates thresholds, liminal spaces and zones of ultimate 
abandonment and exception (Agamben, 1998; see also Chapter 4/ Section 4.2). In such 
thresholds the legal status of people is ambiguous, while their isolation and remoteness 
make them hidden from view. Within thresholds not only “violence passes over into law” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 25) but it is normalised and routinised, and as such “death becomes a 
norm” (Squire, 2017, p. 514).  
7.1.1 The Violence of Abandonment I: Thanatoharms 
Through this lens, I call those particular harms, which are sheer products of the 
thanatopolitical border regime and inflict death, thanatoharms [from the Greek word 
“thanatos” (Θάνατος) which means death]. Thanatoharms ultimately cause death to border 
crossers and include the intentional inaction, indifference and violent abandonment 
through the following patterns. (i) The left-to-die abandonment practices (Squire, 2017; 
Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 47); (ii) Push-back operations (Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, p. 
45) and deaths “at the hands of the state” (Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 7) during search 
and rescue operations or while border crossers are crossing the liminal border spaces (see 
also Chapter 4); (iii) the violent abandonment to the forces of nature  De Le n, 2015; 
Doty, 2011; Squire, 2017). These are the most common types of thanatoharms which, 
additionally, are multilayered, overlapping, interact and intersect (Tombs, 2019).  
7.1.1.1 Deaths through Left-to-die practices 
The first type of thanatoharms are the left-to-die practices (Squire, 2017, p. 516; Vaughan-
Williams, 2015b, pp. 45–46) , during which border crossers in distress are either 
intentionally ignored without a search and rescue operation to take place, or they are 
abandoned during rescue operations by the state officials in the middle of nowhere. A 
recent case of a left-to-die boat in the Aegean Sea was recorded on the 16
th
 March 2018 
near Agathonisi Island. In this incident 16 border crossers in distress, among them 
children, died due to Coast Guard’s inaction and delay in carrying out a search and rescue 
operation (WatchTheMed-Alarm Phone, 2018). According to the activist network 
WatchTheMed- Alarm Phone,  
one of the relatives living in Samos Island knew that his loved ones were travelling in the 
fatal boat notified the authorities repeatedly, via phone and in person. At that point, many of 
the shipwrecked could have still been rescued. According to the survivors, they stayed afloat 
for several hours, waiting for help. But a Search and Rescue operation was launched only a 
day later, after local residents had discovered the first bodies, and they could recover merely 
more dead bodies (WatchTheMed-Alarm Phone, 2018). 
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The deliberate inaction of state officials to perform their duty of searching and rescuing 
people in distress is a systematic arbitrary practice which however consists of a crime of 
act and hence is a state crime (Weber & Pickering, 2011, pp. 83–84). Also, it violates the 
1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) and the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Papanicolopulu, 
2016; SOLAS, 1974; UNCLOS, 1982; UNHCR, 2015b). Left-to-die practices highlight the 
culpability, contribution and complicity of state officials and border security agents to 
inflict intended harm, violence and death (Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 84). As activists 
have vividly noted, 
[border crossers] are not the victims of a natural catastrophe; they are the dead of a border 
regime for which some are politically responsible. Simply said: if it had been possible for 
them to just buy a ferry ticket and to move wherever they wanted and needed to, they would 
certainly be still alive. All those for whom we grieve […] lost their lives due to a senseless 
border regime (in Stierl, 2016, p. 179). 
7.1.1.2 Deaths “at the hands of the state” 
The second type of “thanatoharms” is inflicted when border crossers die at the hands of 
state officials’ (Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 7) while en route and when they traverse the 
various land and sea liminal border spaces and thresholds (Chapter 4/ Section 4.2). As 
already discussed in Chapter 4/Section 4.2 borders and borderzones due to the liminality 
and ambiguity they generate states of exclusion and exception, a juridical and spatial void 
where the rule of law is suspended (Agamben, 1998; Doty, 2011; Nordentoft Mose & 
Wriedt, 2015 see also Chapter 4/Section 4.2). Within this void, border crossers are 
violently abandoned to the mercy, brutality and extreme violence of state officials and 
eventually die at the hands of the state. There, there are no eyewitnesses to testify and the 
geographic space provides a moral alibi to state officials in obscuring, cloaking in silence 
any culpability by enjoying impunity for any violent (in)action and abuse of power which 
has inflicted death (Doty, 2011, p. 600). Very often the two types of thanatoharms intersect 
by combining left-to-die practices, violence and abuse of power by state officials during 
rescue operations, and push-backs. The Farmakonisi tragedy (Amnesty International, 
2015c; Pro Asyl, 2016) where border crossers were physically abused by their rescuers and 
were left-to-die in a boat which was sinking is an indicative example. Additionaly, the ones 
who survived were also victimised, blamed and shamed by the Greek authorities and the 
media for being culpable and responsible for their own deaths. As Miriam Ticktin argues,    
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deaths are blamed on migrants and their families; they are framed as responsible for making 
risky and dangerous choices (that is, crossing the desert), while the state represents itself as 
humanitarian by simply helping to bury the bodies after the fact (Ticktin, 2016, p. 261). 
7.1.1.3 Deaths through the Violent Abandonment to the Forces of Nature 
The third type of thanatoharms is the violence and harm of abandonment to the forces of 
nature which directly expose border crossers to death. As I described in the Vignette as 
well as on Chapter 4, border crossers are coerced due to the militarised border regime, the 
restrictive rules and deterrent policies to follow more risky and dangerous routes. The 
Mediterranean and Aegean Sea, Evros River at the land Greek-Turkish borders, the 
Sonoran desert between Mexico and the US are some of the deadliest sites (Albahari, 
2015a, 2016; Squire, 2017, p. 514) and also symbols of the violence of abandonment, 
deterrence and the thanatopolitical border regime. In these sites border crossers experience 
abandonment to “the physical forces of deserts and seas” (Squire, 2017, p. 514) and 
exposure to drowning, fatal injuries, dangerous and lethal environmental conditions (such 
as very high or very low temperatures), starvation and dehydration, while crossing the 
mountains, lands, deserts and seas (Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 130). As De Le n 
emphasises, “Nature ‘civilizes’ the way the government deals with migrants; it does the 
dirty work” (2015, p. 68). In this respect, the significance of the geographical space and the 
environmental conditions are playing a significant role as an alibi for the enforcement of 
deterrence and the thanatopolitical border regime with impunity.  
7.1.2 The Violence of Abandonment II: “Necroharms” 
Abandonment and inaction not only exist in the form of thanatoharms, meaning directly 
linked with deaths, which are products of the thanatopolitical border regime enforcements 
when border crossers are en route to Europe. Through my lived and first-hand experiences 
and positionalities (as activist, professional and researcher) in Lesvos and Greece I have 
eye witnessed and experienced the exemplifier of the violence and harm of abandonment 
and inaction through; (i) the management of death via specific bureaucratic procedures, 
separate from the other bureaucratic procedures which are implemented at and within the 
borders (i.e. registration, identification, asylum, see Chapter 5). Such bureaucracy is death 
related only and its existence is due to the thanatopolitical border regime which generates 
thanatos (death). That is why I call it thanatobureaucracy and it is inconsistent, chaotic, 
confusing and lengthy by inflicting more harm to survivors and the families of the 
deceased; (ii) the postmortem corporal mistreatment of the dead who are washed ashore or 
die within the refugee camps. The harm here is inflicted via the absence of burials, 
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religious rituals and memorialisation or the presence of undignified ones, resulting in the 
infliction of an enduring social injury and cultural harm, through shaming, dishonor, 
humiliation, pollution and dirt to the dead and the living (families and whole communities) 
 De Le n, 2015; Douglas, 2003; Tombs, 2019). All the aforementioned are a quiet, silent 
and thus indirect and invisible, routinised and normalised everyday violence, which 
“tortures” the living and shames the dignity of the dead and her/his community. In this 
precise moments is where thanatopolitics shift into necropolitics (Mbembe, 2003), while 
thanatoharms turn into what I call as necroharms [from the Greek word necros (Νεκρός) 
which means dead]. Achille Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics is crucial here since it 
highlights the shift from biopolitics to “a new paradigm in which life is subjugated to ‘the 
power of death’” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 39; Squire, 2017, p. 519). Through “necropolitics”, 
Mbembe focuses on the lives which are disposable or not  De Le n, 2015; Squire, 2017, p. 
519). Necropolitics is not only linked with the outright death but defines the power of 
exposing entire populations through abandonment into a permanent condition of injury, 
pain and suffering, and into an “informal existence” through the denial of provision and 
care (Davies et al., 2017, pp. 1268, 1271). In this sense, contra to thanatoharms which 
directly expose border crossers to death, necroharms expose border crossers in the 
enduring state of stuckedness (see Chapter 6) as neither dead nor alive, by being, as 
Mbembe argues, “kept alive but in a state of injury, in a phantom- like world of horrors 
and intense cruelty and profanity”  2003, p. 21). Necroharms directly expose border 
crossers to social death and the status of the living dead. As Vicky Squire argues, 
Mbembe’s emphasis on ‘necropolitics’ involves the delineation of which lives are ‘dis-
posable’ and which are not  cf. De Le n, 2015), with sovereign-biopower operating in 
necropolitical terms through taking on a distinctly colonial dimension whereby ‘entire 
populations’ become the focus of destruction and akin to the ‘living dead’  Mbembe, 2003: 
27–30). (Squire, 2017, p. 519) 
Necroharms tantamount to abandonment into social death and include the following 
multiple, interlinked forms of emotional and psychological, financial, and cultural harms 
(Copson, 2018; Dorling et al., 2008, p. 15; Tombs, 2019): (i) the experience of loss, pain, 
suffering, mourning and grief of the loved ones which is deteriorated due to slow, lengthy, 
chaotic and inconsistent and dysfunctional thanatobureaucratic procedures; (ii) the post-
mortem corporeal mistreatment of the dead, which re-traumatises and protracts the pain 
and suffering of the living (family, community), due to the chaotic and dysfunctional 
thanatobureaucratic and identification procedures, the indifference, apathy, ignorance and 
inaction of the authorities; (iii) the absence of burials, rituals and memorialisation, or the 
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presence of inappropriate and undignified one, which prolongs pain, suffering to the living, 
and generates cultural harms in the form of shame, risk and pollution. Those are harms 
which are caused by the post-mortem corporeal mistreatment when cultural, religious, 
moral, sacred norms -which are closely linked with one’s culture and identity- are violated, 
by inflicting humiliation, shame, insult, pollution and dirt  De Le n, 2015; Douglas, 2003) 
to the dead, the living and the whole community. Also, due to the absence or inappropriate 
religious ritual performance and undignified burials, both the dead and the living (family, 
community) are in a liminal state of temporal stuckedness and waiting between life and 
death. 
7.1.2.1 Thanatobureaucracy and Necroharms 
The memory of death of the 2012 shipwreck evoked multiple times when I was 
interviewing activists about border-related deaths. The ethical, political, bureaucratic and 
procedural issues (see Vignette) of then, I found in some extend being repeated and exist 
now (in 2017), by perpetuating the continuum and ritual of harm and violence in time and 
space. As I will show below, due to the ignorance, indifference and inaction on behalf of 
the local authorities, the burden of the management of death and corpses, the support of the 
survivors and relatives who were reaching Lesvos, was mainly at the hands of activists and 
volunteers. In the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis and the increased deaths in the 
Aegean Sea, activists and volunteers became experts by experience on the procedural and 
bureaucratic issues surrounding death. As Ellie, a long-term activist on Lesvos 
emphasised, “There is know-how now”. After 2015, various International and Non-
Governmental Organisations semi-settled on Lesvos and show an increased interest in 
getting involved in the managing of the macabre issue of death. According to Ellie, “From 
2015 onwards, the UNHCR has started supervising the procedures in order to reassure that 
the process is done from somebody; the police, the hospital’s social service or from other 
organisations”. However, as Ellie noted by echoing most of the activists I interviewed, 
bureaucracy is the main problem which makes the situation difficult and the procedures 
long and slow. In Ellie’s own words, “The system is very bureaucratic and managerial. It is 
all about bureaucratic management and that is why it fails so much.” 
The main problem surrounding the thanatobureaucratic management of the diseased being 
recovered –in whole or in parts- is that the main authority which is responsible for the 
whole processes is the Coastguard. The Coastguard is responsible for multiple and often 
contradictory tasks (Mediterranean Missing Project, 2016, p. 4). On one hand, the 
Coastguard is a repressive body whose task is to prevent, deter and arrest any unauthorised 
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border crossing as “illegal” according to the criminal law. On the other hand, the 
Coastguard is obliged to perform search and rescue operations of boatpeople in distress, 
and also recover the dead bodies and their remains from the sea and coasts. This 
contradictory task brings to the surface the contradiction and ambivalence between 
surveillance and policing of borders and humanitarian practices which are implemented at 
the same time (Mediterranean Missing Project, 2016, p. 4; see also Chapter 5/ Section 5.2). 
Being at the hands of a repressive body, the management of death and the identification 
procedures inflicted enormous emotional and psychological harms upon survivors of 
shipwrecks and their relatives. Due to the ignorance and apathy on behalf of the 
coastguards the identification procedures of the dead were taking place rashly. Most of the 
time there was no interpretation and support for the relatives, who in many cases were 
themselves survivors of the same shipwreck, and eye witnesses of the death of their loved 
ones. The authorities used to begin the identification procedures immediately after the 
dreadful event, without respecting or taking under consideration survivors and relatives’ 
pain and mourning. Meanwhile, survivors of shipwrecks are often held in the only formal 
facility provided by the state, which is the Moria hotspot where multiple forms of harm and 
everyday violence take place (Chapter 5). This fact inflicts additional emotional and 
psychological harm upon survivors. As Martha, an activist supporting survivors of 
shipwrecks and the relatives of the dead and missing people, argued, 
The way the whole procedure is taking place is a huge form of violence. Imagine that 
survivors are often held inside Moria camp. It is an enormous violence because as I see it, 
losing your loved ones is a very traumatic experience per se and even within a very good 
context one can be emotionally torn apart. Imagine now someone in this psychological 
condition living inside Moria camp. 
The violence and harms of abandonment, inaction, ignorance and apathy were combined 
with the institutional violence in the form of the absence of any standard procedure and 
clear framework which perpetuated a “policy vacuum” (Mediterranean Missing Project, 
2016, p. 2). Such a policy vacuum allowed the existence of a Kafkaesque 
thanatobureaucratic context without a beginning, middle and end, by making Ellie 
pessimistically mumble, “You have your mourning and at the same time you have one 
million [bureaucratic] things which are impossible to be done”. Due to my first hand lived 
experiences of the time I was living and working in Lesvos, I could empathise with Ellie’s, 
Martha’s and the other activists’ and volunteers’ agonising struggle and pain. Not only 
border crossers had to endure an endless bureaucratic registration, identification and 
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asylum procedure (Chapter 5) but even in death and mourning they were confronted with a 
thanatobureaucratic border regime. Even in mourning and death border crossers were 
experiencing a protracted displacement and limbo, since similarly to other bureaucratic 
procedures discussed in Chapter 5 they had to navigate through different, inconsistent and 
parallel thanatobureaucratic procedures. There were different procedures implemented in 
case a dead body was recovered and different procedures in case the body was not 
recovered. There were different procedures in case there were relatives and/or survivors 
who could identify the bodies and other procedures if the bodies were unidentified. There 
were different procedures again in case border crossers were missing and other procedures 
in case pieces of the dead were recovered. As Martha told me,  
Sometimes procedures are done and some other times they do not because there is not any 
standard procedure. There are no standard things, no guidelines that one can follow. Thus, 
from the one Port Police to the other and even from staff to staff there is a different 
administering of the procedures, and the one person says something, whilst the other person 
says something different. The whole problem has to do with ignorance and bureaucracy. 
Many of the staff who is managing deaths now had never done this before and so they are 
advised from people who have never done this before as well.  
Listening to Martha’s narration the traumatic memory of the relatives of the dead during 
the shipwreck of December 2012 re-evoked again. I remembered how agonizing it was 
witnessing them standing all alone outside of the Alien’s Bureau in Mytilene being ignored 
by the police officers working there. Not only did the relatives have to endure the loss of 
their loved ones they were also confronted with the apathy and inaction of the local 
authorities. The scene of the relatives silently mourning outside of the Alien’s Bureau and 
the police officers who were inside their offices but they were neither urging the relatives 
to stay nor to go, and also they were not advising them what to do, is imprinted in my 
memory and has deeply traumatised me. The relatives’ existence was just ignored by being 
left to remain standing outside in the dark and cold hall of the Alien’s Bureau. The 
relatives were “abandoned to informal existence” (Davies et al., 2017, p. 1271) by 
experiencing disdain and ultimate dehumanization. They did not count for the authorities 
by also being denied any provision, support and information, although as Delano et al. note 
that the relatives of the dead and missing border crossers count as victims of torture 
 Délano et al., 2016, p. 532) by also being eligible for re-habilitation, damages (ibid., p. 
520). 
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Almost five years after the shipwreck of 2012, the relatives of the dead border crossers 
were experiencing the same abandonment to informal existences and dehumanisation, 
(mis)treatment, humiliation and institutional violence by the local authorities, by being 
“left to suffer in agonizing circumstances that are normalised through the law” (Gilbert & 
Ponder, 2014, p. 407) and/or through the deliberate inaction and violation of the law. As 
Ellie denoted several times during her interview, 
The collaboration with the authorities is very difficult. Often, the relatives who will contact 
the authorities on their own will be ignored and send away. If the relatives will not be able 
to identify the dead from the existing evidences [photos, clothes, other personal belongings] 
they will be ignored and send away by the authorities. They will not be explained that they 
must complete a “missing person’s declaration”, that they must give a DNA sample, that all 
the Greek authorities must be informed and some supplementary information must be given 
on the temporal period of death. They [the authorities] will send them away without 
showing them enough evidences [during the process of identification]. Or they will do it in 
a rush manner. They are indifferent. 
In most of the cases identification was not successful due to the lack of evidence, the 
decomposition of the bodies or the remains recovered as well as the expensive and time-
consuming processes in finding and bringing the relatives for identification (Singleton et 
al., 2017, p. 7). The medical forensic examiner during the interview also told me that there 
is also a delay in the identification of the dead through the DNA samples who are sent via 
the Greek authorities to other countries. As the coroner noted,  
In countries like Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia where there is war and conflicts it is very 
hard to have a contact with the embassies there, in order for the DNA samples to be sent 
and thus to receive an answer. For this reason the identification procedures can be delayed 
or being impossible to take place in the first place. 
In this respect, border crossers are trapped in a state of stuckedness and waiting. Thus, 
death management as well, through thanatobureaucracy, generates temporal 
stuckedness, liminality, ambiguity, in-between-ness. In this perspective, stuckedness 
through abandonment plays again a crucial role in the management, discipline and 
regulation of the undesirable populations. It is a part of the temporal borders and border 
controls enforced through death and thanatobureaucracy in order to make people suffer 
even in death. This is a form of state violence.  
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7.1.2.2 Burials, Funeral, Rituals 
Due to the limited refrigerator facilities operating at the morgue the dead bodies cannot be 
stored for a long time (Kovras & Robins, 2017, p. 165; Singleton et al., 2017, p. 7). Often, 
when the relatives are traced and reach Lesvos they are arriving too late, when the burial 
has already taken place and the dead border crossers have been buried as “unidentified” or 
“unknown”. This is one of the most devastating, violent and harmful aspects concerning 
border related deaths; the people who are buried as “unidentified” as well as the people 
who are declared as “missing”. Due to the inconsistency, the long and slow 
thanatobureaucratic procedures, the policy vacuum surrounding the procedures (Section 
7.2.1.2) and the overall lack of information, the quest of tracing the truth for the destiny of 
border crossers on behalf of the relatives becomes agonizing but mainly impossible. 
Relatives are reaching the Greek islands by being informed or misinformed by the 
smugglers, who take advantage of the system’s gaps and inconsistency and make profit at 
the relatives’ expense. As Kovras and Robins argue, “Smugglers are usually the first to 
know about a shipwreck and to inform the families of those affected” (2017, p. 166). 
Misinformed or deceived relatives are wandering around, from island to island and from 
port police to port police station seeking for their loved ones within photos, clothes, shoes, 
personal belongings, marks on the skins, and tattoos. As De Le n emphasises, “Bare life 
has been reduced to shoes, shards of bone, and the ‘Unknown’” (2015, p. 29). This quest is 
psychologically and mentally violent and tortures the living, especially in case when 
relatives have managed to detect their dead relative but when they are doing so it is too 
late. Their loved ones are already buried as “unidentified” or “anonymous”. The lack of 
consistency of post-mortem data, other relevant information, a map and a record of where 
and who is in the graves within the cemetery prevent the relatives from even finding the 
grave, exhume and repatriate the dead body (Kovras & Robins, 2017; Mediterranean 
Missing Project, 2016). This situation inflicts even more necroharms (psychological, 
emotional and cultural). It also illustrates the “post-mortem precarisation” (Stefatos et al., 
2015, p. 14) of both the dead and the living. According to Anna an activist supporting 
shipwreck survivors and the relatives, 
The whole process causes a lot of suffering and discomfort, and there is a chance that the 
relatives who are not in Lesvos, might never be able to identify the body. Thus, the body 
will be buried as “unknown”. There are many problems and it is time-consuming to 
repatriate the dead bodies. It is too time-consuming and expensive. Sometimes the process 
is absurd. We had a case of a Syrian man who recently passed away and whose brother 
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came from an EU country to repatriate the body. Although, the man was an EU citizen and 
obtained documentations when he arrived on Lesvos Frontex destroyed his papers by 
doubting their originality. So, the man was detained inside Moria camp. If we have not had 
assisted him this person would not be able to do the process on his own. It is a crazy 
procedure. 
The funeral rituals and burial procedures implemented in Lesvos inflict multiple and 
multilayered forms of necroharms to the dead and the living. Due to the policy vacuum 
surrounding burials, the cemetery and the rituals (Mediterranean Missing Project, 2016, p. 
7) dignified burials for border crossers cannot be guaranteed. Until 2015, dead border 
crossers were buried within an old Christian Orthodox cemetery but, as the border related 
deaths started increasing, there was a lack of space inside the old cemetery (see Vignette). 
The new cemetery which is used until now is an allotment rented by the Municipality and 
managed by activists, and volunteers border crossers who also play the role of the imams. 
Both the cemetery and the imams are attributes not formally given, since the “new” 
cemetery is operating without any legal license and is temporal, whilst the imams are two 
volunteers border crossers who have become experts by experience in performing the 
religious rites and rituals. Due to ignorance and indifference on behalf of the authorities, 
the death rituals were not properly taking place. As Inam, one volunteer observes, 
I have started doing the religious rituals since March 2015, when I first came in Lesvos and 
after I heard about a fatal shipwreck. I went to the funeral for the first time as a visitor. The 
situation I encountered was that there was no any ritual from Islam applied, the people who 
were burying the dead were just taking the dead bodies from the hospital and were just 
throwing them inside a dip, and that was all. 
Tariq another volunteer in the cemetery told me, 
When funerals were taking place inside the old cemetery in Aghios Panteleimon, no one 
really knew what to do. We were praying for the dead, but we were not following the ritual 
protocol. According to the protocol we must clean the dead body first and put her/him 
inside a clean white bed sheet before burring. Most of the times, we used the same bed sheet 
from the hospital, which could be dirty with blood, and then Municipality’s workers were 
placing the dead inside the grave, and they were just throwing soil above them. 
The religious protocol and rituals which included cleaning and caring for the dead body 
before it is buried, the position of the body within the grave and the direction of the grave 
at a certain way (Kovras & Robins, 2017; Stefatos et al., 2015) were taking place 
inappropriately, in such extend, that was offensive, sacrilegious, inhumane and undignified 
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 De Le n, 2015, p. 69). Necroharms have also the attribute of being a form of post-mortem 
violence which, as De Le n emphasises, “is aimed at the victim’s spirit, soul or after-life” 
 De Le n, 2015, p. 70)  
7.1.2.3 Missing and Unidentified People 
The violence and harms of deliberate abandonment and inaction (Davies et al., 2017; 
Davies & Isakjee, 2015) expose the dead and the living to the state of the “living dead” and 
“social death”. This is vividly exemplified in the figure of the “missing person” and the 
absence of burial rituals. Border crossers, who are declared as missing and whose bodies 
are never recovered, are another devastating aspect and consequence of the thanatopolitical 
border regime. The case of missing and unidentified border crossers is a very indicative 
example of necroharms. Missing and unidentified border crossers are in a state of enduring 
liminality, ambiguity and temporal stuckedness as neither dead nor alive. They are 
condemned in a temporal stuckedness between life and death as living dead (Davies et al., 
2017; Davies & Isakjee, 2015). The missing and unidentified border crossers due to the 
fact that are not found, they cannot be buried, mourned and grieved as dead. The relatives 
are condemned living both with hope and abjection, which the absence-presence of the 
missing and unidentified generates. This temporal stuckedness of the absence- presence of 
missing and unidentified persons is reflected on Robert Hertz’s (1907) concept of the 
“unquiet dead”; a soul which can never rest and is condemned “forever impinging on the 
land of the living” (Taussig, 1992, p. 48). As Geoffrey Boyce argues, “Disappearance 
produces a condition of uncertainty and liminality- an undocumented individual subjected 
to an undocumented death- such that this death not only fails to count as a crime, but even 
to count as death” (2012, p. 77) 
Missing and unidentified people stuck indefinitely within a liminal threshold between life 
and death. They are captured in an enduring temporal stuckedness and marginalization by 
also trapping their relatives with them. Missing people cannot be grieved and buried, but 
they cannot also give relief to the living, who are condemned to a protracted waiting, 
hoping and questing of the traces of their loved ones (Laczko et al., 2017). In a sense, not 
only the dead but also the living are trapped into a protracted displacement. Missing 
people’s relatives also become “living dead” and experience “social death”. If one is not 
exactly dead, then the relatives cannot perform the death rituals and a dignified burial. 
Religious and cultural beliefs around risk, dirt, pollution, impurity and danger (Douglas, 
2003) are coming into the surface. The absence of rituals surrounding death symbolizes a 
danger and the disruption of order. According to Mary Douglas,  
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Danger lies in transitional states, simply because transition is neither one state nor the next, 
it is indefinable. The person who must pass from one to another is himself in danger and 
emanates danger to others. The danger is controlled by ritual which precisely separates him 
from his old status, segregates him for a time and then publicly declares his entry to his new 
status (2003, p. 2) 
The absence of rituals generates liminality, marginalisation to the whole community. 
According to Mary Douglas, “This ritual play on articulate and inarticulate forms is crucial 
to understanding pollution”. Inam a volunteer assisting with the death rituals on Lesvos 
during his interview spoke about pollution and danger in the form of “sin”. As he argued, 
the “sin” burdens the living, and at the same time shames and pollutes border crossers’ 
community. This is how powerful and important rituals are. According to Inam,  
It is a sin for us and not for the dead. It is a sin for us who are alive, and we are here. It is a 
sin for all the Muslims who know about another Muslim’s death and do not pray and do the 
rituals. Everyone living who is aware of the death must take the responsibility. But the dead 
person even if s/he is thrown to the sea or a mountain, is eaten by animals there is no sin on 
her/him. The responsibility and the sin is distributed to the living ones, to those who knew 
about the death and did not do a ritual. But if someone does this (the ritual), the sin eclipses 
from all. This is an obligation which must be taken by one person. If one person takes this 
responsibility, then the sin diminishes for all. If no one takes the responsibility, then all 
Muslims carry the sin. And when we say the whole Muslims then we mean the Muslims 
from the whole world.  
Consequently, the “rite of passage” from the world of the living to the world of the dead 
cannot be fulfilled and disorder is produced. Similarly, the rite of passage from mourning 
to closure cannot be fulfilled, and relatives are trapped in a protracted temporal 
stuckedness and “ambiguous loss”; an unresolved grief and loss that remains unclear 
 Boss, 2010; De Le n, 2015, p. 71; Mediterranean Missing Project, 2016). According to 
Pauline Boss, “ …) because the lost person is here, but not here, grief is frozen, life is put 
on hold, and people are traumatised. With no official verification of death, no possibility of 
closure, and no rituals for support, there is no resolution of grief” (2010, p. 137). This form 
of necroharms is paralysing and without an end  De Le n, 2015, p. 71; Délano et al., 2016, 
p. 518). The absence of the dead body condemns the relatives into a prolonged, eternal 
mourning, and a permanent state of limbo by preventing them to move on with their lives 
 Délano et al., 2016, p. 521; Mediterranean Missing Project, 2016, p. 6). “Families suffer 
from ambiguous loss: a traumatic loss that gives rise to symptoms of depression, anxiety, 
and family conflict. Ambiguous loss is the most stressful type of loss precisely because it is 
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unresolved” (Boss, 2010; Mediterranean Missing Project, 2016, p. 3). Ambiguous loss and 
unresolved grief only ends with the act of memorialisation through burial and religious 
rituals. As Inam denotes, “What we say is that this human thing [burial] is the least that 
should exist when one dies, even if one is a Muslim, Christian, Jewish. This person must 
be buried with the specific way that this person believes in. This is the minimum of the 
rights that one has; that is to be buried”.  
7.2 The Long Lists of Thanatopolitics: Recording, Counting and 
Memorialising Deaths 
The activist network UNITED (2017) has developed a long list of documented border 
crossers’ deaths from the early 1990’s until June 2017. Within this list dead border crossers 
are recorded by their name, age, country of origin and also the cause of their death. 
Similarly, UNITED has developed a live map recording the collateral casualties in deaths 
of people seeking safety within fortress Europe (themigrantsfiles & UNITED, n.d.). 
Attempts of counting border crossers deaths, border-related accidents and other tragic 
events en route to Europe have been attempted from various NGOs, activists networks and 
academics (Weber & Pickering, 2011, pp. 38–41). Advocates Abroad have been producing 
a Timeline of Tragedies in the Greek islands by documenting fatal events
6
. IOM has 
developed the Missing Migrants Project by recording the dead and the missing border 
crossers too. All these attempts demonstrate the need for “bringing the dead back into 
society”  Délano et al., 2016; Délano & Nienass, 2016a) by making deaths knowable, 
visible and recordable. Furthermore, these attempts highlight the issue of dignity (Squire, 
2017) and protection of the human rights of the dead as well as the acknowledgment of 
lives worth being grieved and mourned (Butler, 2004, 2009; Weber & Pickering, 2011, p. 
6). The acknowledgment of border crossers’ lives through the acknowledgment of their 
death is an active stance against dehumanisation and anonymisation through the process of 
rehumanisation (Squire, 2014). As Brian and Lacko argue, 
A further tragedy, and one that is even less acknowledged than the terrible loss of life, is 
the fact that many of the dead remain nameless. Each body that is unidentified or that is 
never even recovered, signifies a missing person for their family. Caught in limbo 
between grief and hope, families begin a search for knowledge of their loved one that can 
take years or a lifetime (2016, p. vii). 
                                                 
6
 At my disposal by the authors. 
 [202] 
 
At the same time, activists and scholars highlight that memorializing, recording and 
counting deaths is very important since it is linked with accountability, responsibility and 
culpability of those deaths. Counting border-related deaths spreads light of who bears 
responsibility for them  Délano & Nienass, 2016a; Tazzioli, 2015; Weber & Pickering, 
2011, pp. 36–41, 83). Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering argue that “people die because 
of the ways in which the borders between the Global North and the Global South are 
controlled. These deaths are often foreseeable and can occur by deliberate act of omission” 
(2011, p. 1). In this sense, border-related deaths are an outcome of the thanatopolitical 
governance of the unwanted human mobility; that is to say, “governing migration through 
death” and  biophysical) violence (Squire, 2017, p. 514). Thus, the data and numbers 
which are encompassed within “the hopelessly incomplete lists of dead or disappeared 
migrants”  Pérez, 2015 in Délano & Nienass, 2016b, p. xxii), which scholars and activists 
are producing, are the collateral casualties in human cost of the thanatopolitical border 
regime. From this angle, those lists are in practice the long lists of thanatopolitics. Those 
long lists of thanatopolitics and the agonizing struggles of activists in memorializing, 
recording and counting should not been seen, Miriam Ticktin (2016) urges us, as only acts 
of compassion. They should be seen instead as constant attempts of making visible the 
invisible and as reminders. In Ticktin’s words,  
activism that focuses on making bodies and unmarked graves visible to a wider audience 
function not to contain grief or to give it closure but rather to keep the dead in our world, to 
expand our frame of visibility. In this way, the specter of the dead, which increases in size 
each day, forces a reckoning with the larger political structures of violence and exclusion that 
have caused these deaths.  …) The idea is to render it impossible to escape these bodies—to 
have their images haunt us, acting as witnesses, and demanding justice (Ticktin, 2016, p. 
268). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that border-related deaths are not unforeseen, unpredictable 
and random accidents but on the contrary they are an outcome of the thanatopolitical 
border regime; a complex series of political decisions, deterrent enforcements, actions and 
inactions which aimed in governing unwanted human mobility through death, violence and 
abandonment (Davies et al., 2017; Squire, 2017). The governing of unwanted human 
mobility through violence and death has inflicted multiple layered and overlapping forms 
of harm, which as I argued they are distinguished between thanatoharms and necroharms. 
Thanatoharms are directly linked with the border practices and the thanatopolitical border 
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regime, which expose border crossers to ultimate death through abandonment, inaction and 
indifference (Davies et al., 2017, p. 1274). I distinguished three main types of 
thanatoharms; (i) abandonment and death through left-to-die practices; (ii) death from 
state’s in/actions or at the hands of the state; (iii) death through abandonment to the 
physical forces of desert and sea. I also argued that thanatoharms, through various 
processes enabled and enforced when dead bodies are washed ashore at the EU frontiers, 
are turned into necroharms. Necroharms include overlapping and layered forms of 
emotional, psychological and cultural harms which are inflicted via the death-related 
bureaucracy (thanatobureaucracy), the apathy, ignorance and inaction of the state to 
provide care and support to survivors and relatives, the undignified, dehumanising or non-
existent burials, memorialisation and rituals. Necroharms expose border crossers –the 
dead, the living and whole communities- into disposable lives and in a state of temporal 
stuckedness with the status of the living dead. 
In the next Chapter I will refer to the conclusions of this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 
 Conclusions 
 
In this thesis I have tried to shed light upon and answer four interrelated research 
questions: What are the forms of border harms and everyday violence border crossers 
experience at, within and beyond the borders? How border crossers’ experience everyday 
harm and violence on Lesvos? Why is not the everyday violence that border crossers 
experience more widely recognised and denounced by local and international 
observers/citizens/stakeholders? How violence and social harm border crossers experience 
render invisible?  
Having Lesvos Island as a case study I have attempted to respond to both research 
questions by focusing on the ongoing refugee crisis and the overwhelming coerced 
displacement of border crossers since World War II. I specifically focused on the “crisis” 
discourses, which were representing the increased influx of people to Europe, the suffering 
and deaths as a “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005), random, unpredictable events or 
accidents (Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b; Weber & Pickering, 2011). I argued 
that the state of emergency and exception discourses immobilised, oxymoronic interstate 
militarised and humanitarian enforcements towards the increased influx of people in 
Greece and Lesvos, at the external EU borders (Chapters 1 and 4). As I demonstrated, the 
state of emergency and exception were materialised through an overwhelming border, 
asylum and (thanato)bureaucratic regime which, instead of protecting border crossers, 
inflicted upon them more harm, suffering and (social) death.  
Throughout the whole thesis, the term refugee crisis has been challenged – notably because 
it is not exceptional, unforeseen or random, but on the contrary it is an outcome of a 
continuum of political decisions and enforced policies which are escalating, since the 1985 
Schengen Agreement (Vaughan-Williams, 2015b, pp. 17, 21). Additionally, as I have also 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, Greece has been an important entry point for 
unauthorised border crossers since the 1990s. Although the mainstream discourses of EU 
policy makers and the media tend to highlight the death of Alan Kurdi (in 2015 onwards) 
as the beginning of the so-called refugee crisis, the historical and sociopolitical background 
of Lesvos Island indicates multiple border crossings, violence and suffering in time and 
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space even before the 1990s (Chapter 3). Moreover, such mainstream discourses tend to 
represent as crisis and exceptional the degrading, humiliating, dehumanising, abject and 
appalling living conditions within the camps, in borderlands like Lesvos. However, as I 
have shown throughout this thesis the degrading and structurally violent living conditions, 
within which border crossers are exposed to additional forms of violence and harm, are not 
accidents produced by the refugee crisis. These are intentional systematic practices 
enforced since the 1990s in Greece in order to make border crossers’ lives unlivable and to 
deter them from staying or moving forward to Northern Europe. Therefore, throughout this 
thesis I have shown the continuum of institutional and structural violence (Scheper-Hughes 
& Bourgois, 2004) of the politics of deterrence and the border regime in time and space 
(Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Iliadou, 2019; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016; Triandafyllidou & 
Dimitriadi, 2014a; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b). Moreover, I have presented the systematic 
abuse of the crisis discourses and events on behalf of the EU policy makers (and the mass 
media) by constructing a “theatrical” border spectacle (Gillespie, 2018) full of violence, 
suffering, misery and death. The abuse of the crisis discourses and events served EU (and 
non-EU) policy makers in order to legitimise and enforce extreme, exceptional and 
emergency measures and deterrence policies at, within and beyond the borders, which as 
my research indicates, are violating human rights, liberties, the 1951 Convention, and are 
culpable for the social harm and deaths border crossers experience up to the present day. 
Additionally, the abuse of the crisis discourse served in blurring EU and non-EU states’ 
culpability, negligence, acts of commissions and omissions, and responsibility for the 
border related harms, violence, suffering and deaths (Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 
2015b; Weber & Pickering, 2011). In doing so, it distracted the attention from EU states’ 
practices, policies, decisions and crimes, to the “victimisation” of border crossers by the 
“criminal” trafficking/smuggling networks (Chapter 4 and 7). The monolithic border 
regime enforcements at, within and even beyond the external EU borders, are deliberately 
implemented in order to preemptively deter border crossers from arriving with the logic 
that border crossers are better protected by being deterred from taking the journey in the 
first place (Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 2014a, p. 149). Throughout this thesis I have 
critically examined the politics of deterrence and explored the harms it has inflicted upon 
border crossers in various phases of their long journeys. Below I address the literature gap, 
the key insights and findings of this thesis and the recommendations.  
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8.1 Key Insights and Findings 
In this section I will refer to the key insights and findings of my research. 
Firstly, a key insight I have stressed is that the politics of closed borders and deterrence, 
which were strengthened and proliferated as a response to the “refugee crisis”, has 
produced multiple forms of harms and violence to border crossers while en route and, also, 
within and beyond borders zones. In this respect, I argued that; i) borders function as 
“thresholds” or “zones of exception” and “liminality” (Agamben, 1998, 2005; see also De 
Le n, 2015; Doty, 2011; Mountz, 2011b). Inside border zones, lives are reduced to “bare 
lives” (Agamben, 1998), while the law is suspended by creating a “juridical void” which 
permits abuses and killings without punishment (Agamben, 1998; see also De Le n, 2015; 
Doty, 2011, p. 602). As my research findings indicate border crossers en route, and also 
within border zones can easily be exposed to bare life and experience physical harms and 
death; ii) borders and thresholds, as zones of exception, abandonment and liminality where 
law is suspended, are operating as moral alibi for the denial of any state responsibility for 
border-related deaths, violence and harms  De Le n, 2015; Doty, 2011). Within these 
zones of exception, physical harms and deaths become normalised (Squire, 2017); iii) 
without having any other option for safe passages to Europe (Jeandesboz & Pallister-
Wilkins, 2016, p. 316), border crossers are coerced to turn to the trafficking and smuggling 
networks and are thus being exposed to multiple and multilayered border harms, 
trafficking and violence. I have introduced here the concept of “coerced choices” in order 
to highlight the oxymoronic coexistence of agency, autonomy, extortion and coercion 
which formulate in some extend border crossers’ choices and I emphasised the role of 
various forms of debt in financing the unauthorised crossings  O’Connell Davidson, 2013). 
I have argued that in the absence of any alternative option of a safe passage (Jeandesboz & 
Pallister-Wilkins, 2016, p. 316; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2015), border crossers’ are 
coerced to choose between “the devil and the deep blue sea”. Through this lens, I 
documented dominant forms of harm and violence which are underdeveloped in the 
academic literature, notably the role of debt and extortion as a means for border crossers to 
finance their unauthorised border crossing  O’Connell Davidson, 2013). I distinguished 
three dominant as well as a less prevalent form forms of debt; “financial”, “labour” and 
“sexual” debt, and “organ” debt. As my research findings indicate, border crossers are 
extorted and coerced to transact labour, sexual or other financial services with their 
traffickers/smugglers, border guards and other intermediates in order to be allowed to 
travel to Europe. These are forms of border harms which are fostered, generated and 
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proliferated due to the politics of deterrence, closed borders and the EU border regime. 
Those harms are avoidable since trafficking/smuggling networks would not exist if there 
was no border regime and if there were safe passages which lead to Europe.  
Second, not only are border crossers confronted with multiple forms of militarised borders 
before they even reach Europe, but even when they reach Europe, as the Lesvos case 
shows, they are confronted with a Kafkaesque militarised, securitised, bureaucratised 
complex which regulates their everyday lives, and which is produced by the internalisation 
policies being enforced parallel to the externalisation (Hess & Kasparek, 2017; Iliadou, 
2017; Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016). The bureaucratic and asylum regime includes the 
reception, registration, identification and asylum procedures implemented after the EU 
border is crossed, upon arrival to Lesvos. One very important finding here is that the 
overwhelmingly slow, lengthy, inconsistent, confusing, chaotic bureaucratic procedures 
were mentally exhausting and exacerbated existing harms while inflicting new ones. A 
second important finding is that these procedures were intentionally designed to be chaotic, 
lengthy and inconsistent in order always to fail by inflicting harm, despair and enduring 
fear. Also, in order to generate the feeling of a dead end- process; meaning that entering 
the procedures would not necessarily mean exiting them. The procedures were, as I found, 
without a beginning, middle and end. Through this lens, I developed the idea of 
“bureaucratic deterrence”, which I defined as an intentional, well-designed policy of 
deterring by gradually, slowly and silently killing those who have sought international 
protection in Europe. I emphasised that the bureaucratic borders and bureaucratic 
deterrence were so harmful that deterred and indirectly coerced border crossers to 
withdraw their asylum claims, and either undertake alternative dangerous illicit migratory 
pathways to other European countries or “voluntarily” return to the countries of origin. An 
additional key insight that I stressed in respect to the bureaucratic deterrence is the 
conditions under which border crossers wait (Auyero, 2011; Hage, 2009a) in order to 
complete the bureaucratic procedures. As my research indicates, border crossers wait in 
appalling, degrading, humiliating and harmful reception and living conditions and, due to 
destitution, hyperprecarisation are coerced in doing unspeakable/harmful things in order to 
survive, including survival sex, unwanted pregnancies, forced marriages and smuggling 
(Chapters 5 and 6). Through the lens of deterrence and the dogma of “making their lives 
unlivable” (Fili, 2016), I found that border crossers are abandoned to structurally violent 
and life-threatening conditions inside Moria hotspot in order to be mentally and physically 
exhausted and deterred from staying or moving forward to Europe. Due to deprivation of 
their dignity and loss of hope I found border crossers acted on what I called as “despair” 
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harms. This type of harms is very common within detention centres and camps. The 
concept of despair harms, which I introduced and developed in Chapter 5/Section 5.5.4 
includes two forms of actions. (i) Hunger strikes and starvation, self-harms or suicide 
attempts, in which people engage as a form of resistance, pressure, reaction and protest. I 
name these actions despair harms because they are a form of a non-violent violence. They 
might be non-violent acts against others, but they can cause harm and even death directly 
to the persons who perform them, and (ii) Furthermore, despair harms also include violent 
actions like riots, causing damage and setting fires inside camps. These despair harms; (i) 
include both reactions of border crossers who are deprived of hope and dignity in Moria 
camp, by experiencing ultimate dehumanisation and degradation, and reactions against the 
state violence to which they have been repeatedly exposed (Chapter 5), including the 
violence of inaction and abandonment (Davies et al., 2017) for months and years in 
humiliating, degrading and appalling conditions. These kinds of despair harms have their 
logic in one of my interviewee’s words, “violence as a reaction to violence... violence 
against violence” (section 5.5.4). As contradictory as it may seem, despair harms are the 
ultimate form of resistance. Despair harms are a new type of harms I am developing in 
order to understand the range of harm and violence border crossers experience. 
Third, another key insight that I have stressed in this thesis is the role that time and waiting 
plays in the border crossing process. I have particularly focused on the existence of 
temporal borders and controls (Agier, 2013; Tazzioli, 2018) which encircle border 
crossers’ lives, and I have deployed the concept of “confinement beyond detention” 
(Mountz, 2011a; Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018) in order to understand the range of harm and 
violence border crossers experience in relation to time. As my research findings indicate 
there are multiple forms of confinement beyond detention and “the institutional borders of 
the camps” (Mountz, 2012; Tazzioli, 2017; Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018). As the Lesvos case 
shows, after the EU-Turkey Statement and the geographical restriction regime the island 
has been metamorphosed into a spatial and temporal confinement and limbo where instead 
of walls and iron bars there is the deep blue sea. The metaphor of Lesvos as the “Prison 
Island”, which border crossers use, is the ultimate manifestation of the spatial and temporal 
confinement beyond detention. This key insight is an important research finding and 
contribution to the academic research and literature which focuses on the temporality of 
migration controls and on under-recognised, under-researched aspects and consequences of 
confinement beyond the camps and hotspots (Andersson, 2014b, 2014a; Canning, 2017; 
Griffiths & Griffiths, 2016; Griffiths et al., 2013; Mountz, 2011b; Tazzioli, 2018; Tazzioli 
& Garelli, 2018; Turnbull, 2016). In this context, I documented and developed the 
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infliction of harm within the spatial and temporal confinement beyond detention, inside the 
Prison Island. I have demonstrated that harm is inflicted upon border crossers through the 
everyday practices of spatial and temporal controls, policing, law enforcement, discipline 
and violence by the Greek authorities, the police, the municipality and even the local 
community (Mountz, 2011b; Tazzioli, 2018; Tazzioli & Garelli, 2018). Another key 
insight I have also addressed in this thesis is the lived experience of time and waiting 
(Haas, 2017; Hasselberg, 2016; Khosravi, 2014, 2018b, 2018c, 2018a) beyond the hotspot 
and the camp, within Lesvos. My research findings indicate that time and waiting –
temporality- in the form of “stuckedness” is implicated with multilayered ways in the 
governance of migration and is a fundamental feature of the border regime (Mezzadra & 
Neilson, 2013; Tazzioli, 2018). This finding made me address the issue of the violence of 
time, stuckedness and waiting as a form of state violence (Iliadou, 2017, 2018). Time and 
waiting as state violence is hitherto under-recognised. From this angle, I approached time 
and waiting; (i) as a border technique and a mode of governing of the unauthorised border 
crossers (Andersson, 2014b; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013; Tazzioli, 2018) which is enforced 
as part of the politics of deterrence in order to make people suffer and endure until they are 
mentally and physically exhausted and deterred from staying or moving further to Northern 
Europe; (ii) as “stolen time” which is also embodied and existentially experienced through 
the form of existential inertia, immobility or limbo which spends and wastes border 
crossers’ lives and dreams and inflicts harms (Andersson, 2014b; Canning, 2017; Haas, 
2017; Iliadou, 2017, 2018; Jefferson et al., 2018; Khosravi, 2014, 2018c; Mountz, 2011b; 
Mountz et al., 2002). I introduced the concept of “the violence of stuckedness and waiting” 
(Iliadou, 2017, 2018) in order to define a more latent and stealthy form of state violence 
which is intentionally enforced upon border crossers, confining them into an existential 
inertia, immobility, spatial and temporal stuckedness inside and beyond the institutional 
walls of the camp.  
Fourth, a key insight that I have stressed in this thesis is the politics of governing unwanted 
human mobility through death and violence  De Le n, 2015; Doty, 2011; Squire, 2017; 
Vaughan-Williams, 2015b). As my research indicates EU policy makers - in order to 
prevent and deter border crossers reaching Europe - deploy the politics of death and 
violence as the Janus-face of deterrence. From this perspective, EU policy makers in order 
to deter border crossers to reach Europe through the militarisation and securitisation of 
borders create thresholds of liminality which allow or foster death via left-to-die practices, 
abandonment, inaction and indifference  De Le n, 2015; Doty, 2011; Jones, 2016; Squire, 
2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b). The logic here is that the more border crossers die en 
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route, then the more likely that the others will “get” the message and be deterred from 
undertaking the journey in the first place (Doty, 2011; Triandafyllidou & Dimitriadi, 
2014a). As I have shown in this thesis, policy makers call their policies “deterring” instead 
of “killing”  De Le n, 2015). Deterrence through death has inflicted multiple, multilayered 
and overlapping forms of harm. I developed two new interlinked types of harm which are 
also related with the concepts and processes of “thanatopolitics” and “necropolitics” 
(Agamben, 1998; Foucault, 2003; Mbembe, 2003). I have called these new types of harm 
as “thanatoharms” and “necroharms”. Thanatoharms are mainly linked with the 
thanatopolitical border regime and the growing governing of the unauthorised border 
crossings through exposure and abandonment to physical death. Necroharms are harms 
which are related to inaction, indifference, abandonment in a state of liminal existence and 
permanent injury by exposing border crossers to social death.  
Overall, my aim in this thesis has been to explore the extent to which border harms, 
everyday violence and border-related deaths are not unforeseen, unpredictable and random 
accidents but on the contrary they are an outcome of political decisions  De Le n, 2015; 
Squire, 2017; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b; Weber & Pickering, 2011). From this angle, 
throughout this thesis I have argued that “what it has become for me an intense lived 
experience and realisation through the passage of time for more than a decade on Lesvos is 
that for the obscene and apathetic technocrats-policy makers (in local and European level) 
the only border crossers who are welcome are the ones who never reach Europe” (Iliadou, 
2017). Through the case of Lesvos, I have explored the range of harm and violence and 
focused on the academic body of work which challenges the crisis discourses and EU 
states’ responses in the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis. I argue that this is not a 
crisis but the avoidable institutional violence of the thanatopolitical EU border regime. I 
have tried to show this through a detailed account of the history, genealogy, rituals and 
continuums of violence in time and space (Antonakaki et al., 2016; Hess & Kasparek, 
2017; Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016; Vaughan-Williams, 2015b) of; (i) the EU 
Border Regime (i.e. the politics of closed borders, deterrence, externalisation and 
internalisation); (ii) inconsistency, uncertainty and chaos of the bureaucratic and asylum 
regime (i.e. identification, registration, bureaucratic and asylum procedures) in Greece and 
Lesvos; (iii) the structural violence and harms due to the degrading, humiliating and 
appalling reception and living conditions within the hotspots and refugee camps; (iv) the 
thanatopolitical and necropolitical enforcements.  
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I have advanced my argument firstly, by bringing together Nancy Scheper-Hughes and 
Phillip Bourgois concept of “continuum of violence” or “violence continuum” (Scheper-
Hughes & Bourgois, 2004), and “everyday violence” (Scheper-Hughes, 1997). Drawing on 
these concepts I introduced the concept of “continuum of violence in time and space” 
(Chapter 3) in relation to refugee crisis, border related harms, structural violence and 
everyday violence border crossers experience in Lesvos. Through the lens of continuum of 
violence in time and space I argued that the multiple forms of violence, suffering, harm 
and death, border crossers experience en route, within or beyond the EU borders, are not 
new, post-refugee crisis phenomena. On the contrary, these are phenomena which have 
been unfolding and enforced as a continuum both in time (historical, past, present and 
future) and space over the last three decades. I thus focused on genealogies and 
continuities, rituals and routines, continuums of structural and institutional violence. 
Additionally, I have further developed my arguments in relation to the academic body of 
work which is concerned with spaces and experiences of incarceration beyond detention. 
In order to do so I have documented and analysed the range and multiple forms of violence 
and harms border crossers experience inside detention (Chapter 5 and 6). In Chapter 6, I 
developed the notion of confinement beyond detention (Mountz, 2011b; Tazzioli, 2017). 
This concept is deployed in the discipline of carceral geography (Moran, 2012a) which 
argues that “the carceral exists in unexpected places beyond the formal contours of 
detention or prison; carceral scholarship is increasingly identifying previously under-
recognised aspects and consequences of confinement, and innovative methodologies are 
uncovering under-researched elements of carceral experience” (Turner, 2018). The 
metaphor of Lesvos Island as the Prison Island - which border crosser interviewees 
introduced - is an indicative example of how the carceral exists beyond detention and 
prisons. In this sense, my thesis has developed the idea of carceral experience beyond 
detention, prisons and hotspots. Thus, it contributes to the cross-disciplinary dialogue 
concerned with spaces and experiences of incarceration and fills in a research gap between 
criminology and carceral geography. I do that also by emphasising throughout various 
chapters of my thesis on the harmful experience of time and waiting inside and beyond 
detention. My thesis focuses on time and space - aspects which are mainly investigated by 
(carceral) geographers - with the critical criminology and the social harm approach. In this 
way my thesis contributes to the understanding of harm and violence because; (i) it 
highlights the range of social harm due to time and waiting beyond the prison settings 
which as an aspect is under-researched in academic literature; (ii) it approaches 
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stuckedness, time and enduring waiting as a form of state violence which is intentionally 
inflicted upon border crossers.   
Methodologically this thesis has contributed to knowledge by deploying ethnography with 
aspects of auto-ethnography as a research method. Personal accounts in academic research 
of professionals and activists working inside detention centres are rare (Georgoulas & 
Sarantidis, 2012, 2013; Iliadou, 2012; Sarantidis, 2018b). I have used my personal past 
experiences and insights as a professional, activist and a resident on Lesvos Island in order 
to analyse and develop the core idea which traverses this thesis; that the continuum of 
violence and harms in time and space which the border crossers experience while seeking 
international protection in Europe are neither new phenomena nor accidents. They are 
instead the outcome of the continuum of political decisions since the 1985 Schengen 
Agreement onwards (Akkerman, 2018; Albahari, 2015a; Hess & Kasparek, 2017; 
Vaughan-Williams, 2015b). I have applied the Vignette technique which includes 
evocative past personal experiences regarding the phenomenon of unauthorised border 
crossing on Lesvos before the so-called refugee crisis, in order to highlight the continuum 
of violence in time and space. Vignettes are testimonies of over a decade witnessing of the 
multiple forms of border harms and their enduring long-term effects upon people lives.  
 
8.2 Recommendations 
 
In terms of recommendations which could be implemented and improve the everyday 
realities of border crossers have already being articulated by human rights organisations, 
activist movements and academics.  
 Open borders -Safe passages which lead to Europe. The demand for open borders 
and safe passages has been loudly articulated for several years from activist 
networks which have identified that the real problem is the closed border and the 
militarized, thanatopolitical Border Regime. If there were no borders or border 
regime, then border crossers, fleeing persecution, conflicts, civil wars and violence, 
would be able to safely reach Europe and seek for international protection. A safe 
passage approach would mean that the EU instead of treating the phenomenon of 
the unauthorised border crossing through the banner of security, criminality and 
illegality, would provide dignified alternatives towards a coerced displacement for 
which EU bears responsibility. As Akkerman notes, “This means, at the very least, 
that the EU should provide safe passage and good reception and shelter for forcibly 
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displaced persons. It would require a rejection of an approach that dehumanises 
migrants and encourages illegality. Most of all, it would require a focus by the EU 
on truly eliminating the reasons people are forced to flee, instead of feeding and 
enlarging them” (Akkerman, 2018, p. 89) 
 The criminalisation of solidarity should be abolished. The EU border regime and 
the authorities of the EU member states should stop criminalizing solidarity by 
punishing, harassing and stigmatizing as smugglers/traffickers volunteers, activists, 
NGOs and solidarity groups, who advocate and/or are involved in search and 
rescue operations. The criminalisation of solidarity fosters the conditions for further 
exploitation, violence and harm since border crossers in lack of any other option are 
coerced to address to the smuggling and trafficking networks. 
 EU should stop making financial and political deals and collaborations with 
authoritarian countries like Turkey, Libya, Niger and Chad in exchange of their 
commitment to prevent border crossers from entering to Europe. EU policy makers 
should take responsibility for their political decisions and the involvement of many 
EU member states’ in wars which have ultimately produced forcibly displaced 
populations.  
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